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Switzerland could well have the most peculiar naturalisation system in the world. 
Whereas in most countries citizenship attribution is regulated by the central state, 
each municipality of Switzerland has the right to decide who can become a national 
citizen. By transcending formal citizenship models, the Swiss case thus casts 
citizenship politics in an entirely new light. This book explores naturalisation 
processes from a comparative perspective, explaining why some Swiss municipalities 
pursue more restrictive citizenship policies than others. Through quantitative and 
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1 Politics of Citizenship
On 13 March 2000, the following headline appeared in The New York
Times: ‘A Swiss Town Votes to Reject Dozens of Would-Be Citizens’.
What followed in the article must have sounded very odd to the non-
Swiss reader:
Provided with information about an applicant’s salary, tax status,
background and hobbies, voters in an industrial suburb of Lu-
cerne decided that only four families, all of Italian origin, were
suitable to become Swiss – 8 individuals out of a total of 56.
The rest, many from the former Yugoslavia, were voted down,
most by considerable margins (Olson 2000).
Indeed, the way one gets a passport in Switzerland is very different
from the procedures in other countries. To our knowledge, Switzerland
is the only nation-state in the world where naturalisations happen at
the local level. Every municipality, be it a town of 100,000 or a village
of 400 inhabitants, is accorded the right to decide who can become a
Swiss citizen. As the regulations on the national and cantonal (sub-na-
tional) levels are very sparse, each political local entity decides accord-
ing to which formal procedure and criteria its alien residents are natur-
alised. ‘Popular votes’ are only one possible form of decision-making
procedure – but the most controversial one, leading time and again to
violent political debates and to a great deal of astonishment beyond
Swiss borders. Given the high degree of autonomy possessed by muni-
cipalities in this policy field, the naturalisation procedures, the applied
criteria and, consequently, the ratio of rejected candidates vary greatly
from one municipality to another.
The main goal of this study is to explore these municipal naturalisa-
tion procedures and to demonstrate that local political struggles lead-
ing to specific national self-understandings explain why some munici-
palities pursue a more restrictive naturalisation policy than others. Be-
fore we lay out our arguments in more detail, however, this first
chapter will present the peculiarities of municipal naturalisation proce-
dures in Switzerland and raise the question of how the case of Switzer-
land’s local naturalisations enables us to make a more general contri-
bution to the study of citizenship and nationalism. The fact that differ-
ent citizenship policies are pursued within a country suggests that
these policies cannot simply be explained by national citizenship mod-
els. Rather, we must explore the practice of citizenship politics, i.e. how
these models are applied and how this implementation depends on lo-
cal political constellations. By adopting such an approach, we are in
the position to go beyond existing explanation schemes and to account
for the contentious and political nature of citizenship politics – show-
ing how local politicians imagine their nation, how they struggle over
their individual perceptions of Swiss citizenship and how a dominant
understanding of citizenship emerges within a municipality.
1.1 What is to be explored?
A Swiss is not only a citizen of his or her country, but also of a canton
(sub-national state) and of a municipality. Nowadays, due to increased
mobility, most Swiss are no longer citizens of the municipalities where
they live but of a municipality from which their families originate. It
also happens (rather rarely) that Swiss citizens apply for local citizen-
ship in their new home-municipality. The singularity of local citizen-
ship is partly a relic of former times when each town and village was
responsible for taking care of its poor and when only citizens (and not
the inhabitants) of a municipality were allowed to participate in local
politics. Already in 1551, the Diet1 of the Swiss Confederation required
that every municipality nourish and lodge its poor (Simon-Muscheid
2002: 508-509).It was therefore in the interest of every municipality to
control access to local citizenship and to send beggars and other people
in need back to their home-municipalities (Kleger & D’Amato 1995:
260; Gruner 1968: 29-31).
The way political rights were attributed at the local level changed
when the modern Swiss federal state was founded in 1848. The first
constitution held that each Swiss who moves to a new canton is ac-
corded full civic rights after two years of residence. From 1874 on, all
Swiss obtained local and cantonal political rights after three months of
residence in a new canton (Aargast 2004: 53, 2007: ch.4). Nowadays, a
Swiss immediately profits from the political rights of his or her new
home-municipality. In other words, the ‘municipality of citizens’ ceded
political competencies and other responsibilities to the ‘municipality of
inhabitants’. As for the question of poor relief, in most cantons the si-
tuation changed only in the second half of the 20th century. In the
aftermath of the First World War, it was more and more common that
local authorities also took care of Swiss who were living in, but were
not citizens of, their municipalities. Only in 1975, however, did the
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Swiss Confederation obligate municipalities to support all Swiss who
are in need and live on their territories (Argast 2004: 54). Today, the
federal constitution stipulates that the cantons are responsible in the
domain of poor relief (Cattacin & Tattini 2002: 826). While some can-
tons are exclusively responsible in this policy field, many cantons dele-
gate the financing and organisation of benefit payments and poor relief
of local residents to their municipalities.
From the foundation of the modern Swiss state in 1848 until 1874,
the federal state had no competences for establishing citizenship regu-
lations. The federal constitution specified only that citizens of a canton
who were at the same time citizens of a municipality were also citizens
of the Swiss federal state (Steiner 2004a: 15-16). Since 1876, Swiss citi-
zenship is regulated at the federal, cantonal and local levels. The Swiss
Confederation regulates the granting of citizenship through descent,
marriage, and adoption and enacts minimal regulations on naturalisa-
tions of foreigners that can be amended by the cantons and the muni-
cipalities.2 The cantons have the competences to regulate the naturali-
sation procedures at the local level, but, in fact, hardly interfere with lo-
cal naturalisation politics.3 The ordinary naturalisation of alien
residents is thus to a very large extent the responsibility of the munici-
palities.
What does the naturalisation procedure look like in Switzerland?4
The sequence of decision-making with regard to naturalisations be-
tween the three political levels differs from canton to canton. However,
in each case the procedure on the local level constitutes the crucial part
of the process. Whereas the decisions of the Confederation and the
cantons constitute rather formal and administrative procedures on the
basis of very few but clearly specified criteria that are checked either
before or after decisions are taken at the local level, the municipalities
make mainly political decisions. The federal law on citizenship merely
stipulates that only those foreign residents can be naturalised who have
lived in Switzerland for at least twelve years, respect the legal order, do
not compromise the interior or exterior safety of the country and are
integrated and familiar with the Swiss habits and customs. The first
three criteria are quite clear, easy to verify and are always checked by
the federal administration. As for the questions of integration and fa-
miliarity, not only do they constitute vague requirements, but they also
are judged exclusively by local actors. Which local actors are involved
in the decision-making processes? The local administration is in most
cases in contact with the applicants during the entire naturalisation
procedure. They inform them about the formal aspects of the process
and check whether certain criteria for naturalisation are fulfilled. Often
they also discuss with candidates whether they have any chance of get-
ting a Swiss passport and make recommendations to political bodies
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involved in the process. In almost all municipalities a naturalisation
commission composed of local politicians discusses in detail the dos-
siers and makes recommendations to those who make the final deci-
sions. Sometimes dossiers are circulated several times between the var-
ious collective bodies involved in the decision-making processes. It
might also happen that the local parliament or the executive body
makes recommendations before the final decisions are made. Final de-
cisions are made in some municipalities by the entire population,
either by ballot or during a municipal assembly. In other municipali-
ties, it is the local parliament or the executive body which decides who
can become a Swiss citizen. It appears that various actors are involved
in municipal naturalisations and that the evaluation of the candidates’
dossiers occurs at different stages. Naturalisations can therefore be
compared to decision-making processes in other political fields where
political actors have to come to an agreement as to which policy has to
be pursued.
The candidates often have to pass a kind of exam or interrogation to
verify that they are familiar enough with the Swiss political system,
Swiss history and the language of the particular region. The local ad-
ministration and decision makers decide whether and to what extent
candidates have to pass such tests or interrogations. The criteria can
therefore differ among municipalities even within the same canton.
Formal regulations at the local level are rare and when they exist the
criteria that have to be fulfilled are formulated in a very general way.
Decisions depend therefore even more on the interpretations of muni-
cipal politicians or the opinions of the local population.
There exists a wide range of different naturalisation policies, from
very generous to very restrictive. In some municipalities, a complete in-
tegration of the naturalisation candidates is presumed after twelve
years of residence in Switzerland. In other municipalities, applicants
have to prove their degree of integration by passing tests or by showing
how well they are acquainted with the Swiss citizens of their munici-
pality. However, it would be too simplistic to range the municipalities
exclusively along such a scale, since naturalisation procedures also dif-
fer with regard to the issues that mould the respective debates. In
some cases, the question of whether applicants can be naturalised who
are benefiting from social security or disability insurance is at the cen-
tre of debates. In still other municipalities, language ability constitutes
the crucial element of the contest. Switzerland has four national lan-
guages: German (spoken by 64 per cent of all Swiss), French (19 per
cent), Italian (8 per cent) and Rumantsch Grischun (0.6 per cent). The
language used by all Swiss Germans in their daily (and also profes-
sional) life is Swiss German, a strong dialect very different from the
High German that is spoken in Germany and used in written German.
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All Swiss-Germans, however, also speak High German. This particular-
ity adds to the complexity of naturalisation, since in some municipali-
ties it is a controversial issue whether candidates have to speak Swiss
German or High German.
In the last few years, after discriminatory decisions were made, the
Swiss system of naturalisation has aroused a great many political and
judicial debates, especially when candidates from the former Yugosla-
via have been refused Swiss citizenship in municipalities where the po-
pulation has decided on applications by closed ballot. Opponents of
this system criticise the arbitrariness of the municipal decision-making
processes because they expose the candidates to the attitudes of the lo-
cal population and politicians. They demand that procedures be stan-
dardised and decisions be made exclusively by the local administration
or by the executive body and no longer by the population. In July 2003,
the Swiss Federal Court rendered a verdict according to which popular
votes by ballot on naturalisation requests violate the Swiss Constitu-
tion. In May 2004, it further declared that decisions during municipal
assemblies have to be made by open ballot. Since the Swiss Federal
Court regards naturalisations as purely administrative procedures, it
has declared that justifications for the decisions, and possibilities for
appeals against such decisions on this subject, must be made available.
These two rights, according to the Swiss Federal Court, are not guaran-
teed by the system of votes by ballot.
Advocates of the existing system object that these verdicts violate the
autonomy of the municipalities and the democratic rights of the Swiss
citizens. They claim that the population of each municipality should
have the right to decide according to which procedures and criteria for-
eigners are naturalised. Since the verdicts of the Federal Court, munici-
palities where the population had decided naturalisation status by
closed ballot have abolished or suspended this procedure. It is, how-
ever, unclear whether popular votes remain prohibited or whether they
will be reintroduced in the near future. In the canton of Schwyz, a pop-
ular referendum has been accepted in 2005 according to which the sys-
tem of popular votes can be reintroduced. At the national level, popular
and parliamentary initiatives demand that each municipality can decide
according to which procedure alien citizens are naturalised.
A more general debate is also being carried on about whether it is
too difficult and arduous to get a Swiss passport and about whether
naturalisations should be facilitated. Proponents of a more liberal citi-
zenship policy argue that the naturalisation procedures at three levels
are too complicated and time-consuming and that requirements for
naturalisation exceed those of other countries. Indeed, different studies
have come to the conclusion that Switzerland, like Germany, constitu-
tes an example of ethnic citizenship politics and pursues one of the
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most restrictive naturalisation policies in Western Europe (Koopmans
et al. 2005; Giugni & Passy 2006; Steiner & Wicker 2000). This might
partially explain why Switzerland has a very low naturalisation rate. In
the last ten years, on average, only 1.9 per cent of the foreign popula-
tion has obtained the Swiss citizenship. In Germany, a similar percen-
tage of foreigners have been naturalised, while in Italy, Portugal and
Spain, the naturalisation rate has been even lower in the same time
period. In most other European countries, however, between 3 per cent
and 6 per cent of the alien residents have been naturalised. The aver-
age naturalisation rate amounts to 7.8 per cent in Sweden and 8.1 per
cent in the Netherlands (SOPEMI 2006: 290).
One naturalisation criterion that stands out is the fact that one can
apply for Swiss citizenship only after twelve years of residence in this
country. Aside from Austria and Italy, where potential candidates have
to wait for ten years, most Western European countries require only be-
tween three and seven years (Weil 2002: 7). Even in Germany, known
for its restrictive citizenship policy, alien residents nowadays can get a
German passport after only eight years. Opponents of the existing sys-
tem make the further criticism that, besides Austria and Luxembourg,
Switzerland is the only country in Western Europe where no facilitat-
ing dispositions for immigrants of the second generation exist (see
Weil 2002: 6). Only some cantons facilitate the acquisition of the
Swiss citizenship for young foreigners. Since 1980, three attempts to
facilitate the naturalisation of the second and third generations at the
national level have been rejected by the Swiss population. The main
political actor who mobilises against facilitated naturalisation is the
Swiss People’s Party (SVP), one of the major political forces in Switzer-
land. Members and supporters of this populist right-wing party fear
mass-naturalisations, warn of the depreciation of the Swiss citizenship
and argue that people who have grown up in this country are not ne-
cessarily assimilated enough to become Swiss.
These arguments are in line with the party’s more general demands
for a limitation of both naturalisations and immigration. In particular,
the growing immigration from the countries of the former Yugoslavia,
which started in the 1980s, has time and again provoked violent de-
bates about the capacity to integrate those people into Switzerland.
Nowadays, alien residents who have emigrated from the countries of
the former Yugoslavia make up over 25 per cent of all foreigners living
in Switzerland and outnumber even Italian residents (20 per cent),
who constituted the major immigration group in the 1950s and 1960s
(BFS 2005: 16-17). This new pattern of emigration also has had an im-
pact on the naturalisation rates: whereas until the first half of the
1990s most candidates for naturalisation came from EU countries,
from the second half of the 1990s onwards more and more people
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from the Balkans have applied for Swiss citizenship (see Piguet &
Wanner 2000: 31). In 2004, for example, almost 40 per cent of all nat-
uralised candidates emigrated from a country of the former Yugoslavia
(BFS 2005: 41).
1.2 Why explore local naturalisation politics?
When comparing naturalisations in Switzerland with citizenship regu-
lations in other countries, one quickly realises that a full understanding
of the Swiss system can only be gained by taking a look at the local le-
vel, where the most important decisions are made. Only by going to
the municipalities can we explore which are the relevant criteria for
naturalisation and to what extent the practising of citizenship is com-
mensurate with the general picture of a restrictive Swiss naturalisation
policy.
While our study seeks to render the quite awkward naturalisation
procedures more comprehensible, it also intends to make a more gen-
eral contribution to current academic discussions. Switzerland and its
highly decentralised citizenship politics constitute a unique case, but
this does not suggest that inferences from the findings of this case are
not possible. On the contrary, it should be considered as a unique re-
search opportunity, allowing us to discuss citizenship and nationalism
from new perspectives. Taking a closer look at naturalisation processes
is revealing in that it enables us to go beyond formal regulations and
citizenship laws and shows us how national citizenship models are in-
terpreted and put into practice. Indeed, naturalisation is the crucial
moment when it becomes clear how citizenship of a nation-state
works, for it is at this moment that a nation-state decides whether a
candidate might become a member of its community. Such a moment
can show us a lot about the dominant national self-understanding and
about which aspects of citizenship really matter. Going local also allows
us to go beyond classic works on citizenship or nationalism, which of-
ten adopt macro-sociological and historical approaches. Investigating
the application of citizenship laws in the clearly delimited field of
Swiss municipalities and talking to local decision makers enables us to
explore how ordinary citizens think about citizenship: how do they see
the candidates for naturalisation, how do they conceive of their nation
and which criteria do they consider as crucial for becoming a member
of their community?
Studying naturalisations in Switzerland further permits us to abolish
the idea of homogeneous nation-states and to demonstrate that citizen-
ship can take different forms and meanings within a nation-state, not
only over time but also over space. Diverging applications of citizen-
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ship laws and understandings of nationhood are not found only in
Switzerland. In fact, naturalisation politics in many nation-states, as is
the case in many policy fields, are decentralised to a certain extent. In
federal states such as Switzerland, its constitutive units often imple-
ment federal laws. As many studies have shown, such a situation leads
to a variety of applications even if the federal state precisely stipulates
how the law has to be executed (see Perret et al. 2007; Kissling-Na¨f &
Wa¨lti 1999).5
With regard to the implementation of naturalisation laws, the one
case that probably comes closest to the Swiss system is Germany,
where the citizenship law is regulated at the national level but executed
by the La¨nder (sub-national states) (see Hagedorn 2001a,b; Ludvig
2004; Dornis 1999, 2001; Bultmann 1999). The La¨nder are accorded
the competence to organise the naturalisation procedure and to decide
who fulfils the criteria for being naturalised and who does not. A cru-
cial difference between the two countries is, however, that in Germany
an administrative body decides on applications. This does not foreclose
the possibility that different standards may be applied: various studies
have shown that naturalisation rates and citizenship politics differ sig-
nificantly between the La¨nder (Hagedorn 2001a,b; Dornis 1999, 2001).
A case in point is the granting of dual citizenship only as an exception.
According to the federal law, naturalised Germans have to give up their
old nationality. Exceptions can only be made when the former home
country does not allow naturalisation of their citizens in another coun-
try. Nonetheless, the acceptance of dual citizenship varies a lot between
the La¨nder – in 1995, for example, between 9 per cent and 80 per cent
(Hagedorn 2001a: 109-110). This is just one example of how the federal
citizenship laws are applied differently. Moreover, various studies have
shown that the ethnic citizenship model that completely denies the
possibility of identifying oneself with two nation-states is not the pre-
conception of every regional decision maker.
The varying applications of federal citizenship laws in Germany are
often explained by the political orientation of the regional governments
and the attitudes of the authorities that are involved in the decision-
making process. Hagedorn (2001a,b), for example, observed changes
in naturalisation policies when the political majority of a Land switched
from right to left or vice versa. More interestingly, she has shown that
the number of naturalised foreigners depends on the attitudes of the
representatives of the regional administrations (see also Bultmann
1999: 196-202). Thra¨nhardt (1999) has even revealed that in one Land
differences exist at the local level between different naturalisation of-
fices, depending on the resources of the competent authorities and
how they control the documents of the applicants. Dornis (2001: 76-
85) explored how language tests and the verification of the candidates’
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documents varies among the La¨nder and also discovered that indivi-
dual officers regularly encourage applicants to withdraw their applica-
tion if the officers have the impression that they have little chance of
being naturalised. Hagedorn (2001a: 40) reports that it sometimes
happens that the authorities protract the procedures on purpose when
they consider the regulations too generous for certain candidates.
In other countries, divergent practices of citizenship can be ob-
served, too. Cinar and Waldrauch (2006) present diverging implemen-
tation policies and integration requirements at the regional level in
Austria. North (1985, 1987) examined the administrative structure of
the American naturalisation programme and came to the conclusion
that the formal procedures and the approaches of the examiners vary a
great deal among district offices. There are differences with regard to
how language tests are evaluated and how and when people are per-
suaded to withdraw their dossiers when they seem not to be qualified
for naturalisation. He has demonstrated that rejection rates vary be-
tween zero and 11.5 per cent (North 1985: 38-39). Differing implemen-
tations of the naturalisation laws can even be observed in highly centra-
lised states such as France. Weil (2004: 377-387) observed applications
that clearly contradict the idea of a voluntaristic citizenship model with
which France is often associated. In some regional offices, candidates
are even manifestly dissuaded from applying for French citizenship.
While Costa-Lascoux (1996: 149) reports that the assimilation of candi-
dates is tested very differently from one regional office to the other, Ha-
gedorn (2001a: 43-44) found that candidates are often refused for lack
of assimilation. Since the degree of assimilation is exclusively judged
by regional officers, arbitrary decisions cannot be excluded (see also
Fulchiron 1996).
All of these studies partly explain differences in naturalisation poli-
tics by the different attitudes of the regional authorities towards the
question of who has the right to become a citizen of their country. Var-
iations in the national self-understanding can be observed not only in
the context of naturalisations but also, more generally, when we ana-
lyse local integration politics and how municipalities manage ethnic di-
versity (e.g. Ireland 1994). It is often argued that cities have always
been more confronted by problems related to migration than nation-
states are,6 and thus constitute more interesting cases to analyse (Ro-
gers & Tillie 2001; Rogers 2000; Penninx et al. 2004b; Favell 2001;
Borkert & Caponio 2008). In those studies, it is argued that the local
political structures shape the ways migrants are integrated. Although
an influence of the national citizenship regime on local politics can
sometimes be detected (e.g. Garbaye 2004), various empirical studies
have demonstrated that forms of local integration and citizenship poli-
cies cannot be explained (at least not exclusively) by their embedment
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in a national system. The essays collected in Penninx et al. (2004a)
and Borkert and Caponio (2008) demonstrate that in various countries
local politics towards immigrants varies a lot and that this heterogene-
ity is mainly attributable to differences between local political systems
and prevailing citizenship paradigms. Ireland (1994), Koopmans
(2004) and Bousetta (1997) demonstrate that local integration regimes
and citizenship frameworks have an impact on the way, and on the de-
gree to which, immigrants participate in political debates. Garbaye
(2000) has explored how two cities in France and Great Britain man-
age ethnic diversity and identifies three elements that explain the dif-
ferent approaches: the relations between central and local govern-
ments, the organisation of political party systems and the organisation
of local government. It is particularly interesting to observe that even
in a country such as France, cities make differential use of their exist-
ing discretionary power to integrate foreigners (Moore 2001, 2004).
Revealing heterogeneous implementations of naturalisation laws and
the variation of citizenship paradigms at the local level in other coun-
tries makes the case of Switzerland appear much less exceptional. Our
project can therefore be incorporated into a wider study field of local ci-
tizenship and integration politics. In contrast to other studies that have
concentrated their focus on large cities, mainly due to the fact that
these political units are confronted with a relatively high percentage of
immigrants or alien residents (see Alexander 2004: 60), our study ex-
plores relatively small local units. This is mainly due to the fact that
the average number of inhabitants in a Swiss city is much lower than
that in a city in the other countries. On average, a Swiss municipality
has 2,100 inhabitants.7 Fifty per cent of the roughly 2,800 municipali-
ties in Switzerland have fewer than 1,000 inhabitants and there are
only five towns with more than 100,000 inhabitants. Despite their
small size, Swiss municipalities constitute pertinent cases for the study
of naturalisation processes, as they have a relatively high ratio of for-
eign residents. In this regard, too, Switzerland constitutes an excep-
tional case. Whereas in most European countries between 2 per cent
and 9 per cent of the population are non-citizen residents, Switzerland
counts a foreign population of almost 20 per cent.8 Such a high per-
centage of foreigners can also be observed in relatively small towns
and villages.9
Small municipalities not only have a high percentage of foreigners
and thus have to deal like bigger towns with a lot of naturalisation re-
quests, they also display a very distinct political system, making the
study of local politics highly relevant. The distribution of competences
with regard to naturalisations, for instance, reflects Swiss federalism,
which attributes sovereignty to both the cantons and the municipalities
(Kriesi 1998a: 50-89). The degree of local autonomy varies from canton
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to canton, but is everywhere very high compared to other countries.
Municipalities not only implement federal and cantonal laws, they also
autonomously organise themselves, raise their own taxes and adminis-
ter the municipal assets. Swiss municipalities enjoy a great many re-
sponsibilities and even enact laws in the following domains: primary
education, culture, sports, environmental protection, poor relief, police,
construction of roads, church and naturalisation (Ladner 1991: 40;
Kriesi 1998a: 68).10 Each municipality has its own administration and
executive body (local government), which is composed of elected local
politicians and is, aside from the sovereign, the most powerful local po-
litical body. The mayor, as one member of the local government, has a
particularly powerful position, as he or she is directly elected for this
office. The mayor presides over the executive body and, in some can-
tons, holds specific responsibilities in certain policy areas (Geser 2002:
448-449). In small municipalities, the legislative body consists of all lo-
cal Swiss citizens, while in larger municipalities, local parliaments are
elected. Unsurprisingly, in a country with such a distinct system of di-
rect democracy, decisions that are not made by the local parliament or
during a local assembly are made by ballot by the local population. At
the local level, commissions are also important political bodies, which
are composed of local politicians or local citizens that are appointed in
various policy domains to assume the functions of supervision and
consultation. Naturalisation commissions, for example, discuss applica-
tions for Swiss citizenship and make recommendations to the political
body that makes the final decisions.
Given the distinct political structures at the local level it is hardly as-
tonishing that municipalities can also be distinguished by their party
systems. Most municipalities have their own sections of cantonal and
national parties. Parties or political associations also exist that are not
politically integrated beyond the local boundaries. However, the four
major political parties in Switzerland are also the most important poli-
tical forces at the local level. Of all local sections, over 80 per cent be-
long to the Liberal Party (FDP), the Social Democrats (SP), the Chris-
tian Democrats (CVP) and the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) (Ladner
1991: 133). Of course, local sections are not as well organised as the
cantonal or national parties. Particularly in small municipalities, how-
ever, their influence is rather strong, as they often are the only politi-
cally active, collective actors, and they also assume important social
functions. Even very small local unities with fewer than 2,000 inhabi-
tants have more than one political party (Geser 2002: 438). Given Swit-
zerland’s distinct federalism, cantonal and municipal sections of a
party are for the most part independently organised and sometimes dif-
fer in their political orientation (Ladner 1991: 120-121). As a conse-
quence, local sections might pursue a citizenship policy that is not in
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complete accordance with the positions of their national party or with
those of other local sections.
1.3 Culture and power: how to explain local naturalisation
politics
Given the large autonomy of municipalities, the distinct local political
system and the relatively high ratio of foreigners, we can conclude that
naturalisation politics can become a central political issue even in
small municipalities. We have seen that naturalisations constitute a
very timely topic in Switzerland and a unique research opportunity for
studying the practice of citizenship, the way ordinary citizens conceive
of citizenship and the variation of citizenship politics within a nation-
state. Hence, it is all the more astonishing that this topic has been so
inadequately studied. The political debates on legal norms have been
accompanied by judicial studies treating the question of the constitu-
tionality of local naturalisation procedures (Auer & Arx 2000; Thu¨rer
& Frei 2004).11 At the same time, ethnographic studies have gone be-
yond the legal aspects of citizenship and demonstrated, among other
things, the complexity of local citizenship politics by means of single
case studies (Arend 1991; Centlivres 1990; Centlivres et al. 1991; Stei-
ner & Wicker 2000, 2004; Achermann & Gass 2003). Especially the
works collected in Steiner and Wicker (2004) and the case study of the
town of Basel in Achermann and Gass (2003) deliver helpful insights
into the various aspects and moments of municipal naturalisations.
However, these studies do not provide, or only poorly develop, theoreti-
cal frameworks for a comparison of local procedures; they treat the
question of why some municipalities pursue a more restrictive policy
than others only at the margins, if at all. So far, Piguet and Wanner
(2000: 66-74) and Bolliger (2003) provide the only, even if explorative,
investigations that attempt to explain policy outcomes in citizenship
politics.
Our study seeks to explore local naturalisation politics more systema-
tically and takes the question of causality more seriously, in an effort to
explain why in some municipalities more candidates for naturalisation
are rejected than in others. We have seen that studies exploring diver-
gent regional and local immigration, integration and naturalisation pol-
itics explain differences in policy outcomes with differing conceptions
of citizenship. In a similar vein, we hold the conviction that the way
alien residents are naturalised depends on the prevailing national self-
understanding, which is, in turn, the outcome of political struggles. Ac-
cording to this view, it is ideologies and ideas about citizenship and na-
tionality that shape how issues related to immigrants are resolved. Bru-
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baker’s (1992) comparison of citizenship politics in Germany and
France is probably the most prominent study adopting this approach.
According to him, differences in citizenship politics and immigrants’
attitudes towards naturalisation are due to the fact that France repre-
sents a republican, expansive and assimilationist model of citizenship,
while Germany defines citizenry as a community of descent that is very
restrictive towards non-German immigrants. Similarly, Favell (1998)
explains the divergent responses to ethnic and racial groups in France
and Britain in terms of each nation’s public philosophy and political
tradition. According to him, it is France’s republican tradition that fa-
vours a policy of integration rather than accommodation and conse-
quently opposes separate Islamic institutions because this arrangement
would violate the state’s ideological commitment to integrating indivi-
dual outsiders into the French political culture. On the other hand, in
Britain, more emphasis is placed on allowing separate groups to retain
their distinctive identities. As a consequence, Islamic groups and the
development of independent Muslim communities are recognised
through public policy. Other scholars take the argument a step further
and contend that institutionalised conceptions of citizenship even
shape the collective action of immigrant groups trying to change public
policy (Ireland 1994; Koopmans et al. 2005; Giugni & Passy 2006).
To distinguish different forms of national consciousness, the distinc-
tion most commonly made regarding nations is between ‘civic-territor-
ial’ and ‘ethnic’ types of nationalism and citizenship, which are con-
ceived, respectively, as free associations of human beings and as fixed
and indelible organisms. While most researchers in this field nowadays
agree that these two types constitute ideal types, we will further argue
that they pose analytical problems, since they are normatively loaded
and seem to be mutually exclusive, whereas every nationalism is
shaped by both principles. Moreover, taking those categories too ser-
iously risks the danger of a culturalist approach, which implies homo-
geneous and static citizenship politics. While ideological accounts have
a high impact on how foreigners are naturalised, we must not forget
that conceptions of citizenship take different forms within a nation-
state and change over time. To account for these aspects we have to
bring to mind the contentious and political nature of citizenship: the out-
come of a specific naturalisation policy is the result of ongoing political
struggles over the questions of who we are and who belongs to us. To
understand those struggles, we first have to clarify what they are about.
As we will demonstrate in Chapter 2, naturalisation is about the sym-
bolic and emotional aspects of full membership in a nation-state. Dur-
ing the entire history of humankind, people have organised themselves
in cultural groups and excluded those who were not considered to be-
long to them. In this age of nationalism, in which societies are orga-
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nised in nation-states, this exclusion happens by means of national citi-
zenship. National citizenship is tightly linked to the ideas of popular
sovereignty, equality and self-determination. During naturalisation pro-
cedures, governmental actors struggle over the question of who be-
longs to the sovereign body, who profits from equal rights, who is al-
lowed to participate in the democratic processes and, simply, who be-
longs to ‘them’. This makes national citizenship a salient and
contentious closure mechanism.
Chapter 3 elaborates on these ideas and provides instruments to ana-
lytically grasp struggles among municipal politicians in the context of
local citizenship politics. Inspired by Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) so-
cial constructivism and Bourdieu’s (1977, 1990) idea of the ‘logic of
practice’, we will propose an empirical research programme concentrat-
ing on interaction processes and accounting for both the individual
perceptions and the larger social environment partially shaping the ac-
tors’ understandings of citizenship. We thereby follow Brubaker’s
(2004) plea for a more thorough constructivist approach in the study
of ethnicity and nationalism, seeking to circumvent both cliche´d con-
structivism and hidden essentialism. While we are highly inspired by
his cognitive approach, which proposes nationalist ways of thinking as
forms of classification, we will try at the same time to avoid the pitfalls
of methodological idealism. To understand nationalism and citizenship
politics, we not only have to demonstrate how people think about these
social phenomena, but also how a dominant view emerges within a
group and how these processes depend on material aspects and are in-
fluenced by power structures. Such a theoretical extension is necessary,
since constructions of a nation do not happen in a cultural vacuum
and national traditions cannot be invented ad libitum. It is Bourdieu’s
analytical tools of ‘habitus’, ‘capital’ and ‘field’ that will help us under-
stand how individuals are both actors and agents producing and repro-
ducing the social world in a socially and culturally constituted space.
Our analytical framework will allow us to account for both structure
and agency and how actors interact in a social environment.
To investigate struggles over the question of who belongs to a nation,
Switzerland provides a unique ‘laboratory’, because in it the function-
ing of the contentious closure mechanism of national citizenship can
be observed in clearly distinguishable local fields. How we go about
analysing local citizenship politics in Swiss municipalities will be laid
out in the last part of Chapter 3. It will become clear that given our the-
oretical framework and the complexity of local naturalisation politics,
we have to approach the object of our study from various perspectives,
at different analytical levels and by analysis of both quantitative and
qualitative data. In a first step, Chapter 4 will analyse data from a
large-N survey to get a more general view of what determines the out-
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come of naturalisation politics, while Chapter 5 then compares prevail-
ing understandings of citizenship and local power structures in four-
teen municipalities, Chapter 6 will illustrate our arguments and dis-
cuss in detail four case studies. Finally, in Chapter 7 we will focus our
attention on individual politicians and show to what extent their indivi-
dual understandings of citizenship are shaped by local citizenship poli-
tics. We thereby investigate and apply Bourdieu’s logic of practice and
his concepts of ‘habitus’, ‘capital’ and ‘field’ in two steps: first, by show-
ing how political struggles among municipal politicians in local power
fields influence the outcome of citizenship politics (Chapters 5 and 6)
and, second, by demonstrating that the ‘habitus’ of the involved politi-
cal actors is partly shaped by these ongoing struggles (Chapter 7).
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2 From Citizenship to National Self-
Understanding
2.1 What is citizenship?
To tackle this question let us directly start with Charles Tilly’s defini-
tion addressing various important aspects of citizenship that will be
specified in the course of this and the next chapter. Tilly (1999: 252-
253) defines citizenship as referring to a relation between governmen-
tal agents1 and whole categories of persons identified uniquely by their
connection with the government in question. The relation between gov-
ernment and its subject population can be considered as a contract in-
volving transactions that cluster around mutual rights and obligations
and drawing visible lines between insiders and outsiders. According to
Tilly, such a contract is never completely specified. Rather, it might
vary in range, depend on unstated assumptions about context, be modi-
fied by practice and be constrained by collective memory.
What immediately strikes us is that Tilly’s view goes beyond many
other definitions that address solely or mainly the legal and formal sta-
tus of individuals (Brinkmann 1986) or the rights and obligations as
related to such a status (Andrews 1991; Turner 1997). Moreover, it be-
comes clear that Tilly proposes a definition about what citizenship is
and not about what it should be. By doing so, Tilly avoids the certainly
interesting but, for an empirical research scarcely useful, normative ar-
guments of who should be granted citizenship rights.2 Rather, it opens
the way for an empirical investigation of how governmental agents de-
cide which categories of people can be considered as part of the nation.
What further stands out in Tilly’s definition is the contractual nature
of citizenship, underscoring thereby that citizenship is not just about a
mere aggregate of persons who happen to belong legally to a state. Na-
tion-states are not simply territorial organisations but rather member-
ship organisations or associations of citizenship in which all citizens are
equal and have the same rights through their direct relations with the
state (see Brubaker 1992: 22). Indeed, most citizens of a state are also
residents of the state’s territory. However, their relation to the state in-
volves more than their passing or extended residence alone. Otherwise,
one would automatically lose his or her citizenship by leaving the terri-
tory of the state. As will become clearer in the course of this chapter, in
the age of nationalism, citizenship is about the symbolic and emotional
aspects of full membership, and it is about the questions of who be-
longs to the sovereign body, of who benefits from equal political rights
and, simply, of who belongs to ‘us’. Conversely, the overlapping of dif-
ferent forms of peoplehood (mainly the sovereign body and the nation)
makes national citizenship a particularly salient closure mechanism, ex-
cluding all those who do not belong to ‘us’.
Speaking of ‘full membership’ means that we are mainly interested
in citizenship in a narrow sense: we will investigate the processes of
becoming a full member of a nation-state and the procedures of the ac-
quisition of individual citizenship rights. We will not discuss the proce-
dures of entering the territory of a nation-state or collective rights and
duties of migrants and permanent alien residents. To understand nat-
uralisation processes, and mainly its variation in range, we will have to
account less for formal rules but rather for governmental actors, how
they practise citizenship politics and how such policies are influenced,
respectively, by unstated assumptions about context and collective
memory (as Tilly argues), or by national self-understandings (as we will
put it). Ultimately, it is by looking at how a nation sees itself that helps
us understand who is admitted. Ethnic and civic-territorial understand-
ings of nationhood are two classic categories of classifying citizenship
politics. While many authors have already pointed to the analytical am-
biguities of these two concepts, hardly anybody has proposed alterna-
tives to classify citizenship politics. We will plead for an approach that
allows us to go beyond this dichotomy. Leading up to the next chapter,
we will argue finally that such a new approach is demanded to account
for the struggles between governmental actors that result in specific de-
grees of social closure and openness.
2.2 Becoming a new member: from local to national citizenship
Naturalisation is the very moment when an alien resident becomes a
full member and when both parties – the government and the new citi-
zens – sign a contract and agree to respect the others’ rights and de-
clare to follow their obligations. Naturalisation is the transition from
one citizenship status to another or the acquisition of a second one if
dual citizenship is permitted. It has to be distinguished from ascription
of citizenship by birth. Virtually everyone becomes citizen of a country
at birth, either of the country of his or her parents or of the country
where one is born. The admission procedure to a new citizenship sta-
tus involves two crucial steps: first, an alien citizen has to decide for
him-or-herself whether he or she wants to apply for a new citizenship
and, second, the respective government has then to make a decision
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whether it wants to accept him or her. The government is in the stron-
ger position since it has the power of the last word. This is why we
shall concentrate our empirical analysis on governmental actors.
Authorities are free to decline an application after a candidate has
made a first move showing his or her willingness to become citizen of
that state – and even if the applicant fulfils all conditions (Baubo¨ck
1994: 72). This makes decisions about naturalisation discretionary
rather than strictly consensual.3 The acquisition of citizenship is not
really optional, either. Foreign citizens of a country, it is true, have the
choice of whether they want to apply for citizenship and are seldom
forced to acquire a new nationality; however, individual candidates do
not have the power to influence the naturalisation procedures, nor can
they really choose between different nation-states.4 If migrants have
any choice at all, it is in their decisions to migrate to a specific country
based on considerations about territorial access or economic opportu-
nities. They might emigrate to a third country if they do not encounter
the positive economic or social conditions they expected to find in this
first country to which they emigrated, but it is hardly imaginable that
considerations about opportunities to become a full citizen will moti-
vate such decisions.5
Referring to citizenship politics, Baubo¨ck (1994) proposes to ima-
gine a world of voluntary associations with completely open boundaries
of membership. These associations would take binding decisions for
their present members and be open for all individuals who wished to
join them. As individuals have different needs and preferences, not
everybody would like to join all associations. On the other hand, na-
tion-states would adapt their criteria for adhesion to attract more, or
specific, naturalisation candidates. According to Baubo¨ck, such a mod-
el, reminiscent of the liberal market regulated by offer and demand,
would face the problems of collective action. Associations producing a
lot of benefits for their members would be desired by non-members
and overwhelmed by free riders; even more so, if a general right of exit
would make it impossible to distribute burdens or duties necessary for
the production of some collective benefit. In order to avoid such a self-
destroying model and to deter any free riders, specific criteria have to
be established that have to be fulfilled before one can be accepted.
The free rider problem and how it is solved by access regulations
might be illustrated with the example of citizenship in medieval towns
and their practice of poor relief. In his discussion of the evolution of ci-
tizenship in Germany and France, Brubaker (1992: 64-72) gives the ex-
ample of German imperial legislation that in 1530 required every town
and commune to nourish and lodge its poor.There was no doubt that
each town was responsible for its municipal citizens. But did other in-
habitants also belong to ‘its’ poor? In order to avoid a situation in
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which too many migrant poor would populate a territory, each town
had do define who ‘its’ poor citizens were and, obviously, had an incen-
tive to define membership as restrictively as possible. While it had suf-
ficed for a long time to live in a town to be considered as a member,
from that time forward towns increasingly made membership contin-
gent on formally approved domicile.6 The municipal closure against
migrant poor was problematic insofar as an expulsion or a too restric-
tive definition of citizenship would displease other towns that would
have to house these people. States began therefore to interfere in com-
munal citizenship. Not only were membership policies more and more
coordinated on the state level, but practices of poor relief also became
the responsibility of states. This development lifted the problem of citi-
zenship definition and exclusion of the poor from the municipal to the
state level. As the towns had done before, the state now had to define
who ‘its’ poor were. Also, as in the inter-communal disputes, states
could no longer simply expel their poor without imposing costs on
neighbouring states. Numerous treaties between states at the begin-
ning of the 19th century articulated the principle that states could only
expel into the territory of another state a member of that second state.
Prak (1999: 22) illustrates similar social exclusion mechanisms in
his discussion on the municipal citizenship in the Dutch town of Bois-
le-Duc. Since there was no way to stop the influx of lower-class immi-
grants, in 1772, the local authorities stipulated that one could only be
treated in the hospital – which was mainly an institution for the poor –
after ten years of residence in town. To be eligible for municipal poor
relief, one had to wait for fifteen years. While long-term residents prof-
ited from those social services, becoming a full citizen of Bois-le-Duc
included significant additional advantages. Unlike ordinary inhabitants,
native or purchased citizens could be admitted to the guilds and elected
to the city’s more important offices. A further advantage was that they
could be tried only by local courts. Such judicial differences between ci-
tizens and other inhabitants also came along with social inequalities.
As Prak (1999: 21) notes, the distribution of wealth between natives
and immigrants were quite equal. However, if one compares the natur-
alised immigrants with the mere inhabitants, it appears that the for-
mer were much better off than the latter. Whereas the citizens were
over-represented among the upper middle class and the elite, the lower
middle class and the poor were overrepresented by the inhabitants.
Clearly, the attribution of citizenship seemed to be in favour of the
wealthy. The various citizenship regulations not only prevented the
municipal resources from being exhausted, but the political and eco-
nomic exclusion mechanisms also aimed to protect the local citizens
and deter possible free riders. Citizenship was an instrument of social
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closure whose application reflected the material interests of the local ci-
tizens.
Like Germany, the Dutch Republic witnessed a transfer of citizen-
ship regulations from the local to the national level at the end of the
18th century. However, this transfer was not only a shift of compe-
tence, but it also brought forth a new meaning of citizenship. Prak
(1999) explicates that new ideas about citizenship began to emerge
among radical opponents of the regime during the 1770s and 1780s.
They developed a model of political participation by all the people
against a hierarchical model of clientelism. Against a vertical concep-
tion of citizenship that was of a corporate nature and confined to cer-
tain localities, they put forward the idea of a horizontal, general and
national conception of citizenship. This modern understanding of citi-
zenship was inspired by thinkers of the Age of Enlightenment and
reached a high point in the French Revolution. Citizenship was central
to the theory and practice for the time after 1789 because the French
Revolution sought the establishment of equality before the law and a
general membership status for all permanent residents. These ideas
began to dominate the debate in the Dutch Republic after the invasion
of the French revolutionary armies. Citizenship status was no longer
restricted to the urban elites but was thrown open to rural folk. More
generally, citizenship became strongly politicised whereas before it had
just been an economic and social institution. This might be illustrated
by Prak’s (1999: 22-23) discussion on the treatment of Jews. Before the
transfer of citizenship regulations, shopkeepers in Bois-le-Duc claimed
that their business were undercut and disadvantaged by the illegal
practices of Jews who came and went without paying any taxes. In
1777, the guild’s directors successfully requested that the admission of
Jews be terminated. Whereas Bois-le-Duc considered Jews explicitly as
outsiders, in the new conception of the national citizenship there was
no reference to Jews. In 1796, the National Assembly decided that Jews
could become equal citizens of the Batavian Republic, arguing that citi-
zenship was an individual quality and that provincial and local bylaws
concerning Jews must not interfere with national policy.
2.3 Two modes of social closure: immigration policy and
national citizenship
The new form of citizenship that emerged all over Europe from the
second half of the 18th century onward has not been a full break with
the local citizenship models, in that it still functioned as an exclusion
mechanism for poor and inferior social people from outside the na-
tion-state’s territory. Like the towns before them, nation-states had to
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decide who belonged to them and who could benefit from their institu-
tions. However, the exclusion of economically undesirable people oc-
curred more and more at the territorial boundaries of a nation-state.
From this policy, though, it should not be deduced that access to the
territory, on the other hand, equated with the acquisition of full mem-
bership. Rather, a system with two modes of social closure – once at
the territorial border and once inside the territorial borders – has
emerged. According to Mackert (2004: 258) and Brubaker (1992: ch.1)
these internal and external exclusions have different meanings and re-
flect the dual nature of nation-states. When we dissect the nation-state
we have got, on the one hand, the state that is – following Weber’s
(1946: 78) definition – a territorial organisation, which exercises legiti-
mate control over its own territory undisturbed by internal power com-
petition or external intervention. On the other hand, we have got the
nation that is a community of sentiment tending to produce a state of its
own (Weber 1946: 176). When a state and a nation coincide territorially
and demographically we then can speak of a nation-state.
The regulation of immigration into a territorial community has a de-
cisive bearing on the life chances for migrants, since the access to a
state includes such basic goods as security, public order and a promis-
ing labour market. The regulation of immigration is crucial not only
insofar as it concerns the labour market, but also welfare state politics
and nation-states have various material interests in facilitating and re-
stricting immigration. This differentiates nation-states from medieval
polities where rules were exercised over particular sets of persons and
not over territories; mere presence did not include political, administra-
tive, or legal inclusion. In modern times, jurisdiction has depended
more and more on the spatial coordinates of the action and less on the
personal status of the agent. Therefore, the territorial state has every in-
terest in controlling the flow of persons across its boundaries. The re-
fusal to let in migrants or to expel them is not unproblematic, since
immigration policy of a particular state also concerns other, mainly
neighbouring states. The various bilateral and multilateral treaties on
immigration underscore to what extent different states have an interest
in the degree of openness of a particular state’s borders. The European
Union is probably the most illustrative example of a common immigra-
tion policy between various nation-states that have lost some sover-
eignty in this field.
While external closure serves vital and tangible nation-state interests,
closure inside of a nation-state’s territory – what we henceforth call na-
tional citizenship – cannot be attributed to material interests. When one
takes into consideration that nowadays in Western European nation-
states permanent alien residents – ‘denizens’ as they often are called –
have almost the same social rights as ordinary citizens,7 it becomes
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clear that the attribution of citizenship must be influenced by other fac-
tors. Denizens, ordinarily, are allowed to remain indefinitely in a coun-
try and to participate in social and economic life on the same terms as
ordinary citizens. It is political participation in particular that is not
possible for alien residents.8 This does not mean that in individual
cases pragmatic interests might not motivate an alien citizen to apply
for citizenship. Having a Swiss passport, for example, might facilitate
travelling and increase one’s chances on the job market. From the per-
spective of the nation-state, however, there are no differences in terms
of material interests whether its permanent alien residents are natura-
lised or not.9
Citizenship therefore cannot be considered in a purely functional
context, that is, its contribution to the opportunities of immigrants or
the exclusionary capacity of a state. Rather, it has to be analysed in a
political-cultural context. Since hardly any material interests are at risk,
symbolic stakes can be considered as crucial when it comes to naturali-
sation: future citizens are not selected (primarily) on their economic or
kinship status but on the basis of cultural categories that are consid-
ered as a crucial part of the nation. Before we discuss in more detail
the criteria that have to be fulfilled to become a new citizen, let us now
explore to what extent this new closure mechanism relies on a different
understanding of community than its local predecessor.
2.4 A new form of political community: popular sovereignty,
equality and self-determination
National citizenship is very closely related to the age of nationalism. To
understand the role and meaning of national citizenship, we therefore
have to make clear what we understand by nationalism. There are al-
most as many definitions of it as scholars in this field (for an overview
see Jafferlot 1997; Smith 1998; Spencer & Wollman 2002). Most re-
searchers are preoccupied with uncovering its origins and explaining
its emergence. Some see it as a result of enduring ethnic identities
(Geertz 1963; Smith 1986; Hutcheson 1994, Armstrong 1982) whereas
others link it to the needs of generating a ‘high culture’ for modernisa-
tion and industrial development (Gellner 1983). Still others argue that
nationalism derives from the rational workings of the world economy
or consider it as separatists’ responses to unequal economic develop-
ment (Hechter 1975; Nairn 1977). Tilly (1975, 1990), Mann (1993,
1995), Giddens (1985) and Breuilly (1993) explore the relationship be-
tween nationalism and sources of power such as war, elites and mod-
ern states. Greenfeld (1992) puts forward the argument of the status
anxiety and ressentiment of new elites claiming distinction from older
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elites by legitimating themselves as representatives of the new nations,
and Hobsbawm (1990) explains it as a result of the invention of an
ideology to legitimate states within capitalist economic relations. A last
group of scholars includes Kedourie (1960) and Juergensmeyer (1993),
who consider nationalism as a belief system and a form of religious
surrogate or secular religion.
All of these approaches contribute in one way or the other to a better
understanding of the creation of nationalist movements and the emer-
gence of nation-states, but none of them explains them entirely.10 They
help us understand the various dimensions and contents of those social
phenomena but they do not explain the form itself that would enable
us to better understand the role of national citizenship (see Calhoun
1997: ch.1). While ‘form’ stands for the undifferentiated primal ele-
ment of nationalism, contents or dimensions are the particular shapes
that are assumed. Under ‘dimensions’ of nationalism we might cate-
gorise such diverse phenomena as inter-state wars, separatist move-
ments, singing national anthems at soccer games, or the hissing at na-
tional flags on national holidays. The ‘content’ of nationalism consists
of the meanings that are associated with the different dimensions. Cru-
cial in the course of the next chapters will be the ‘content’ of the clo-
sure mechanism of citizenship (another dimension of nationalism), for
example, the question of whether a rather restrictive or a rather gener-
ous understanding of citizenship prevails in Swiss municipalities.
While questions of content and dimension will preoccupy us exten-
sively below, they are inadequate for grasping the more general charac-
ter of nationalism, namely that it is a modern version of ethnicity. Follow-
ing Jenkins (1997), we define ethnicity as a first-order dimension of
human experience and a principle of groups living together: it is a
form of cultural understanding, social organisation and political con-
testation. This definition draws heavily on Weber’s (1978: 385-398) and
Barth’s (1969) understanding of ethnicity as social organisation of cul-
tural difference and group claims based on the belief in shared culture
and common ancestry.
Throughout history, human beings have organised themselves in
groups with cultural or symbolic meanings. By underscoring this basic
principle of nationalism, we do not speak out on the stability and fluid-
ity of groups or the mechanism producing them, nor do we claim that
there is a specific content for a cultural group in general or a nation in
particular.11 Our argument is simply that human beings have always
been culturally organised – mostly in ethnic groups and nations. There
are similarities between these two versions of ethnicity: the search for
historic origins and the socio-cultural organisation to mobilise part of
the masses have been part of both versions of ethnicity (Smith 1984,
1986: ch.6). However, the differences between them are crucial: na-
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tions are distinguished by action oriented towards political autonomy,
and this aspect makes nationalism entirely modern. Emphasising the
political and modern character of nations also enables us to separate
them from other categories of collective identification such as class for
example.
‘Modern’ does not imply that drawing on older communities or tradi-
tions is irrelevant for nations. A reproduction of traditions and mobili-
sation of a (suitable) cultural and heroic past and a certain way of re-
sorting to an ethnic community to legitimate their existence can be ob-
served in every nation-state. Nor does ‘modern’ mean that nationalism
is necessarily and exclusively the outcome of other modern develop-
ments such as industrialisation (Gellner 1983), print-capitalism (Ander-
son 1991[1983]), or new communicative facilities (Deutsch 1966).
Rather, following Wimmer (2002) and Calhoun (1997, see also 1993),
it can be argued (1) that nationalist principles structure modernity, i.e.
the idea of nation and claims to national identity are the basis for mod-
ern politics and culture and (2) that nationalism is the result of the
overlapping and fusion of other modern notions of peoplehood. The
first argument draws on Gellner’s (1983: 1) seminal definition of na-
tionalism, which holds that the political and the national unit should
be congruent.12 This does not simply mean that nations tend to pro-
duce states of their own and that modern societies are organised within
nation-states. Following Wimmer (2002: 4-5), it rather can be argued
that nationalism is modern because it ties institutions of inclusion
such as citizenship, democracy and welfare to national forms of exclu-
sion. Calhoun (1997) adopts an even broader understanding of nation-
alism as a modern phenomenon and argues that ‘national’ ways of
thinking or the ‘discourse’ of nationalism structure not only political
life but also everyday experiences (see also Billig 1995). The emergence
of national citizenship and its exclusion mechanism is indeed a corol-
lary of state formation. However, its deeper functioning, and this is our
second argument, can fully be understood only when we see national-
ism in combination with other notions of peoplehood: the people as a
sovereign entity, the people as citizens of a state holding equal rights,
and the people as a community held together by common political des-
tiny and shared cultural features (Calhoun 1997; Wimmer 2002). In
other terms, nationalism as a modern version of ethnicity is tightly
linked to the ideas of popular sovereignty, equality and self-determina-
tion this – and this makes national citizenship a highly salient closure
mechanism.
By defining nationalism as a modern form of ethnicity, we make no
particular claims about the period of its emergence, although it can cer-
tainly be agreed that most nationalisms did fully develop only in the
wake of the French Revolution.13 For some scholars, nationalism made
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its appearance earlier.14 Seton-Watson (1977) and Johnson (1993), for
example, demonstrate that national feelings had already emerged in
England and France in the 17th century. For Greenfeld (1992), the Brit-
ish rebellion against monarchy in the 17th century constitutes the be-
ginning of nationalism. Anderson (1991 [1983]) situates its origins a
century later in the struggles of creole pioneers against Iberian coloni-
alism. Hastings (1997) even argues that such phenomena and the term
‘nation’ (as it is used in the modern sense) could be discerned at least
from the 11th century onwards.
Tracing the development of the meaning of the notion of nation pro-
vides a first opportunity to apprehend the modernity of nationalism.
The term ‘nation’ has existed for a long time but has had various mean-
ings and has referred to different groups of people (Greenfeld 1992: 4-
9; Habermas 1991: 8-9). The initial use was derogatory and reserved
for groups of foreigners in Rome coming from the same geographical
region. The idea of common geographical origins was also part of a la-
ter use of the word ‘nation’: communities of students coming to several
universities from the same region. In a further change, this concept
partially lost its geographical connotation and began to stand for a poli-
tical, cultural and social elite, namely, the representatives of secular
and religious potentates at the Church Council. In England in the early
16th century, the word ‘nation’ and its counciliar meaning of an ‘elite’
was applied to the people of the country and subsequently made synon-
ymous with the word, ‘people’. As Greenfeld (2002: 6) points out,
prior to its nationalisation, the term ‘people’ referred to the lower
classes of a region. The elevation of the people to a nation made it the
bearer of sovereignty and the basis of political solidarity. The people –
formerly stratified along status – were now perceived as essentially
homogeneous. In other words, the emergence of nation-states was clo-
sely coupled with the emerging idea that the legitimacy of the state ‘as-
cended’ no longer from God but from the people. Since the label ‘na-
tion’ was attached to a specific people of a certain territory, the concept
of nation referred not only to the sovereignty of a people but also to its
uniqueness. The differentiation between these two meanings is quite
crucial, for a ‘nation’ can be considered as both a general organising
principle and a specific form of cultural community. Indeed, ‘nations’
are always associated with existing populations or countries. This does
not mean, however, that certain elements determine what a nation is.
It is rather the organising principle, which makes these elements into
a unity and gives them a certain meaning. Similarly, nationalism in-
volves more than the construction of a particular national identity. It
includes the general principle that the people organise their own cul-
tural community.
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At first sight, this Janus-faced meaning of nationalism (or nation) –
universalism and particularism – might appear paradoxical but, in fact,
it allows us to fully grasp its modern character: while nationalism goes
hand in hand with the universalistic doctrines of sovereignty, equality
and democracy, these principles apply only to the people who belong to
a particular nation. In other words, only those persons who are part of
the nation belong to the sovereign body, profit from equal rights and
are allowed to participate in the democratic processes. According to An-
derson’s (1991 [1983]: 6) seminal definition, a nation is a community
imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. Anderson (1991
[1983]: 7) explains the relation between sovereignty and nationalism by
the fact that both concepts were born in the age of Enlightenment: na-
tionalism grew partly out of popular challenges to the authority and le-
gitimacy of the elite of modern states. From another perspective, one
observes that the extension of the power of states through a standing
army, bureaucracy and the collection of taxes was only conceivable if
politics was legitimatised by the population. To call up a popular army
and collect taxes is only possible if the people consider themselves as a
part of the nation and if they also consider themselves as the sovereign
body. Nationalism plays a crucial role in the modern discourse of politi-
cal legitimacy, for that state is legitimate which fits with and serves the
interest of the people: ‘To “fit with” the people meant both that the
boundaries of the state matched those of the nation – an important as-
pect of the movement towards compact and contiguous territories –
and that the purposes of the state matched the interests of its citizens
– conceived not only as individuals but also as a singular nation or con-
federation of such nations’ (Calhoun 1997: 69-70; see also Scho¨neberg
1987: 49). To conceive of the citizens as a singular nation is commen-
surate with Anderson’s (1991 [1983]: 7) idea that a nation has to be ima-
gined as ‘limited’. For even the largest nation has finite, if elastic,
boundaries and would never imagine itself coterminous with mankind.
The idea that each nation constitutes a particularly imagined commu-
nity has to be seen in the light of liberalism and the idea of individual-
ism, which were entwined with nationalism at least from the time of
either the English or French Revolutions up until 1848 (Spencer &
Wollmann 2002: 6-8). A lot of liberals made a connection between in-
dividual and national freedom and saw nations as ‘individuals’ with
particular talents that had the right to unfold themselves in freedom.
Nations were seen both as communities of individuals and as them-
selves being individuals – ‘both in the literal sense of being indivisible,
and metaphorically as singular beings that move through history as or-
dinary people move through their biographical life courses’ (Calhoun
1997: 44). As for individual persons, it was suggested that a healthy de-
velopment of nations was only possible in freedom, that is, when na-
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tional communities are conceded self-determination and sovereignty.
According to Spencer and Wollman (2002: 6), the foundations of the
rapprochement of liberalism and nationalism were laid by Kant, who
insisted on the idea of individual autonomy and will and thus opened
the way for others to think about nations along the same lines. Cal-
houn (1997: 45) sees the links between individualism and nationalism
most clearly in the works of Gottlieb Fichte and his notion of self-re-
cognition. For Fichte, nations are individuals with particular talents. To
succeed and become an extraordinary community, nations had to
achieve a distinctive character in a process of individuation. Even if
some later nationalisms were connected more with collectivistic and
authoritarian ideologies, rather than with the concepts of individual lib-
erty and rational cosmopolitanism, the idea of constituting a self-deter-
mined nation remained (Kohn 1967; Greenfeld 1992).
The ideology of individualism forged not only the conception of the
nation but also the relationship between nations and between each na-
tion’s constituent parts. Individuals are directly members of their na-
tions, this relationship not being mediated through other social struc-
tures. Nationality is understood as an attribute of the individual, and
because this attribute is the same for everyone, nationality makes all
individuals potentially equal and consequently seems to erase structur-
al inequalities. The new nation-states integrated all major exclusionary
modes previously organised on different social levels and fostered inter-
nal integration and homogenisation. Thus, the emerging national citi-
zenship was no longer confined to the members of certain families or
persons of high social status but extended to the lower classes (Bendix
& Rokkan 1971; Bendix 1977). Nairn (1977: 41) formulates this idea as
follows: ‘The arrival of nationalism in a distinctively modern sense was
tied to the political baptism of the lower classes […] Although some-
times hostile to democracy, nationalist movements have been invariably
populist in outlook and sought to induct lower classes into political
life.’ Demands for equality did not result uniquely from an economic
dissatisfaction, as is put forward by Marxist theory, which concentrates
on one of the major movements in the 19th century – socialism – but
completely ignores the second one, namely that of nationalism. As
Bendix (1977) argues, the distribution and redistribution of rights and
duties were rather the result of a political alienation of the working
class and a rising awareness of not having a recognised position in the
national community. Such distributive processes might be influenced
by the structure of society – as the Marxian argument runs – but they
are also affected ‘by conceptions of what the proper distribution in the
national community ought to be, and by the give and take of the politi-
cal struggle’ (Bendix 1977: 88). Thus, it is in the course of political
struggles about the definition of who constitutes the nation that the
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boundaries are drawn and certain parts of the population are included,
while others are excluded.
While at first citizenship excluded socially and economically depen-
dent persons and for a long time women too, in the course of the 19th
and 20th century such restrictions were gradually reduced, until even-
tually all adults had been classified as citizens. According to Marshall’s
(1950) famous trichotomy, citizenship rights successively included ci-
vic, political and social rights. Whether this sequence over three centu-
ries could be observed only in his study of England or could be ob-
served in other countries as well might be subject to debates (see Mann
2000). Moreover, it is certainly true that his trichotomy should be ex-
tended with economic and cultural rights as mechanisms to include or
exclude specific groups (Mackert 1999; Kymlicka 1995: 179-181). None-
theless, Marshall’s (1950) theory enables us to dissect the various as-
pects of citizenship rights and, more importantly, to apprehend their
integrative function in nation-states in which capitalist development
led to class inequalities: citizenship rights foster a sense of community
based on loyalty to a nation that is a common possession.
The evolutionary ascription of the same rights to all members of a
nation-state is part of what Bendix (1977) and others call the ‘age of de-
mocratic revolution’. Since citizenship no longer referred to member-
ship in corporate institutions, henceforth and especially with regard to
political rights, an active participation in the affairs of the national
community was required. Whether the basic ideas of democracy and
nationalism are compatible is subject to academic debate (Spencer &
Wollman 2002: ch.5). At first, the logics that are commonly attributed
to these two concepts – democracy as an inclusive and nationalism as
an exclusive doctrine – seem to be contradictory. In the context of the
French Revolution, however, both democratic and nationalist struggles
pursued the same aims: to abolish authoritarian rule and to establish
self-determination of the people. We can thus agree with Greenfeld
(1992: 10) and hold that ‘[n]ationalism was the form in which democ-
racy appeared in the world, contained in the idea of the nation as a but-
terfly in a cocoon.’ Moreover, it can be argued that nation-states provide
the necessary framework within which democratic rights have been
most effectively demanded, accorded and sustained.
Yet, given the fact that nationalism and democracy emerged in a spe-
cific spatio-temporal context indicates that the relation between these
two principles might vary according to historical circumstances and the
nature of the political process (Wimmer 2002: 2; Greenfeld 1992: 10-
11; Spencer & Wollman 2002: ch. 5). In fact, democracy has not the
same significance in all nation-states and, of course, there can be na-
tionalism without democracy. France and Germany are often brought
up as two examples where democracy played a different role in the pro-
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cess of nation-state formation. In France, both ideas seem to be closely
related because this country was the setting for both a democratic and
a nationalist revolution. Consequently, nationalism there has been al-
most unthinkable without democracy; but only ‘almost’, for it has also
undergone its anti-democratic periods. In Germany, on the other hand,
democratic and nationalist movements have evolved separately. At cer-
tain times, nationalism even took a radically anti-democratic turn –
especially in the context of the destruction of the Weimar republic and
Hitler’s rise to power. Such variations of the relation between these two
principles, however, do not belie the fact that nationalism is an essen-
tial component of democracy (Nodia 1994). While the latter concept
stands for the idea that the people decide what they want, the former
defines who the people are who make those decisions. Miller (1995,
2000) goes even a step further in his argumentation. For him, the role
of nations is not limited to telling us who is allowed to participate in
the democratic process. Defending the idea of republican citizenship,
he argues that a good democracy is one whose citizens are actively en-
gaged in politics and that such an engagement necessitates a shared
national identity among the participants to motivate them to work to-
gether (see also Calhoun 2007). For a common national identity is the
basis of mutual trust that is, in turn, a necessary condition to make a
state work. From this it does not follow that democracy entails nation-
alism. Rather, democracies are structured within nation-states. As a
general rule, only those people are accorded political rights who are
part of the nation15 – and this is true in France as well as in Germany.
Of course, the exclusion of people from democratic processes can be
strongly contested when long-term residents of a state get no voting
rights. To which atrocities the confusion of the demos (the mass of the
population) and the ethnos (the ethnic group) can lead has been de-
monstrated by Mann (2005) in his book on ethnic cleansing in the age
of democracy.16
To summarise the foregoing discussion, it can be stated that nation-
alism claims rights of self-determination and legitimate rule by refer-
ence to the sovereign people of a country. In modern times, state
power is derived from and exercised for a nation; or formulated differ-
ently, a nation-state claims to be the state ‘of’ and ‘for’ a particular, dis-
tinctive and bounded nation. The closure mechanism of national citi-
zenship can only be understood by the idea of this interconnectedness.
For to qualify to be or to become a full member, potential candidates
have to be a member of the nation or to fulfil the membership criteria.
As we have illustrated with Prak’s example of citizenship politics in
Bois-le-Duc, historic forerunners of nation-states were based on organi-
sational forms, which conceived of a hierarchical order of unequal sta-
tus as normal (see also Mackert & Mu¨ller 2000: 14). As we have seen,
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citizenship was mainly an economic regulatory mechanism open for
the wealthy urban elite and closed for the poor and socially disadvan-
taged. Nation-states, on the other hand, are always conceived as ‘a
deep, horizontal comradeship’ (Anderson 1991 [1983]: 7) – regardless
of actual social or economic inequalities. They are organised primarily
as categories of equal individual members identified on the basis of
various cultural attributes and exclude all those who do not belong to
the nation (Calhoun 1997: 42-48; see also Gellner 1983: 57). Vertical
boundaries dividing rulers and ruled were replaced by horizontal
boundaries separating nationals from foreigners. This new distinction
has become particularly salient given the overlapping of various forms
of peoplehood; the definition of who belongs to those who can be con-
sidered as equal members became of crucial political importance.
2.5 Citizenship and national self-understanding: analytical
ambiguities
Claiming that human beings have a natural tendency to organise them-
selves in groups and that in modern times nation-states exclude unde-
sirable people through citizenship mechanisms does not help us un-
derstand who exactly is excluded. It only implies that even the most
generous politicians demand applicants to fulfil at least some minimal
criteria. Or as Wimmer (2006a: 341) has put it: ‘However widely the
boundaries of the national community are imagined […] it remains a
bounded community, with the large majority of the world’s population
on the outside.’ It is hardly imaginable that a person with no Swiss
passport, with no historical or emotional connection to Switzerland,
and speaking no Swiss national language could immigrate to Switzer-
land and have any expectation of acceptance when requesting Swiss na-
tionality. Closure mechanisms are always at work when somebody
seeks to cross cultural boundaries. Consequently, we have to ask the
following questions: how is a nation-state imagined? Who belongs to
the people that enjoy equal rights? In whose name does a state rule?
And hence, who can be admitted to full membership? By looking for
answers to these questions, we turn to the various contents of national-
ism and to the particular understandings of citizenship.
The most commonly used categories of nationalism or citizenship
are ‘civic-territorial’ and ‘ethnic’. Kohn (1967 [1944]), probably the most
influential source of this opposition, speaks of Western and Eastern
versions of nationalism and makes a distinction between a ‘voluntarist’
type, which regards the nation as a free association of rational human
beings entered into voluntarily and on an individual basis, and an ‘or-
ganic’ type, which views the nation as an organism of fixed and indel-
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ible character that was stamped on its members at birth. The two coun-
tries that are most often put forward as examples of these types are
France and Germany.17 While France represents a republican, expan-
sive and assimilationist model of citizenship, Germany defines citi-
zenry as a community of descent that is very restrictive towards non-
German immigrants. What consequences such different understand-
ings of nationhood can have on citizenship politics has been illustrated
by, among others, Brubaker (1992). He starts his study with the obser-
vation that, although both countries recruited foreign workers in large
numbers in the 1960s and 1970s, subsequently witnessed a growth of
the migrant population and consequently pursued an equally restrictive
immigration policy, they differ in their sharply different citizenship po-
licies. While Germany requires from potential applicants for naturalisa-
tion ten years of residence and the renouncement of the original na-
tionality, in France candidates have to live in the country for five years
before they can apply and are allowed to keep their old passport. Ger-
many lacks a political support for naturalisation and explicitly consid-
ers itself as not a country of immigration. In France, on the other
hand, naturalisation is considered as a normal and desirable outcome
of permanent settlement. Consequently, immigrants’ attitudes towards
naturalisation differ in Germany and France. In 1985, only 6 per cent
of German migrant workers intended to naturalise, while they were
about 25 per cent in France. Looking at the naturalisation rates in the
1980s reveals that they are four to five times higher in France than in
Germany. Brubaker (1992) explains this difference by different na-
tional self-understandings in these countries, which are, in turn, rooted
in distinctive French and German paths to nation-statehood.
Both concepts – the civic-territorial and ethnic models of citizenship
– have become so habitual in the meantime that it is often forgotten
that they are invented (Calhoun 2004a: ix). They seem to be natural,
whereas in fact they are based on political discourses. Therefore, they
should not be treated as normative categories but as different styles in
which nations are imagined (see Anderson 1991: 6). Brubaker (1992)
has demonstrated how particular ways of thinking and talking about
nationhood were reinforced and activated in specific historical and in-
stitutional settings. A similar position is taken by Greenfeld (1992,
1995), for whom the inventors of nationalism were psychologically in-
secure or socially subordinated parts of a specific society: the English
protestant squires, the French nobility, the newly literate German
classes or the English Puritans in America. Insecurities arose in speci-
fic historical circumstances in which consisting identities or social or-
ders disaccorded with the beliefs of those groups. The resulting ressen-
timents were relieved by using the idea of nationalism to invent new
nations, and these new definitions of what constitutes a particular so-
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ciety mainly served to legitimatise the interests of the emerging elite.
Whether nations were defined in civic-territorial or in rather ethnic
terms depended on the perception of a nation’s status relative to other
nations. Ethnic nationalism emerged in societies that believed them-
selves – at the time of emerging national identity – to be inferior to ex-
isting nations. Civic nationalisms, on the other hand, emerged when
achievements provided a society with sufficient reasons for national
pride. According to Greenfeld (1992), German ethnic nationalism was
triggered in the aftermath of the defeats against Napoleon’s revolution-
ary troops and during a period of French hegemony. In such precarious
circumstances, claims to a particularly restrictive German identity,
clearly delineating oneself in contrast to others, seemed to answer a
great need. France, on the other hand, being at the time of emerging
nationalism in a period of superiority, was too self-conscious to fear
cultural or political hegemony and took the liberty to define its nation-
hood rather generously, allowing the access to all those who were ready
to share their political convictions. Thus, references to common blood
or to political ideas are less inherent characteristics of German or
French culture respectively, but rather the outcome of particular histori-
cal and political situations.
Kohn’s geographical application (dividing the European countries at
the Rhine) has become, in the meantime, a more overall account of na-
tionalism and, alternately, is replaced by other typologies, such as cul-
tural/political, illiberal/liberal, emotional/rational or bad/good national-
isms. The last distinction suggests to what extent those dichotomies
are ideologically and politically laden and have even passed into carica-
ture. Eastern nationalism is often considered as too exclusionary, too
collectivist and too particularistic compared to the inclusionary, indivi-
dualistic and universal Western nationalism. Civic nationalism is com-
monly located in the Enlightenment and connected with the concepts
of individual liberty and the liberal revolt against absolutism, whereas
ethnic nationalism is considered as opposed to these core values.
Instead of distinguishing between inclusionary and exclusionary na-
tionalisms that pose normative ambiguities, it is analytically more use-
ful to discern the bases or criteria of inclusion and exclusion. While
the distinctions of ethnic and civic nationalism do grasp important as-
pects of reality, it is suggested here that these supposedly fundamental
differences are better understood as differences of degree and empha-
sis than principle. Each form of nationalism has its inclusionary and
exclusionary aspects and each nation-state defines who its people are
and, thus, specifies who is excluded. Smith (1995: 101) even suggests
that civic nationalism can be as severe and uncompromising as ethnic
nationalism. As the example of France shows, civic nationalism might
also require assimilation of ethnic minorities within the borders of the
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nation-state through acculturation to the dominant culture.18 As Kuzio
(2002) and Kaufmann (2000) underscore, so-called open citizenship
models such as the Canadian and the US-American, excluded various
groups such as blacks, Catholic conservatives or communists at various
moments in their history. Moreover, in all nation-states with a suppo-
sedly civic form of citizenship, distinctions are made between foreign-
ers from European or North American countries and those from other
regions.
Even if we consider these two forms of nationalism as two ideal-
types or end points of a continuum, the terms ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ are
ambiguous and their definitive meanings are elusive. For Brubaker
(1999: 59-63), the notion of ethnic nationalism can be interpreted nar-
rowly or broadly. In the narrow interpretation, it refers to descent and
biology; in the broad interpretation, it is used as a synonym for ‘cultur-
al’. Given the fact that very few nations invoke a common ancestor and
that for many nationalists ‘common descent’ is only one among many
claims (and often a minor one), the group of ethnic nationalisms de-
fined this way would be severely under-populated; the group of civic
nationalisms, on the other hand, would become too heterogeneous,
since it would include any number of nationalisms emphasising com-
mon culture. Applying the broader definition of ethnic nationalism
leads to the problem that, in this case, virtually all nationalisms would
fall in this category. Almost every nationalist movement invokes cultur-
al characteristics that separate their people from other peoples. More-
over, cultural differentiations have been relevant throughout human
history. Thus, a ‘cultural definition’ would include communities that ex-
isted before the age of nationalism and others that do not consider
themselves as nations. Furthermore, it first would have to be decided
which cultural characteristics divide such communities and how much
homogeneity is required for a community to be considered a nation
(Gellner 1983: 54). On the other hand, interpreting ‘civic nationalism’
in a very narrow sense involving an acultural, voluntarist and rational-
ist understanding of citizenship would define the phenomenon out of
existence, too, since even classical cases of civic nationhood such as
France or the United States involve cultural components (Brubaker
1999: 59-63). From another perspective, if we define nations as groups
that will themselves, we end up with too many observations, since such
a definition also applies to groups such as conspiracies, gangs, teams,
or religious communities. Thus, even if will were the basis of nations,
it is also the basis of much else (Gellner 1983: 54).
Dividing nation-states into ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ groups of nationalism
seems to imply that ‘culture’ and ‘will’ are mutually exclusive and mis-
leads us into dividing citizenship models into clearly defined groups.
For Gellner (1983: 53f) and Smith (1986: ch.6), neither one of them is
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remotely adequate for fully grasping the complexity of nationalism.
Rather, it should be recognised that each form of nationalism consists
of a combination of these two principles; and this combination can
change over time. There are very few examples that come close to the
extreme – the complete exclusion of those who do not belong to their
ethnic community from the possibility of naturalisation. On the other
hand, every civic nation-state attributes citizenship on the basis of at
least some minimal cultural requirements. Smith (1986: 144-152) ar-
gues that what distinguishes nations from ethnies are ‘Western’ fea-
tures and qualities of nationalism such as territoriality and political cul-
ture. Even ‘original Western nations’, however, have reconsidered their
ethnic bases and reasserted their cultural and historic unity against
minorities and subversive ideologies. Ernest Renan – the advocate of
subjective self-understanding in constituting nationhood (through a
daily plebiscite) – underscores that cultural elements play a crucial role
in modern nation-states. According to him, a nation is both a soul and
a principle. The first one belongs to the past and represents the com-
mon possession of a rich legacy of remembrances, and the second one
is in the present and stands for the desire and will to honour this le-
gacy. He even seems to switch to the other side when he argues that
man does not improvise but that the nation is the end product of a
long period of work, sacrifice and devotion (reprinted in Hutchinson &
Smith 1994: 17).19
2.6 Citizenship as a contested instrument of social closure
Given the fact that the concepts of ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ citizenship as well
as political and cultural nationalism are analytically ambiguous and
ideologically laden, we suggest a return to Weber’s idea of open and
closed relationships in our study of the functioning of the closure me-
chanism in national citizenship (Weber 1978; see also Brubaker 1992:
23). Weber defines a social relationship as ‘open’ to outsiders if partici-
pation in the mutually oriented social action relevant to its meaning-
content is not denied to anyone who wishes to participate and who is
actually in a position to do so. On the other hand, a relationship will
be called ‘closed’ for outsiders if participation of certain persons is ex-
cluded, limited, or subjected to conditions.
Weber himself did not develop these concepts any further and
mainly applied them in the context of economic closure mechanisms.
Nonetheless, his arguments are very helpful in our discussion for three
reasons: first, he provides neutral notions for the functioning of closure
mechanisms. Second, speaking of open and closed relations implies
that closure mechanism can be more or less open and closed. Accord-
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ingly, there can be more or less restrictive understandings of citizen-
ship (cf. Howard 2006). Third, Weber accounts for actors who use
those instruments of social closure according to their interests. This
brings us back to the beginning of this chapter where we discussed to
what extent citizenship can be considered as an instrument of social clo-
sure being operated by governmental agents. Those operations, as Weber
would put it, are governed by both material and ideal interests; these
in turn have been created by ‘world images’ – or what we call in this
context national self-understanding – that have determined, like switch-
men, the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of
interest (Weber 1946: 280). This becomes most clear when Weber pre-
sents closure mechanisms in monasteries and religious sects, which
have passed from a stage of religious proselytising to one of restriction
in the interest of the maintenance of an ethical standard or for the pro-
tection of material interests.
Introducing human action or agency in the study of nationalism and
citizenship is indispensable for the following reason: underscoring the
continuity of closure mechanisms between total closure and total open-
ness and its propensity of change over time contains the danger of
fluidity and vagueness. Indeed, we sought to put in perspective see-
mingly fixed categories such as ethnic and civic-territorial understand-
ings of citizenship. This does not mean, however, that we cannot ob-
serve enduring citizenship politics. As will become clearer in the next
chapter, fluidity and persistence can be reconciled by accounting for
how actors struggle over the meaning of citizenship. National self-un-
derstandings persist as long as they appear to be legitimate and change
when they are successfully challenged. This stands in blatant contrast
to Gellner’s (1983) proposition of how to overcome the dichotomy of
will and culture. He completely blinds out the role of actors, adopts a
functionalist perspective and argues that nations are indispensable for
industrial societies requiring patterned homogeneity, individual mobi-
lity, and cultural standardisation. Smith’s seminal contribution to this
discussion in The Ethnic Origins of Nations (1986) seems to prioritise
culture over agency (or will). However, he also speaks in detail of the
malleability of particular ethnics and nations (1986: 210-211). He em-
phasises the role of intellectuals (calling them the modern priesthood),
rediscovering and transmitting to future generations the myths and
symbols of modern nations that are far more politicised than ethnies.
But he is quick in cautioning us – and rightly so – against an instru-
mentalist perspective: ‘Ethnies and nations are not fixed and immuta-
ble entities ‘out there’ […]; but neither are they completely malleable
and fluid processes and attitudes, at the mercy of every outside force.’
Brubaker’s (1999: 67-69) alternative to civic and ethnic nationalism
does not account for agency but points to a further aspect that will be-
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come more relevant in the next chapter – political struggle. Brubaker
prefers to apply the concepts of state-framed and counter-state forms of
nationalism. In the former, ‘nation’ is conceived as congruent with the
state and as institutionally and territorially framed by it. There is not
necessarily anything ‘civic’ about state-framed nationalism; different
linguistic, cultural and ethnic aspects may be shaped by the state.
‘Counter-state’ nationalism imagines ‘nations’ in opposition to existing
‘state-framed’ nationalisms. Similarly, counter-state definitions of na-
tions may be drawn from various ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ aspects of nation-
hood. Brubaker does not elaborate very much on this dichotomy but by
giving various examples insinuates that counter-state nationalisms seek
regional autonomy or secession from existing nation-states. By general-
ising his arguments, we could understand by ‘counter-state’ national-
ism a movement questioning the way in which individual aspects of
nationhood are framed by the state. We then might assume that there
are various actors (within a nation-state) challenging the dominant de-
finition of a nation-state, and that such conflicts occur at different
points in time. Such movements do not assert their claims to specific
parts of a nation-state but to its very essence.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter started out to explore the idea of citizenship and its func-
tioning in modern nation-states. On the basis of Tilly’s definition, we
first underscored the contractual nature of citizenship between govern-
mental agents and categories of persons. Dissecting the two steps of
naturalisation – decision-making by both potential candidates and the
authorities – revealed that the latter have the last word and regulate the
access to citizenship according to specified criteria. Contrary to medie-
val local citizenship politics, national citizenship is no longer about an
economic free-rider problem. Rather, considering nation-states as
membership organisations where cultural and symbolic aspects are at
stake, it is the national self-understanding – i.e. the way a nation is per-
ceived – that guides citizenship politics. To better understand the logic
that follows the functioning of national citizenship, we explored the
concept of nationalism as a modern form of the principle of groups liv-
ing together. We argued that modernity is structured by nationalist
principles and that nationalism is the fusion of other notions of people-
hood. Accordingly, naturalisation has become a highly political issue
because it is about the questions of who belongs to us, who is an equal
citizen, who is allowed to participate in the democratic processes and
who belongs to the sovereign body legitimatising the state.
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Citizenship models provide answers to these questions, as they re-
present different ways that community is imagined. The dichotomy of
ethnic and civic-territorial models has emerged as the main theoretical
framework to study contents of nationalism and citizenship. While
these two models do grasp reality in a certain way, they pose various
analytical problems: they are normatively loaded; they represent ideal-
types and not clearly distinguishable empirical cases; they seem to be
mutually exclusive whereas in fact every nationalism is composed of
both principles; and, finally, they suggest differences of principle
whereas it would be more useful to consider them as differences of de-
gree and emphasis. To overcome these problems, Weber’s concepts of
open and closed social relations were introduced: Weber provides neu-
tral terms and enables us to account for both agency and for different
degrees of social closure. The aspect of agency is crucial for under-
standing why citizenship models emerge and change over time: for ci-
tizenship politics is led by the ‘unstated assumptions and collective
memory’ (Tilly) of the governmental agents regulating the access to the
national community, and they might be challenged by various other ac-
tors with different national self-understandings. This argument comes
close to Beissinger’s (2002: 19) approach of grounding ‘nationalism in
an ongoing interaction between a national order and those who seek to
overturn or alter that order through the production of disruptive
events.’
A contentious approach to nationalism allows us to better apprehend
how definitions are imposed and contested and enables us to reconcile
cultural fluidity and cultural persistence. Moreover, it becomes clear
that the categories of ethnic and civic-territorial understandings of citi-
zenship are not inherent characteristics of particular nation-states but
rather politically framed ideologies. Speaking of ‘political struggles’
does not necessarily imply violent conflicts between national or ethnic
groups. As we have argued above, nationalism also structures our
everyday life and politics – citizenship politics! How to grasp analyti-
cally these struggles over who might be granted full membership in a
national community will be dealt with in the next chapter.
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3 Nation as a Political Field
3.1 From the practice of citizenship to the logic of practice
This chapter seeks to provide a theoretical framework for the ways the
closure mechanism of national citizenship is manipulated, how its ma-
nipulation depends on the prevailing national self-understandings and,
finally, how a specific use might be contested by other actors posses-
sing another understanding of what it means to be member of the na-
tion. All this brings us back to Tilly’s (1999: 252-253) definition of citi-
zenship, which we have outlined at the beginning of the previous chap-
ter. While so far we have discussed a great deal the contractual nature
of citizenship and its role in modern societies, we have only slightly
touched on Tilly’s addendum that such contracts are never completely
specified but rather modified by practice. This specification opens a
window to follow a research strategy that has hardly been adopted so
far in the study fields of citizenship and nationalism.
To put the ‘practice’ of citizenship in perspective has both theoretical
and empirical implications. As for the latter, it simply means that we
have to concentrate on what people do and to adopt a research pro-
gramme based on close observation and ethnographic studies. To con-
centrate on the activities of individuals might seem trivial, since, al-
most per definition, the social sciences deal with what people do, espe-
cially when we analyse social interaction, everyday life, or social
behaviour. However, in the fields of nationalism and citizenship the si-
tuation is quite different in this regard. Most studies follow a mere
structuralist perspective, situate themselves on a purely macro-sociolo-
gical level of argumentation and concentrate mainly on the origins and
developments of nations. As a consequence, a majority of studies adopt
an historical perspective and analyse large evolutions, completely disre-
garding micro-sociological aspects. Several authors in this field have re-
cognised that research merely relying on macro-sociological data does
not allow a full understanding of the functioning and evolution of na-
tionalism and citizenship, since it is only by accounting for agency that
processes and variations of nationalism can properly be understood.
For Hobsbawm (1990: 10), nations constitute ‘dual phenomena, con-
structed essentially from above, but which cannot be understood unless
also analysed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes,
needs, longings and interests of ordinary people.’ Criticising Gellner’s
perspective of modernisation, he argues that official ideologies of states
and movements are not necessarily guides to what is in the minds of
the even loyal citizens or supporters (1990: 11). He further states that
national identity is not always a major part of the set of identifications
that constitute the social being; national identification can change and
shift in time. Anderson (1991[1983]) also believes that taking into con-
sideration the attitudes of individuals is crucial for the understanding
of nations and nationalism. Since ‘communities’ are ‘imagined’ and in-
dividuals have a great capacity for invention, they do not simply reflect
the macro-social forces. After all, nations exist only through the minds
of its citizens, or as Seton-Watson (1977: 5) puts it ‘[a] nation exists
when a significant number of people in a community consider them-
selves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one.’
Following the citizenship-as-practice idea does not mean to disregard
the pitfalls of individualistic or psychologistic approaches. Tilly (1999:
253) seems to be quite clear on that point when he reminds us that the
practice of citizenship is constrained by collective memory and depends
on unstated assumptions.1 This implies that we should not take what
people do in their daily lives for granted but also account for the wider
patterns of social life, for what people do is located in a social space
and shaped by social relations. This is what Bourdieu understands by
the ‘logic of practice’ (Bourdieu 1977; 1990; Bourdieu & Wacquant
1992). It is here that we are turning to the theoretical implications of
the citizenship-as-practice idea. The ‘logic of practice’ refers to the in-
terdependence of mental structures and institutional requirements by
recognising that the emergence and conditionality of social structures
must be relocated on the level of social actors (see also DiMaggio 1997:
277). In other words, Bourdieu proposes to go beyond the dichotomy
of objectivist and voluntaristic approaches according to which ethni-
cally motivated actions are either determined by their cultural environ-
ment or the result of individual rationalised decisions. According to
Bourdieu’s famous words, one can escape the alternative between ob-
jectivism and subjectivism by accounting for how in ongoing processes
dominant interpretations emerge out of different representations of the
social world. To study such processes Bourdieu’s analytical tools of ‘ha-
bitus’, ‘capital’ and ‘field’ will help us understand how human beings
both internalise external structures and produce and reproduce them
by externalising internal structures within the confines of a socially
and culturally constituted space. These concepts will enable us to cap-
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ture the dynamic nature of nation and to combine micro- and-macro-
sociological elements in the study of nationalism.
Elaborating on Bourdieu’s logic of practice, this chapter aims at pro-
viding a theoretical framework that enables us to closely look at the
very moments when citizenship laws are applied and when it is
decided to whom national membership status is given. For this pur-
pose, we will first address the question of social constructivism. By re-
viewing some of the current debates, we will plead for a more thorough
and coherent constructivist theory that closely follows Berger and Luck-
mann’s (1967) model and which accounts for interaction processes be-
tween human beings that produce social reality. Their approach will
enable us both to overcome essentialist arguments and to avoid the pit-
falls of instrumentalism and post-modernism. Their model will be
complemented with the notion of power, in order to go beyond classic
discourse analysis that is unlikely to explain why a certain interpreta-
tion of a social phenomenon prevails. Without abolishing the notion of
nation altogether, Berger and Luckmann’s approach to social constructi-
vism enables us to follow Brubaker’s (2004: ch.1, 1994) advice to treat
nations not as bounded groups but as variables that may be moulded
across and within putative groups. The main arguments of this chapter
will then be presented in two parts. First, we will emphasise that a cog-
nitive approach to nationalism and citizenship crucially enables us to
better understand citizenship politics. We will discuss concepts such as
‘scheme’, ‘categorisation’ and ‘stereotypes’ to apprehend the actors’
point of view. Departing from the idea that individuals are both socia-
lised and improvising human beings, we will then demonstrate that
definitions of cultural boundaries are produced and reproduced in on-
going political struggles leading to temporarily stable cultural compro-
mises.
3.2 Rethinking the social construction of nations
For a long time now, the research fields of ethnicity and nationalism
have been the settings of violent struggles between essentialists/pri-
mordialists and constructivists on the questions of whether or not na-
tions can be considered as bounded and fixed groups or whether or not
they constitute historically deep-rooted entities. An essentialist ap-
proach perilously implies homogeneous and static entities and does
not allow us to account for variation over both time and space. Essenti-
alist definitions of nations are often contestable because they are based
on qualities that putative nations share with other groups or on quali-
ties that are not clearly shared among all recognised members of the
nation (Calhoun 1993: 216). Considering ethnic groups or nations as
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fixed and bounded may lead to a risk of over-ethnicised interpretations
of conflicts and violence between ethnic and national groups, thereby
obscuring either other possible explanatory factors such as material in-
terests at stake or dynamics involved that could be better explained, for
example, by warlordship or opportunistic looting (Bowen 1996). Disre-
garding framing dynamics or instrumentalisation processes may lead
us to mistake groupist rhetoric of political leaders for real groupness
and putative groups of ethnopolitcal rhetoric for substantial things in
the world (Brubaker 2004: 9-10). It also lets us falsely assume that the
ascribed characteristics or features of such entities are an essential part
of individual identities. Finally, it does not permit us to understand
why ethnic or national identities arise and wane at different moments
in time and never have the same salience for all the constituent parts
of a group.
Today, constructivists clearly dominate the field, arguing that groups
are contingent and fluctuating, as they need human practices to sus-
tain their existence. In other words, individuals participate in the crea-
tion of their perceived reality of groups, dominant views on what con-
stitutes a group being maintained or challenged by social interaction.
Essentialist arguments are no longer represented – at least not in the
forefront of the theoretically more sophisticated debate. It has even
been convincingly demonstrated in the meantime that Shils (1957) and
Geertz (1963), who have often been accused of primordialism, were
not saying that the world is constituted by an objective primordial rea-
lity, but were actually emphasising the ‘participants primordialism’,
that is, the idea that primordial attachments are felt towards co-ethnics
(Gil-White 1999: 802-804; Smith 1998: 151-159). Ordinary people in-
cessantly naturalise and essentialise their social environment. Bourdieu
and Wacquant (1992: 228) have called this ‘our primary inclination to
think the social world in a substantialist manner.’2 As we have pointed
out above in defining the concept of nationalism, human beings have a
natural tendency to organise themselves in groups and tag them with
cultural or symbolic meanings. We may agree that primordialist think-
ing is an inherent and necessary functional aspect of the organisation
of society that gives human beings a sense of belonging and hence of
security.3 However, while such entities may appear as fixed to indivi-
duals, social researchers must take care not to run the risk of adopting
such common sense concepts as analytical instruments or, in Bour-
dieu’s terminology, to take care to maintain a clear distinction between
categories of practice and categories of analysis.
For Brubaker (2004: 8-9), essentialist ideas still covertly inform
‘much ostensibly constructivist academic writing.’ He observes a ten-
dency to speak, for example, of Serbs, Muslims, Jews, Turks, etc. ‘as if
they were internally homogeneous, externally bounded groups, even
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unitary collective actors with common purposes.’ According to him, it
often happens, especially in debates on multiculturalism and group
rights (be it by political actors or researchers), that groups are essentia-
lised and legitimacy is lent to political discourses (Brubaker 1998: 294-
295; see also May et al. 2004: 10-11). As Brubaker (2004: 10) rightly
points out, one cannot criticise politicians talking about group rights
and the existence of groups, as this is precisely what their business is
(and what scholars are to analyse). As for researchers, it is, indeed, a
more delicate question. Brubaker explains the perseverance of (some-
times unconscious) essentialist thinking with the fact that talking
about nations itself easily misleads social scientists into adopting com-
mon sense views of a world partitioned into deeply constituted and
quasi-natural entities. Brubaker (2003: 557) seeks to solve this problem
not simply by expunging the misuses of these terms but – in a very
Bourdieuian tradition – by ‘constructing an analytical language that
can do justice to the complexity of social affinities and affiliations,
without falling back on the easily accessible yet impoverished social
ontologies – individualist or groupist – on which moral and political
theories too often rest.’ Brubaker introduces the concept of ‘nation-
ness’, which stands for a variable that may be moulded across and
within putative groups and thus provides us with a very useful analyti-
cal tool to apprehend the complexity of the social phenomena of na-
tionalism.
However, even if we agree that nations are not bounded primordial
groups, this does not imply that this notion has no analytical value for
constructivists. In fact, we still need it to describe the reality we ob-
serve. When a certain number of individuals consider themselves as
part of a nation, agree to share certain cultural characteristics and to
build a community of sentiment (Weber 1946: 78) – and this happens
nowadays quite often – which other term than ‘nation’ could social re-
searchers use to describe this social phenomena? ‘Nationness’ does not
do the job. Rather, it shows us how to think and talk about nations. It
rightly forces us to ‘treat nation not as substance but as institutiona-
lised form; not as collectivity but as practical category; not as entity but
as contingent event’ (Brubaker 1996: 16, our emphasis). ‘Nationness’
is a conceptual tool to guide the work of researchers, but does not re-
place the concept of ‘nation’. Moreover, what Sewell (1992: 3) said in
his critique and reformulation of the concept of ‘structure’ is also true
for ‘nation’, namely that it is such a rhetorically powerful and pervasive
term that any attempt to abolish it would be futile. Instead, we should
try to overcome its weaknesses and redefine it in a way that allows us
to better grasp social reality.
Such a redefinition should prevent us from assuming essentialist
convictions exist behind every scholarly use of the term ‘nation’.
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Smutny (2004: 83-88), for example, very much inspired by Brubaker’s
new terminology, argues that some scholars adopt what he calls a ‘light
essentialist’ approach. They try to distance themselves from substanti-
alist thoughts by deducing ‘nations’ from other categories such as ‘peo-
ple’, ‘communities’, or ‘ethnic groups’, thereby simply moving the es-
sentialist bias to another level. For Smutny (2004: 85-86), Smith’s
(1986) argument on the ethnic continuity of nations, for example, runs
the risk of ‘essentialising’ ethnic groups or what he calls ethnic cores.
Indeed, Smith (1991: 39) asserts that a state’s ethnic core often shapes
the character and the boundaries of the nation. In his defence, it has to
be pointed out, however, that he clearly says that ethnic cores do not
automatically lead to the emergence of nations. Rather, modern nation-
alism resorts to ethnic myths (Smith 1991: 39, 1986: 148, more gener-
ally ch.6 and ch.7), and the search for historic origins and the socio-
cultural organisation needed to mobilise part of the masses has been
part of both ethnic groups and nations (Smith 1986: ch.6). Smutny
further accuses Alter (1994), among others, of ‘light essentialism,’ only
because he asserts that ‘the nation is a politically mobilised people’ or
that a nation ‘is constituted by the social group’s (the people’s) con-
sciousness of being a nation, or their wanting to be one […]’ (Smutny
2004: 86). For Smutny, this is evidence enough that Alter deduces na-
tions one-to-one from the people thereby reifying social groups. Did he
overlook that Alter speaks of politically mobilised people and of social
groups that gained consciousness and that he understands by ‘people’
simply a set of people of a certain category?
Interestingly, Smutny (2004: 85n278) defends the authors he criti-
cises by acknowledging that they are all researchers who definitely dis-
tance themselves from essentialist arguments. Smutny then explicates
that his accusation concerns mainly their ‘essentialist rhetoric’. It thus
seems that he merely criticises their use of notions such as ‘nation’ or
‘ethnic group’. Speaking of nations (especially when scholars do it
nowadays), however, does not automatically imply representing a ‘so-
cial and cultural world in terms reminiscent of a Modigliani painting
as a multichrome mosaic of monochrome ethnic or cultural blocs,’ as
Brubaker asserts (1998: 293). Pointing to the dangers of reification, i.e.
‘the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things, that is,
in non-human or possibly supra-human terms’ (Berger & Luckmann
1967: 89), does not mean that groups are not real or that there are no
cultural differences. It is rather the case that they cannot be considered
as clear and fixed unities but as both fluid and manipulable. On this
point most researchers in this field certainly agree.
Why then worry about essentialism when the large majority seems
to agree that nations are socially constructed? In our opinion, concerns
are still largely justified. The ongoing campaign against essentialism –
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even if it often resembles straw man bashing – is itself a sign of dis-
comfort towards current theoretical approaches in the field of ethnicity
and nationalism. The unease with the current analytical frameworks is
due not so much to some dissenters of the dominant view, but rather,
can be explained by the fact that it is getting ever more difficult to un-
derstand what the idea of ‘constructivism’ really represents. Too often
taken for granted, its meaning is seldom explained, i.e. what it really
means to say that communities are imagined, contingent and fluctuat-
ing. This, in turn, has led to a certain naivety or over-simplification of
argument, or as Brubaker (2004: 3) puts it, ‘by virtue of its very suc-
cess, the constructivist idiom has grown “weary, stale, flat, and unprofi-
table.”’ Constructed phenomena of any kind then get blurred and may
hardly be analytically or intellectually grasped. Nations appear as illu-
sory communities and nationalism as a case of false consciousness or
a mistaken identity. Such a situation is then mainly grist for the mills
of those who criticise an apparently everything-goes constructivism and
for whom traditions seem to be invented out of the blue.
To counter such criticism we first and foremost have to delimit social
from radical constructivism. The latter has mainly been developed by
Glasersfeld and Foerster (1999, see also Glasersfeld 1996). Similar to
postmodernists, radical constructivists argue that we cannot know the
reality of the human world. Objective knowledge is not possible because
all our knowledge is constructed by cognitive processes of the human
brain. Although there is an objective world out there, all we can do is
offer representations of it. For Berger and Luckmann (1967) – probably
the most important representatives of social constructivism – reality is
also produced by people acting on their interpretation and their knowl-
edge of it. However, Berger and Luckmann claim that knowledge about
the social world is possible by revealing the ways in which actors contri-
bute to the creation of their perceived reality. Such a method involves
looking at the ongoing and dynamic processes in which social phenom-
ena are created and institutionalised by humans. Berger and Luckmann
argue that all knowledge, including the most basic – the taken-for-
granted common sense knowledge of everyday life – is derived from
and maintained by social interactions. When people interact, they do so
with the understanding that their respective perceptions of reality are
related and, as they act upon this understanding, their common knowl-
edge of reality becomes reinforced. Since this common sense knowl-
edge is negotiated by people, human significations and institutions
come to be presented as part of an objective reality.
Translated into our more specific research field, this model of how
society works implies that we have to account for what we have earlier
called the principle of nationalism, i.e. the social organisation of cultur-
al difference and, more specifically, for how people imagine citizenship
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and nationalism and how the more general perceptions of these phe-
nomena are the results of ongoing social interactions. Following our
discussion on nationalism and national citizenship in the foregoing
chapter, we can state more precisely that these confrontations consti-
tute ongoing political processes in which claims are made about the ca-
tegories that are included in the nation. Such an approach clearly re-
futes instrumentalist accounts with which constructivism is often re-
lated. Ethnic and national groups are not rational associations of self-
interested actors or the artefacts of cultural engineers (Brass 1979,
1991; Nairn 1977; Hechter 1975).4 It also questions post-modernist and
cosmopolitanist arguments, which, indeed, reject substantialism but
completely deny the existence of any cultural groups by considering
ethnicity and nationalism as a matter of free-floating, ubiquitous and
undetermined construction (see Calhoun 2003, 2004b). At the same
time, Berger and Luckmann’s approach helps us describe groups of
people considering themselves as a nation without automatically imply-
ing that a nation constitutes a bounded group. On the contrary, demon-
strating interaction processes within a nation (in our case even within
Swiss municipalities) challenges the idea of homogeneous cultural en-
tities (cf. DiMaggio 1997: 267-268).
There is one remaining problem: when we assert that common
sense knowledge of everyday life is derived and maintained by social
interactions, how can we explain that a specific perception or opinion
prevails? Berger and Luckmann’s model of society is problematic inso-
far as it concentrates on the symbolic aspects of the social worlds,
thereby almost completely neglecting the material practices in which
symbolisation is embodied. Indeed, they discuss at length the question
of legitimation. However, as Jenkins (1997: 137-139) rightly criticises,
power should be more prominent in their model. Accounting for
power means going beyond a classic discursive approach that relies so-
lely on the meanings and attitudes that are mobilised and evoked. Dis-
course analysis has indeed deconstructed the idea of cultural homoge-
neity and replaced it by notions of multiplicity and heterogeneity by de-
monstrating how multiple discourses exist in a certain place, dissolve
and reappear (Bhabha 1990; Chatterjee 1993). However, as Wimmer
(2002: 24-26) rightly points out, it does not provide analytical tools to
explain why a specific construction dominates. The social construction
of the world is intimately linked to the capacity to impose one’s defini-
tion onto others: ‘In this sense, nationalism is not simply about ima-
gined communities; it is much more fundamentally about a struggle
for control over defining communities and, in particular, for control
over the imagination about community’ (Beissinger 2002: 18).
To combine discursive elements and power structures we will refer
below to Bourdieu’s ‘field-approach’, which accounts for both the sym-
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bolic and material aspects of interactions (cf. Swartz 1997). A nation is
such a field in which people confront, in a socially constituted space,
their opinions on what constitutes the cultural boundaries (cf. Spill-
man & Faeges 2005: 435). Such a definition does not predefine which
categories lie at the basis of a nation; it even leaves open which actors
participate in the processes of labelling the nation and which argu-
ments are mobilised. It merely expounds that people incessantly strug-
gle in political processes over the question of who they are and whom
they exclude and that the arguments of the more influential actors pre-
vail. The claim that a nation is socially constructed thus invokes a spe-
cific process by which a national self-understanding is produced and
reproduced in interaction processes (cf. Fearon & Latin 2000: 850).
The precise mechanisms of these processes will be delineated in the re-
maining parts of this chapter.
3.3 The actors’ perceptions and categorisations
A social constructivist approach involves recognising the importance
that has to be accorded to the actors’ point of view (Borofsky 1994; Di-
Maggio 1997). When we investigate how the closure mechanism of ci-
tizenship is used and postulate that its application depends on national
self-understanding, we first have to account for how social actors per-
ceive citizenship politics and which categories are mobilised to regroup
candidates for naturalisation. Accounting for the ways cultural cate-
gories are applied is all the more crucial in the age of nationalism, in
which social structures are no longer defined by kinship networks and
citizenship has ceased to be an economic regulatory mechanism.
One of the first researchers in the field of ethnicity and nationalism
who emphasised the actors’ perceptions was Barth (1969). Best known
is his prioritisation of ethnic boundaries over groups. What is relevant
is not the ‘stuff’ of a group, i.e. common language, culture, territory or
history, but how certain characteristics become salient boundary mar-
kers between groups: ‘We can assume no simple one-to-one relation-
ship between ethnic units and cultural similarities and differences.
The features that are taken into account are not the sum of ‘objective’
differences, but only those which actors themselves regard as signifi-
cant […] some cultural features are used by the actors as signals and
emblems of differences, others are ignored, and in some relationships
radical differences are played down and denied’ (Barth 1969: 14).
The selection and use of cultural features happens through categori-
sations and by means of schemes (Lakoff 1987; DiMaggio 1997: 268-
272). Jenkins (2004: ch.8) distinguishes categorisation from group
identification. While the former stands for external definition, the latter
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points to internal processes of self-definition. Of course, both are clo-
sely connected, for how we define the others depends on how we see
ourselves. Cultural boundary demarcation is thus not only a means to
exclude those who do not belong to us; simultaneously it informs us
about the identity that has been adopted by a group. More generally, ca-
tegorisations are the processes through which we make sense of the
complex social world. All our thoughts, perceptions and actions are
structured through mediative filters, or what others call schemes and
frames (Strauss & Quinn 1994, 1997; Goffman 1974). This fact be-
comes relevant, for example, when we meet strangers: ‘The ability to
identify unfamiliar individuals with reference to known categories al-
lows us at least the illusion that we know what to expect of them’ (Jen-
kins 2004: 82).
Such categorisations of individuals are akin to what others call
stereotypical thinking (Hamilton & Sherman 1994). Stereotyping is the
partial or incomplete labelling of others, thereby simplifying and gener-
alising the view of others based on a restricted amount of information
(e.g. external characteristics such as clothes, skin colour, gender or be-
haviour), cliche´s and prejudices. Indeed, stereotyping might result in
discrimination, false assumptions and dramatising simplifications.
However, today stereotypes are no longer considered as cognitive defi-
ciencies but as normal and ubiquitous mechanisms of the mind gener-
ating inferences and expectations (Hamilton & Sherman 1994: 2-3).
They need not necessarily be hostile. Like schemes, they are mental
structures or templates that help us to interpret the world and render it
more predictable. Since we are incessantly led in ambiguous and un-
certain situations we all need instruments to explain and anticipate the
behaviour of others (Jenkins 2004: 128). Stereotyping is only one as-
pect of cognition and identification, but a highly crucial one in the con-
text of citizenship politics.
Nonetheless, we have to keep in mind that not only individuals get
classified but also utterances, situations, events, actions and state of af-
fairs. Analysing such categorisations not only helps us understand how
people or things get classified, but also, more generally, it provides an-
swers to the question of how people see the world (Brubaker 2004:
77). In the empirical chapters below, we will not only demonstrate how
foreigners are categorised. We also will discuss in detail how member-
ship criteria are established and which are the opinions on the recent
decisions of the Swiss Federal Court, in order to understand how citi-
zenship is perceived, how local politicians see their own community
and how such understandings lead to different naturalisation policies.
Where do schemes, stereotypes and attitudes come from? Why do
people categorise strangers in a specific way? For Strauss and Quinn
(1994: 284-285) schemes are the generic versions of past experiences
58 PRACTISING CITIZENSHIP AND HETEROGENEOUS NATIONHOOD
and the internalisation of collective representations. Thereby, they em-
phasise that a cognitive approach is not identical with individualistic
analytical models. Rather, schemes, stereotypes and attitudes are ‘so-
cially shared knowledge of social objects’ (Brubaker 2004: 86). A com-
mon perception of the nation, for example, can be imposed through ex-
plicit teaching (see Gellner 1983: 140; Smith 1991: 118-119). Following
this idea, Eugene Weber (1976) demonstrated how the compulsory
education system in France led to the incorporation of the great major-
ity of the population into the French nation-state.5
However, most of our expectations about the world are learned in so-
cial interactions without explicit rules being taught us (Strauss &
Quinn 1994: 286-287). Perspectives on others might be imposed by
the state through what we have referred to earlier as constructions
from above, i.e. categorisation practices of authoritative institutions.
The modern state has not only the monopoly of violence, but also seeks
to legitimate symbolic force and control ethnic categorisations (Bour-
dieu et al. 1994: 8-12). By means of censuses or specifications in for-
mal identity documents, for example, individuals can be obliged to
choose a specific ethnic identity (cf. Anderson 1991[1983]: 164-170; Jen-
kins 1997: 69; Caplan & Torpey 2001).
The way state institutions promote national identity, mobilisations
by nationalist entrepreneurs, or more generally, discourses by the poli-
tical elite concerning foreigners and immigration, might also shape in-
dividual schemes. However, the connection between official categories
and popular self-understandings is seldom demonstrated in detail.
Barth (1969) argued that a definition of identity cannot simply be im-
posed on a group, but has to be accepted by significant others before
an identity can be said to be taken on.6 Ethnographic studies have
shown that categories used by ordinary people in everyday life can dif-
fer substantially from official classifications.7 So¨kefeld (1999) demon-
strated the plurality of contradictory identities in northern Pakistan.
Different ways of grouping ethnic categories have been investigated by
Sanjek (1981) in urban Ghana. Gorenburg (2000) revealed that sup-
port for nationalism within an ethnic group is neither constant nor
random. To what extent caste classification depends on context has
been reported by Levine (1987) and Berreman (1972). Brubaker et al.
(2006) show in their study of an ethnically mixed town in Transylvania
that despite elite-level nationalist discourses against the ethnic minor-
ity, ordinary people of both the majority and minority do not seem to
be preoccupied very much by questions of ethnic differences. As we
will see below, such variation does not mean that the range of popular
self-understandings is unlimited.
Another way to explain the formation of shared knowledge constitu-
tes the exploration of the interplay between self-identification and exter-
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nal categorisation (Barth 1969). Such interactions, though, do not hap-
pen only between groups of people considering themselves as different
from each other but also in various ways within a group (Tilly 2005: 7-
8). As Jenkins (1997: 63-70) points out, the production of identity and
ethnic categorisation happens in a variety of contexts, or more gener-
ally through primary and secondary socialisations (see also Berger &
Luckmann 1967: 129-146). The former designates the first socialisation
an individual undergoes in childhood when patterns for our receptive-
ness to being categorised are set. The latter stands for subsequent so-
cialisations in the various sub-worlds an individual encounters. Every
individual is born in a socially structured world and takes over to a cer-
tain extent the world in which others already live. However, once-inter-
nalised structures do not remain unchanged forever. Each individual is
incessantly confronted by new attitudes and has to find his or her way
in new situations. Such confrontations happen at various levels and in
different contexts. Social categorisation can take place in routine public
interactions, communal and associational life, or market relationships
(Jenkins 1997: 66-67). For our study, the influence of the social envir-
onment of local settings on the attitude towards naturalisation candi-
dates will be of primordial importance.
By distinguishing all different contexts in which individuals interna-
lise schemes and stereotypes, one runs the risk of ending up with indi-
viduals completely determined by their social environment. However,
each human being is also an actor contributing to the production of
the social world. Only by conceiving human beings as both agents and
actors or socialised and improvising individuals are we able to capture
the dynamic nature of nations. Relying solely on socialisation would
not allow us to comprehend the ongoing negotiation processes on cul-
tural boundaries or the variety of attitudes within a group. People are
not just imbibing culture; the culture in which they are socialised
leaves much opportunity for choice and variation (DiMaggio 1997:
264-268).
To capture the duality of internalisation and externalisation, Bour-
dieu has elaborated the concept of ‘habitus’ that stands for a principle
of generation and structuration. It is a system of dispositions that is
adopted by an individual actor throughout his or her life and through
the interiorisation of his or her social environment. It can be consid-
ered as a general perception or action-scheme that structures an indivi-
dual’s reactions to new situations. Emphasis is placed on structuration:
our habitus does not determine our actions, but structures them by
providing a limited set of possible solutions or, in Swidler’s (1986) ter-
minology, a toolkit of habits, skills and styles, which are applied in
everyday thinking and activities. This ‘elbowroom’ – limited by the ac-
tors’ socialisation and the constitution of the field in which they act –
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accords them the competence to assess pros and cons in a given situa-
tion and to develop strategies on the basis of their own interests. To be
completely clear on this point: This does not mean that human beings
are sometimes free and sometimes they enact learned structures;
rather, their activities are always constrained by learned dispositions.
Habitual responses do not represent hard-and-fast rules, but are ac-
quired from everyday practices that are not highly precise.
By the means of their habitus, actors tend to reproduce their own
conditioning: Confronted with familiar situations, human beings act
according to their past experiences and apply those schemes that were
useful for solving previous, similarly shaped problems. Such a repro-
duction may be observed in traditional societies in which individuals
do not very often need to improvise. This leads some to criticise Bour-
dieu for reintroducing structural determinism in his theoretical frame-
work (Sewell 1992: 13-19; Jenkins 1992: ch.4; Wimmer 2002: 27; Bidet
& Bailey 1979; King 2000). However, Bourdieu clearly goes a step
further by arguing that we are all constantly confronted with new pro-
blems for which we have no ready-made solutions at hand. When we
find ourselves in unfamiliar situations, all we can do is to choose
among our schemes and transpose them to the new situations (Bour-
dieu & Wacquant 1992: 129-135; Bourdieu 1989: 406; see also Sewell
1992: 17-18 and Swartz 1997: 211-214). By doing so, human beings pro-
duce structures and give social life a certain dynamic. This incessantly
happens in modern and complex societies. However, even in very tradi-
tional societies improvisations occur. In his ethnological studies of the
Kabyles in Algeria in the 1970s, Bourdieu (1972) observed that indivi-
duals exercised some degree of freedom even in seemingly highly regu-
lated domains as, for example, marriage.
The idea of habitus can best be illustrated by Bourdieu’s own meta-
phor of sport games in which intense competition and engagement in
a struggle with others is going on (see Calhoun 2000). Bourdieu sug-
gests that social life is like such a game, except that the stakes are big-
ger. To understand a game, we first have to look at the individual
players and their abilities that make the game dynamic and interesting.
A successful player not only masters particular techniques, he or she
also has a sense of the game that is, for example, a constant awareness
of and responsiveness to the play of one’s opponents. This sense of the
game is the result of years of experience and practice and allows him
or her to react quickly, almost automatically, to the actions of other
players; deliberate decisions would be mostly too late. Indeed, a game
in which players solely and strictly reacted according to practised strate-
gies would be quite boring. Moreover, it is hardly imaginable that any
training or coaching could completely determine the players’ game.
Since no game is like another one, improvisation is constantly re-
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quired. The unpredictable reactions of the players confronted with the
constantly changing situations on the field make a game, like life, cap-
tivating and dynamic.
Individuals are capable of exerting (consciously or unconsciously)
some degree of social control over the social relations they are part of
(Sewell 1992: 20-21). Since hardly any two human beings have under-
gone exactly the same socialisation, when confronted with the same
unresolved problems they react differently, due to their own mechan-
isms of social perspectivity (Hannerz 1993: ch.3). This explains the
variable, conflictive and processual character of nations or culture more
generally. As the examples above illustrate, the connection between of-
ficial categories and popular self-understandings vary in range between
individuals and groups due to different perceptions and interpretations
of the same cultural phenomena. Such a heterogeneity or inconsis-
tency of schemes may also lead to conflicts between groups or indivi-
dual actors: dominant views may be questioned and new ones im-
posed. However, as we will see in the next sections, not any view can
be conceived and/or imposed.
3.4 Limited contestations
To make it clear right from the outset, emphasising the processual
character of nations (Tilly 2005: 23-44; Brubaker 1994) does not mean
adopting a developmentalist perspective of modernist exponents such
as Gellner (1983), Anderson (1991[1983]) and Hobsbawm (1990), there-
by running the risk of falling into the teleological trap. Such a danger
also exists when agency is accounted for. Greenfeld’s (1992) agent-
centred accounts in the comparison of the emergence of nationalism
in five countries, for example, pays indeed a lot of attention across time
and place to the way ideas of the nation are originally conceived. How-
ever, by emphasising that the character of every national identity is de-
fined in the early phase of the emergence of nationalism, once-estab-
lished nations in her accounts seem impervious to subsequent events.
It is rather the opposite case: struggles about nation incessantly change
directions, wane and reappear (see Tilly 1975, 2005).
Brubaker (1996: 63) introduces, among other concepts, that of ‘na-
tionalising states’ to allow a better analysis of the situation of emerging
nations in Eastern Europe in the last two decades. He prefers this con-
cept to the one of ‘nation-state’ because the latter stands for an
achieved or completed condition, while the former implies that this
completed condition has then not yet been achieved in most Eastern
European states. This differentiation is certainly of crucial importance
and highly useful. At the same time, it implicitly reveals an often mis-
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guided view that considers nation-states as an achievement of a certain
evolution. Nation-states continue, even when established and legiti-
mised, to nationalise their territory. Therefore, it would be more appro-
priate to speak of ‘nationalising nation-states’. But not only do nation-
states incessantly nationalise their territory, the nationalisation process
itself is subject to debates between various actors over its definition
and meaning.
This has already been recognised by Brubaker (1992) in his earlier
work on citizenship models in France and Germany.8 Indeed, his citi-
zenship models seem to be enduring but not immutable. Interestingly,
Brubaker reveals that they have been fluid and internally contested at
different points in time. He convincingly demonstrates how particular
‘cultural idioms’ and ways of thinking and talking about nationhood
were reinforced and activated in specific historical and institutional set-
tings. Speaking of ‘cultural idioms’ allows him to avoid the culturalist
trap and provides a finer theoretical grasp of contention and variability
in the field of citizenship politics (Spillman & Faeges 2005: 431). Ac-
cordingly, citizenship models are not culturally determined but the out-
come of political struggles and power relations between actors defend-
ing opposite ideas. The concept of ethnic citizenship was raised by
some actors at certain moments in France as much as defenders of a
republican model regularly appeared in Germany.9
Yet, at the same time, Brubaker’s cultural idioms can be persistent
over time and limit the discursive field within which debates are con-
ducted. As we have already mentioned in the previous chapter, nation-
alism and ethnicity are about the social organisation of cultural differ-
ence and similarity. However, too crude a dichotomy between the social
and the cultural should not be made, since the ‘‘cultural stuff’ […] and
ethnic boundary mutually modify and support one another. The former
establishes and legitimises the contrast of the boundary; while the lat-
ter, often in response to external conditions, modifies or alters the rele-
vance to the boundary of aspects of the former’ (Handelman 1977: 200
quoted in Jenkins 1997: 20).
Although the ‘cultural stuff’ does not automatically lead to group-
identity, it is not irrelevant, either. Not all categories can be instrumen-
talised and mobilised, nor are ‘invented traditions’ fabricated or cre-
ated, ex nihilo. Hobsbawm (1983) would certainly agree with Smith
(1998: 129-131) that such ‘inventions’ occur in a historically constituted
field, and that the selecting and reworking of old traditions by modern
elites and intellectuals must take place ‘on the wavelength to which the
public is ready to tune in’. Struggles over cultural boundaries happen
in a culturally and socially pre-constituted field. In such a field, certain
ethnic distinctions may be particularly salient, reinforce cultural differ-
ences and develop effects of path dependency (Wimmer 2006b). Those
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could be considered the rules of Bourdieu’s sport games we have used
as illustration above. To understand such a game, we have to account
not only for the players but also for the rules that position the players
and that set the limits for the individual actions. On a more general le-
vel, this means that we not only have to look at the various meanings
that are given to a certain social phenomenon, we also have to account
for the fact that this processes do not happen in a cultural and social
vacuum. This argument is akin to what others call the influence of dis-
cursive frameworks or cultural idioms on the interests and actions of,
and the relations between, individuals and groups (Skocpol 1985; Emir-
bayer & Goodwin 1994; Koopmans et al. 2005).
However, not only is the scope for imposing new perceptions lim-
ited, the habitus of each individual allows only for a restricted use of
new strategies. Since individuals have been socialised not in the same,
but a similar, social environment, the variation over cultural schemes
is not infinite. The example of Leach’s (1965 [1954]) study on the politi-
cal systems of highland Burma is a case in point. Against the idea of
cultural homogeneity, Leach successfully demonstrated that the Kachin
culture varies a great deal between local places. In particular, he investi-
gated political organisations between lineages. Whereas in most groups
they were hierarchical, in some local settings an egalitarian view was
asserted. Leach (1965 [1954]) explains this uneven implementation of
political forms with the distribution of local resources and local conflicts.
In spite of these different political claims, however, the range of politi-
cal alternatives is limited. A comparison shows that a feudal hierarchy
like that of the neighbouring Shan society was not possible in Kachin
society. Leach argues that attempts to institutionalise feudal hierarchies
in Kachin groups always failed because they would have gone against
certain persistent presuppositions of the Kachin groups on how society
should be organised.10
3.5 The political field and cultural compromise
To understand the structuration of the field of nation we first have to
remind ourselves that today’s social organisation of cultural groups is
happening in the age of nationalism and by the exclusion of undesir-
able strangers through the mechanism of national citizenship. Most of
us certainly agree with Brubaker (2004) that nationalism (and ethni-
city) can exist without groups. It might be part of the discourses of na-
tionalist entrepreneurs and political elites. Also, it might appear and
disappear at various moments and have various meanings for different
people. However, when groups of people are culturally organised, they
are most often called nations nowadays. This has not always been the
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case and might very well change in the future, for ‘[n]ationalism is a
historical phenomenon. It appeared in one age and it can disappear in
another’ (Greenfeld 1992: 491). Whether or not and when nationalism
will disappear is subject of debate and shall not occupy us here (see
Smith 1995). But if it does, Greenfeld (1992: 491) continues:
the world in which we live will be no more, and another world
will replace it. This post-national world will be truly post-mod-
ern, for nationality is the constitutive principle of modernity. It
will be a new form of social being and it will change the way we
see society; to understand it, we shall have to begin anew.
Above, we have demonstrated how politically salient nationalism is. Na-
tionalism not only structures modernity (Wimmer 2002), but also our
everyday life (Calhoun 1997; Billig 1995). Being in the age of national-
ism thus already limits the scope of the thinkable. It is almost incon-
ceivable to organise society within other forms than nations. From this
it does not follow that any specific nationalism comes to the fore: ‘Na-
tionalism as such is fated to prevail, but not any one particular nation-
alism. We know that reasonably homogeneous cultures, each of them
with its own political roof, its own political servicing, are becoming the
norm, widely implemented but for few exceptions; but we cannot pre-
dict just which cultures, with which political roofs, will be blessed by
success’ (Gellner 1983: 47). Any particular content of nationalism
might be challenged much easier than the form itself. This comes
close to Spillman’s (1995: 144) argument of the limits that may be
reached in questioning profound categories such as, for example, gen-
der: ‘it is much more possible to challenge meanings and values asso-
ciated with gender than to constitute for oneself a genderless identity’.
To understand which ‘culture will be blessed by success’ or why cer-
tain categories become more salient than others, power structures
within fields of nation have to be accounted for. They help us under-
stand why a specific construction of the world permeates a group and
why frames are being changed, disappear and reappear in diverse con-
texts. In such ongoing processes, power structures are not more sub-
stantial than any community or group. For the power of a group or an
individual defending a certain idea is not an inherent characteristic of
them but depends to a large extent on their position in these spaces of
struggle. The ongoing interactions in a social space point to the rela-
tional nature of power and ideas and underline that the production of
a frame heavily depends on the relations between the different units
(see Emirbayer 1997; Emirbayer & Goodwin 1994; Tilly 1994, 2005;
Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 15-19). Correspondingly, the emerging
and waning of any specific frame can be explained by changing rela-
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tions between the involved actors and thus by the formation and defor-
mation of specific power structures.
The relational character of power can best be captured by Bourdieu’s
notions of capital and political field. Following our earlier discussions
and definitions of the concepts of nation and nationalism, we can con-
sider the nation as a part of what Bourdieu (1996) calls the political
field. As all the other fields such as, for example, those of art, educa-
tion, or media that have been explored by Bourdieu, the political field
refers to a relatively autonomous sector of social activities with its spe-
cific rules. However, a distinctive feature of the political field is that
confrontations of different ideas and interpretations of the social world
can be observed more directly than in other fields. Much more expli-
citly than elsewhere, actors in the political field struggle for the legiti-
mate manipulation of the comprehensive view of the social world (e.g.
Kauppi 2003). Next to journalists and scientists, politicians perform
the function of making visible their perception or action schemes, their
visions of the divisions of the social world and they work to transform
them into categories applicable for all (Fritsch 2001: 21).
Political struggles are not simply debates of convictions but rather
confrontations of ‘power-ideas’ (ide´es-forces) between progressives and
conservatives or challengers and incumbents (Bourdieu 1996; see also
Kauppi 2003). These power struggles are motivated by an internal
asymmetry between established and newcomers. Ultimately, it is the
political power of an idea that is crucial for the continuity of an old
and the emergence of a new interpretation. In other words, the domi-
nant world-view prevails not because it is truer than others but because
it appears more legitimate or convincing than others. A new compre-
hensive view of the social world can only be proved to be wrong with
another power-idea. The power or the political capital of agents or
groups that hold those convictions depends on their social and sym-
bolic capital that, in turn, results from their position in the political
field. Social capital stands for the relationships or the social network of
agents and the resources that depend on specific social affiliations. The
symbolic capital can be considered as the perceived and legitimised
form of any capital, i.e. prestige and legitimacy. Political capital is
mostly symbolic capital, since only legitimated and respected politi-
cians can convince others of their interpretations of the social world.
However, it is also social capital insofar as the power of actors depends
on their positions and relationships with other political actors. It be-
comes clear that political capital constitutes a relational form of power.
Far from being an attribute or a property of actors, power is thus un-
thinkable outside structures of force relations. Bourdieu proposes the
differentiation between accumulated and delegated political capital.
Whereas the former is the result of slow accumulation of symbolic, so-
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cial and cultural capital, the latter is acquired by delegation and investi-
ture. In this way, political capital becomes institutionalised in the form
of posts and positions (e.g. Kauppi 2003).
The powerful are those people who succeed in convincing the others
of their interpretation of the world and thus influence the others’
choices against their original wills. Those have a lot of political capital
who are perceived by the others as the legitimate holders of power. Ac-
cordingly, we will operationalise the influence of local politicians by
their reputation. Speaking of ‘legitimation’ implies that struggles about
cultural boundaries is less about elimination and suppression of min-
ority positions than about conviction. Since people are related to one
another in a space of social relations and communication, such strug-
gles can be considered as negotiation processes leading to cultural
compromise. Wimmer (2002: 29) defines a cultural compromise ‘as
consensus over the validity of norms, classifications and patterns of in-
terpretation that lasts beyond the open process of its production.’ Put
differently, a cultural compromise emerges when actors agree that cer-
tain modes of classifying the world makes sense to them. It can be con-
ceived of as a temporal consensus abiding until new, more convincing
arguments are put forward. Wimmer partially draws on Habermas’ the-
ory of communicative action that stands for the idea that norms and
values can be substantiated through a process of argumentative nego-
tiation and thus in principle can be questioned. Contrary to Habermas,
however, Wimmer (2002: 31) argues that norms can be questioned not
by referring to universal standards of rationality, but simply by relying
on norms and modes of validation respectively habitualised as schemes
of cultural givens. All this brings us back to our earlier argument that
human beings are socialised and incessantly internalise their social en-
vironment. In the meantime, however, we understand why specific
schemes and perceptions are adopted.
3.6 Empirical implications: the design of the study
Nowadays, most scholars in the field of nationalism and citizenship
agree that we are all constructivists. Thus, the question that needs to
be asked is no longer whether, but how, nations are socially constructed.
Indeed, the axiom of constructivism has reached a dominant position
in this field even though some argue that essentialist arguments still
exist in seemingly constructivist approaches. But in any case, we have
to specify what it means that nations are socially constructed, for ‘con-
structivism’ would lose its analytical power if it degenerated to a simple
buzzword. Following this idea, this second theoretical chapter helped
us understand the mechanisms of the social construction of a national
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self-understanding and how a specific naturalisation policy is the out-
come of political struggles. In this sense, we not only look at how citi-
zenship is conceptualised and a nation is perceived. We propose to
study the actual politics of citizenship, i.e. the ways in which ideas
about the question of who might be admitted are pitted against each
other in local naturalisation fields. To do this, we have to account for
both the ideologies of municipal politicians and the local power structures.
We thereby closely follow Bourdieu’s and Berger and Luckmann’s pro-
positions of how to study the social world. Berger and Luckmann re-
mind us that scholarly knowledge about the social world is possible
when we analyse how knowledge is produced in interaction processes
between human beings. In accounting for power structures, Bourdieu
similarly argues that we have to put in perspective political struggles
between the different visions of the division of the social world.
How do we go about analysing such struggles? First, we have to re-
mind ourselves what kind of struggles we are analysing. Above, we
pleaded for studying citizenship politics at the micro-sociological level.
However, the basic ideas of our theoretical framework can be applied
at various levels and in different circumstances. Struggles about na-
tional cultural boundaries can be observed in the early phase of the for-
mation of a nation, but also after the achievement of a clearly definable
nation-state, when the national elite continues to nationalise its terri-
tory and when opposing powers try to question the ways a nation is de-
fined. A successful opposition can lead to a reformulation of the na-
tional self-understanding, the attribution of more autonomy to, or even
the secession of a part of, the national territory. But citizenship and na-
tionalism are not only about tumultuous events. Citizenship and na-
tionalism can be much more banal and very close to everyday lives (see
Billig 1995). In our case, we are probably somewhere between everyday
nationalism, that might be so familiar to everyone that it is easily over-
looked, and violent contestations of nationalist politics. Naturalisations
are part of daily politics and constitute decision-making processes dur-
ing which politicians have to come to an agreement on which criteria
have be fulfilled to get a passport. Such processes can be observed at
various levels in both federal and centralised states. As for Switzerland,
we have seen in the introductory chapter that the large autonomy of
municipalities, the distinct local political system and the relatively high
ratio of foreigners make naturalisations a central political issue even in
small municipalities. Switzerland thus provides a useful ‘laboratory’ to
study decision-making processes, struggles over national boundaries
and the practice of citizenship in clearly delimited fields. To be sure,
Swiss municipalities are no nations. Yet, given the large competencies
of Swiss municipalities in naturalisation politics, we can apply analyti-
68 PRACTISING CITIZENSHIP AND HETEROGENEOUS NATIONHOOD
cal instruments at the local level we would use in other countries at
the national level.
Given the fact that local decision-making structures are not very
much formalised, one has to look very closely at what happens in these
municipalities. Detailed case studies and ethnographic work are there-
fore indispensable. However, too close a look carries the danger of not
seeing the wood for the trees, especially when we do not know a lot
about local naturalisations. Hence, it is necessary to approach our ob-
ject of study from different perspectives to better grasp the complexity
of local citizenship politics and to test our hypotheses with different
data. We therefore decided to present naturalisation politics in four
steps: first, by discussing data of a large-N analysis; second, by compar-
ing quantitative data collected in fourteen case studies; third, by illus-
trating our arguments with qualitative data of four case studies; and
fourth, by analysing individual data of local politicians. Combining
quantitative and qualitative comparisons helps us frame qualitative
data within a quantitative profile and put some qualitative flesh on
quantitative bones (Tarrow 2004). Both our large-N analysis and our
case studies aim at reconstructing the local naturalisation fields and at
distinguishing the ideas of local actors and power-structures within
municipalities. When we study the local naturalisation fields we will
adopt a relational approach and resort to social network analysis in or-
der to study the distribution of both symbolic and material resources
in the social space of local citizenship politics. Concentrating our atten-
tion on both the systemic level, i.e. the local naturalisation fields, and
the individual actors enables us to conceive of local politicians as both
improvising and socialised individual beings. On the one hand, they
contribute to the production and reproduction of the practice of citizen-
ship and, on the other hand, their own understanding of citizenship is
influenced by the prevailing naturalisation policy.
In what follows, we give a short overview of how we collected data to
analyse our theoretical constructs. In order not to confound the reader,
the detailed operationalisations will be discussed in the individual em-
pirical chapters at the places where the respective data are used. In
Chapter 4, we start out to set the stage by analysing data from a large-
N survey in more than 150 municipalities. The aim of this first survey
was twofold: on the one hand, it enabled us to collect important data
that has not been available so far;11 on the other hand, data from this
survey will help us specify the factors influencing naturalisations be-
fore we can fully apply our theoretical framework. Contrary to other
studies (Piguet & Wanner 2000; Bolliger 2004), and because we are
only interested in the attitudes of local politicians towards applicants
for naturalisation (and not why they apply for citizenship), we pre-
ferred not to analyse the naturalisation rates but the rejection rates,
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which depend exclusively on the way local politicians handle the appli-
cations for naturalisation. For each municipality we collected data on
the number of rejected applications between 1990 and 2002. To obtain
these data and further information on the formal aspects of local citi-
zenship politics, the administrations of 207 municipalities have been
contacted in the summer of 2003 to fill in a questionnaire.12 Despite
the fact that citizenship politics constitutes a highly politicised issue,
we did not face any major difficulties in obtaining the requested infor-
mation: 78 per cent (N=162) of all 207 municipalities have responded
and 74 per cent (N=154) provided us with their average rejection rates
for the period between 1990 and 2002.
For the selection of the municipalities, we resorted to a dataset com-
prising data of three national surveys in all Swiss municipalities in
1988, 1994 and 1998 executed by Ladner and his colleagues (see,
among others, Ladner 1991). This dataset provides important informa-
tion on the socio-economic and political structures of nearly 80 per
cent of all Swiss municipalities, which we used for our analyses. Since
we have had almost no systematic information on local citizenship pol-
itics at our disposal, our only selection criterion was the size of the mu-
nicipalities. We assumed that the ways according to which decisions
are taken and opinions are formed are different in urban and rural
areas.13 Accordingly, we first selected all municipalities in the dataset
with more than 10,000 inhabitants (N=107). In addition, we randomly
selected 100 municipalities among the remaining communities with
less than 10,000 residents that are documented in the Ladner file.
As we will show below in detail, cultural and political factors are
good predictors of the naturalisation policy that is pursued in a munici-
pality, and socio-economic and socio-structural factors have no explana-
tory power. On the basis of these results, we have selected fourteen
municipalities, in which we have executed detailed case studies (see
Chapters 5 and 6). For this second phase of our study, we have selected
the municipalities in a way to guarantee a large variety among the
cases and to make sure that they are representative for the entire popu-
lation of cases (King et al. 1994: 139-146; Collier et al. 2004: 94-95).
For a small-N analysis, random selection is unwise, as we would run
the risk of missing typical cases and/or end up with few or no variation
on our dependent variable. We therefore selected the cases on both the
dependent and the explanatory variables. Such a procedure bears some
dangers, since it is easy to bias the results inadvertently. As King et al.
(1994: 142) note, the most egregious error would be to select cases in
which dependent and independent variables vary together in ways that
are consistent with the hypotheses to be tested. To avoid this danger,
we applied a ‘mixed-selection procedure’, according to which cases are
selected in two steps (King et al. 1994: 143-144).
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First, we have selected municipalities on the basis of the variation of
the three variables that had a significant impact on the rejection rate in
our large-N analysis. As we will demonstrate, a restrictive understand-
ing of citizenship, high influence of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP)
and popular votes lead to more rejections. As it appears in Table 3.1,
we distinguished whether in the municipalities of our sample a restric-
tive or a generous understanding of citizenship prevails, whether or
not the SVP is influential in local politics, and whether decisions are
taken by the population by ballot, during a municipal assembly, or by
elected politicians (a parliament or an executive body). We then re-
grouped all cases of our sample according to these three characteristics
(see Table 3.1). For some groups, we disposed of none or only one case.
In a second step, from each one of these groups, one municipality with
a relatively high rejection rate and one with a relatively low rejection
rate were selected. In view of the more detailed case studies in Chapter
6, the pairs of municipalities within each group were selected in a way
to make sure that they are in the same canton and similar with regard
to socio-structural factors.14 We thus end up with municipalities in
which decisions are taken by the population at ballot (four cases), or
during a municipal assembly (four cases), or by their representatives in
the local parliament or the executive body (six cases). In seven cases, a
restrictive understanding of citizenship prevails and, in seven cases,
the attitudes towards foreigners is rather generous. In nine municipali-
ties, the local section of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) is powerful
and, in five municipalities, it plays a rather minor role. Since we pro-
mised our interviewees complete anonymity and because we are not in-
terested in naturalisation politics of specific municipalities, but seek in-
stead to make some general statements about local citizenship politics,
we decided to rename the municipalities. The first part of the new
name refers to the canton of the municipality, while the second part in-
Table 3.1 Selected municipalities
Understanding of
citizenship
Influence
SVP
Formal decision-making procedure (rejection rates)
Popular votes Municipal assembly Elected politicians15
Restrictive
Low Schwyzhigh (47%)
Schwyzlow (26%)
High Luzernhigh (24%) Bernhightwo (29%)
Aargaulowtwo (1%)
Zürichhigh (11%)
Zürichlow (2%)
Generous Low St. Gallenhigh (11%) Neuchâtelhigh (15%)
Neuchâtellow (5%)
High Aargauhigh (13%)
Aargaulow (1%)
Bernhigh (22%)
Bernlow (0%)
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dicates whether the rejection rates in these municipalities are relatively
high or low.
To get a clearer picture of naturalisation politics in our fourteen mu-
nicipalities, we first analysed documents such as voting bulletins and
regulations, the ‘grey literature’ from the local authorities and the local
press. At the same time, we conducted expert interviews with represen-
tatives of the local administration to get to know better the local natura-
lisation processes and especially the role, influence and attitudes of the
local actors. We also conducted expert interviews with representatives
of the cantonal administration in the cantons in which our case studies
are situated. This information allowed us to gain a more general view
of the naturalisation politics in a certain region and to find out whether
there are regional patterns of citizenship politics and whether there
might be any external influences on the municipalities we were investi-
gating.
Once we gained an overview of the respective local naturalisation po-
licies between September 2004 and February 2005, interviews have
been conducted with all actors that are involved in the decision-making
processes. Depending on the size of the municipalities ten to twenty
interviews have been carried out, mostly with the members of the local
executive body, several members of the municipal parliament and the
naturalisation commission, representatives of the local administration
and representatives of political parties.
With the selected actors face-to-face, we carried out interviews by
means of standardised questionnaires.16 The interviews lasted between
45 and 90 minutes. To operationalise the individual understandings of
citizenship, in the first part of the interview we asked questions con-
cerning their personal attitudes towards the naturalisation politics of
their municipalities and about different criteria that may or may not be
relevant for naturalisation (open and closed questions). In the second
part of the interview, they were asked to indicate which actors they
were regularly in contact with and whether they share the same opi-
nions with these actors. Moreover, we asked all interviewees to tell us
which actors they judged to have some influence in the local naturali-
sation politics. These questions help us reconstruct the local power
structures. In the third part of the interviews, we asked additional ques-
tions concerning their attitudes towards other policy domains or parts
of social life that are related to questions of naturalisations. In the four-
teen municipalities, we conducted 180 interviews. Only ten persons re-
fused to participate.
The data collected in our fourteen municipalities are analysed in
Chapters 5, 6 and 7. In Chapter 5, we will investigate naturalisations in
a comparative perspective and present the construction of two crucial
indicators, which will be of relevance throughout of the remaining
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chapters: the individual understanding of citizenship (UC) and the re-
lative power within a municipality an individual actors has. The under-
standing of citizenship will be measured by accounting for the atti-
tudes towards eleven naturalisation criteria. While it will be revealing
how large the variety of naturalisation policies can be, and how differ-
ently naturalisation criteria are applied, we also have to find out which
are the majority positions and which attitudes play a minor role. By ac-
counting for the contact structure between politicians and the relative
degree of influence of each actor, i.e. the reputation a person enjoys in
a political field, we will get a much clearer picture of the various policy
fields and a more pertinent indicator to predict rejection rates.
Keeping a comparative perspective, Chapter 6 will allow us to look
even closer at the individual decision-making procedures and at the dif-
ferent prevailing attitudes within four of our case studies. Using quali-
tative data, we will demonstrate how people think about the impor-
tance of various naturalisation criteria. Moreover, opinions on candi-
dates from Muslim countries and the recent decisions of the Swiss
Federal Court will help us understand to what extent local citizenship
politics is discriminatory, how people with another cultural background
are perceived, and whether local politicians consider naturalisation pro-
cedures as political rather than administrative procedures.
While Chapters 5 and 6 account for the entire local social structure
and demonstrate to what extent individual actors contribute to the re-
production and production of the municipal naturalisation fields,
Chapter 7 will concentrate on the individual level and investigate how
the politicians’ attitudes are influenced by their social environment, i.e.
how their habitus are shaped in the context of citizenship politics.
Drawing on theories in social psychology and social network analysis,
we will demonstrate that within a group of local politicians a cultural
compromise might emerge on the question of who can become a Swiss
citizen. Contacts with other actors during the decision-making pro-
cesses are crucial when politicians exchange their views, try to convince
others and alter their attitudes in the light of convincing arguments.
NATION AS A POLITICAL FIELD 73

4 Explaining Rejection Rates
4.1 A first glimpse at rejected applications
Following the theoretical discussions in the two previous chapters two
groups of arguments and approaches in the field of nationalism and ci-
tizenship studies will be challenged in the empirical part. First, our
constructivist approach will be pitted against both essentialists’ and re-
lativists’ reasoning throughout the following chapters. Second, this
chapter more particularly contrasts our theoretical framework to per-
spectives that explain tensions and conflicts between ethnic and na-
tional groups as directly related to socio-economic and socio-structural
conditions. Exponents of such approaches argue that situations of crisis
for example caused by a high unemployment rate or that feelings of
threat triggered for instance by a high ratio of immigrants or alien resi-
dents spark negative attitudes and movements against foreigners. By
analysing data from our survey in 154 municipalities,1 those hypotheses
will be tested against our argument that you can explain the outcome
of naturalisation processes by political and cultural factors. More gener-
ally, this first empirical part helps us set the stage for the ensuing ana-
lyses and get a rough idea which direction we have to take in the next
chapters to unveil the causal mechanisms with which we can explain
citizenship politics. Looking at such a large group of municipalities
does not enable us to study local citizenship politics in detail, but it
permits us to sort out variables that have no explanatory power and to
specify what has to be explained.
As we have already argued in the introductory chapters, data on local
naturalisation politics in Switzerland – with the exception of our study
– are virtually inexistent and limited to some few case studies describ-
ing the formal naturalisation procedures. To get a first impression of
what is going on in these municipalities when it comes to decide
whether a foreign resident might become a member of their commu-
nity or not we have to resort to media reports. Since 1985, the Endow-
ment against Racism and Anti-Semitism (Stiftung gegen Rassismus
und Antisemitismus) in Switzerland has gathered, among other things,
information on rejected naturalisation applications and racist state-
ments in the context of citizenship politics reported by newspapers.2
The national coverage of this collection of reports constitutes an ideal
complement to our own survey, which for the sake of feasibility had to
be limited to 154 municipalities and for which we were not able to col-
lect data on individual rejections.
The presentations of these media reports are mostly very short but
nonetheless allow us to get a glimpse of how and why naturalisation
requests are rejected. Most articles report time and again similar inci-
dences. The following fictive report could be a very typical article of
this electronic archive on rejected naturalisation applications:
On 12 September 1999, the Swiss citizens of the municipality of
X rejected almost all naturalisation requests of persons from the
former Yugoslavia. Only the application of a young Muslim wo-
man from Bosnia-Herzegovina has been accepted. All candidates
from Italy, Portugal and Germany have been approved. A mem-
ber of the local Swiss People’s Party (SVP) told the newspaper
that the refused candidates were not integrated enough, did not
take part in the communal life and often did not greet when you
met them in the streets.
While persons from countries of the European Union normally are nat-
uralised without any dissenting votes, candidates from the former Yu-
goslavia or from Muslim countries often face a lot of difficulties to be
accepted. Religion seems to be a crucial factor since Catholics from
Croatia, for example, are sometimes naturalised with less opposition.
Girls and young women who were born in Muslim countries but have
grown up in Switzerland have more chances to get a Swiss passport
than their brothers and mothers. Young women are considered more
integrated and more decent persons. Young men are sometimes re-
jected on the grounds that they are aggressive and speed around with
their cars. Muslim women, who immigrated to Switzerland as adults,
often speak the regional language very badly. When they wear the Mus-
lim headscarf in public they arouse suspicion among the local popula-
tion. It sometimes happens that they are refused citizenship while
their husbands, who are better integrated as a consequence of their
contacts to Swiss citizens at their workplaces, are naturalised. If any ac-
tors speaking against certain applicants are identified in the newspaper
articles, they are members of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) – a major
populist right-wing party – or minor right-wing movements. It is rarely
reported that representatives of left-wing parties speak in favour of
such applicants. To justify their negative attitude towards candidates
from Muslim countries, the SVP politicians often argue that those per-
sons are very different from Swiss citizens and are not accustomed to
the Swiss mentality, customs and traditions. If any justifications for re-
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fusals are put forward at all, they are mostly kept very short and refer
almost exclusively to the cultural and religious characteristics of the
candidates. A last typical communality of the reported incidences is
that candidates for naturalisation are exclusively rejected at popular
votes at ballot or during a municipal assembly. No incidents are re-
ported from municipalities where elected politicians decide on naturali-
sation requests.
Although these reports are kept very short, they allow us to dissect
some crucial elements that we have to investigate in more detail in the
following chapters: who are the actors influencing the naturalisation
policy? Which are their attitudes towards citizenship in general and
naturalisation candidates in particular? How do the formal procedures
have an impact on the outcome of the decision-making processes? The
dominant understanding of citizenship, i.e. the idea what makes a dif-
ference to be or to become a Swiss citizen, is certainly a crucial factor
when it comes to establish criteria for naturalisation. A restrictive un-
derstanding of citizenship will be translated into higher barriers and
entails a higher rejection rate. Given the political character of naturali-
sations in Swiss municipalities, we also have to account for the atti-
tudes of the political actors who influence the decisions. Of particular
interest is the role of local SVP representatives. The Swiss People’s
Party is a crucial actor in naturalisation politics in Switzerland and the
only major political force seeking to limit naturalisations and immigra-
tion. The formal decision-making structures are of importance insofar
as they provide different opportunity structures facilitating or inhibit-
ing mobilisations against naturalisation or the activation of discrimina-
tory attitudes. In the last years, the political and judicial debates in the
context of local naturalisation have mainly focused on those procedures
in which the population makes the final decision on naturalisation re-
quests by ballot or during a municipal assembly. It is argued that such
procedures enable discriminatory decision because people do not have
to render an account for their decisions.
Finally, we will also take a particular look at how candidates from
Muslim countries are treated. An accumulation of negative reactions
against persons from Muslim countries began in the mid 1990s when
people from the former Yugoslavia gradually became the biggest group
of naturalisation candidates. The examination of the newspaper articles
shows that there were hardly any incidents of negative decisions re-
ported before 1996. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s Switzerland wit-
nessed an increase of immigration from the countries of the former
Yugoslavia and from Turkey. Akin to the immigrants from Italy in the
1950s and 1960s, those migrants have met a lot of resistance among
the Swiss population. Can we consider such incidents in the context of
naturalisations as local clashes of civilisation? We will analyse below
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whether the ratio of applicants from those countries influences the nat-
uralisation policy. If our hypotheses are correct such candidates do
meet with more resistance not in those municipalities where a lot of
persons from Muslim countries try to get a Swiss passport, but rather
in those places where local politicians perceive them as a cultural
threat; and conceptualisations of such a threat are expected to be very
different from one municipality to another.
In the next part we will present competing approaches explaining
tensions and conflicts between national and ethnic groups. We will ar-
gue that socio-economic and socio-structural factors have no direct im-
pact but might be mobilised by political actors to legitimate their
claims. In a second part we will discuss in detail the operationalisation
of our dependent variable, i.e. the outcome of naturalisation processes.
It will be argued that the rejection rate, i.e. the ratio between the sub-
mitted and rejected applications, constitutes a valid indicator since it
only depends on the supply side, contrary to the naturalisation rate
which is heavily influenced by the demand side. After a discussion of
the variance of the rejection rates and the operationalisation of the in-
dependent variables, we will test the various hypotheses presented in
the course of this chapter. It will be demonstrated that the rejection
rate can to a large extent be explained by three variables: the local
dominant understanding of citizenship, the strength of the local Swiss
People’s Party and the formal decision-making procedures. No signifi-
cant values could be obtained for the perception of the unemployment
rate, the ratio of local alien residents and the ratio of candidates from
Muslim countries. It will further be shown that our explanatory model
explains even better the rejection rate of candidates from Muslim coun-
tries. In the concluding part we will address the question of whether
there are regional clusters of municipalities with similar naturalisation
policies.
4.2 Competing explanations
In the above-presented example of rejected naturalisations the repre-
sentative of the local Swiss People’s Party (SVP) was reported to justify
the rejection of most candidates from the former Yugoslavia with cul-
tural and religious differences between Swiss citizens and foreign resi-
dents emigrated from Muslim countries. He held the opinion that such
persons do not fit in their community. This statement is in line with
our main hypothesis according to which the outcome of naturalisation
processes can be explained by how the cultural frontiers are drawn
within a municipality. This explanation stands in contrast to a whole
group of grievance theories that stress the objective economic or socio-
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structural conditions triggering xenophobic and discriminatory atti-
tudes towards foreigners. The self-interest theory states that individuals
develop negative affects toward others with whom they are in competi-
tion and conflict (for an overview see Horowitz (2000 [1985]: 105-135).
Economic success of foreigners, firms seeking to replace highly-paid
workers by cheaper ones or challenges to the dominant group’s exclu-
sive claim to privileges may result in frustration, relative deprivation
and prejudices (Blumer 1958; Bonacich 1972). The realistic group theo-
ry (Bobo 1983) argues that subordinate groups may be a threat to real
resources and accepted practices of the dominant group. Prejudice is a
response to collective threats against the real interests of the dominant
group. However, it is often emphasised that individuals whose interests
are not directly threatened may also express racial prejudice (Sears &
Funk 1991) and that dominant groups may require immigration re-
strictions although they profit from the lower production costs (Quil-
lian 1995: 588). Therefore, Blumer (1958) and Quillian (1995) argue
that prejudice is not necessarily linked to the individual interests of
group members but is rather the result of a feeling that their preroga-
tives are threatened by the subordinate group. This feeling of threat is
largely influenced, according to Quillian (1995), by both the relative
size of the subordinate group and the economic circumstances of the
dominant group (see also Blalock 1956, 1967).
In a similar vein, theories of internal colonialism and cultural divi-
sion of labour explain antipathy against foreigners or ethnic groups by
the combination of unequal industrialisation and cultural differences
(Hechter 1975). According to these theories, economic disparities or ne-
glect of certain regions by the dominant group lead to mobilisation
and conflict, if the neglected group is segregated along ethnic lines.
Horowitz (2000 [1985]) makes a distinction between ranked and un-
ranked ethnic groups. The distinction is based on the coincidence of
social class with ethnic origin. In ranked systems the two coincide and
are therefore less stable and concerned with power and domination.
Connor (1984) and Montlibert (1981) criticise the supporters of eco-
nomical interpretations of nationalism and ethnic movements. They
state that nationalist movements can emerge independently from any
economic discrimination. There are enough examples of ethnic groups,
for example the Catalans, requiring more autonomy although they are
highly privileged regions. Often, secessionist movements originate in
regions which would hardly be capable of survival or which even profit
economically from the hitherto common state – as the Slovak part of
the former Czechoslovakia demonstrates (Wimmer 2002: 99). On the
other hand, not all economically or culturally neglected groups are the
source of ethnic conflicts (Horowitz 2000 [1985]: 194). Hechter’s
(1975) segregation theory is also refuted by the competition theories
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(Bonacich 1972; Olzak 1982, 1992). According to this approach, not
the segregation of ethnic groups, but confrontation and competition
are causes of conflict. Bonacich (1972) argues that employers maintain-
ing low labour costs by employing cheaper work forces encourage vio-
lence against other ethnic groups. Olzak (1992) expands on this sub-
ject, arguing that economic competition between ethnic groups leads
to conflict. Competition for its part is the result of socio-structural
changes undermining traditional local identities and opening the op-
portunity for ethnic identities. She enumerates four processes that in-
fluence competition and ethnic conflicts: large number of immigra-
tions, economic crisis, augmenting resources of the ethnic groups and
organisational structures (political parties and social movements). But,
conflicts over jobs or housing frequently disappear as rapidly as they
arise. Wimmer (2002: 99-100) argues that so-called socio-structural
struggles are often less concerned with individual economic goods than
with the political, legal and moral goods of the modern nation-state.
From our point of view, tensions or conflicts between ethnic and na-
tional groups are never the logical or direct consequence of socio-eco-
nomic or socio-structural conditions. This does not mean, though, that
such elements are completely irrelevant. Perception of threat and eco-
nomic crisis might be two fundamental elements for the understand-
ing of hostilities between ethnic groups, but their relation can only be
explained by the framing processes conditioning the presence of per-
ceptions of threat and conceptualising social causations. Stereotyping
and discrimination are relatively open to manipulation and can be con-
structed by political entrepreneurs, if the latter manage to link them to
specific issues. Watts (1997) sketches a model of xenophobia that easily
visualises this argument. He distinguishes political xenophobia from
potential xenophobia. By the former he understands a desire to discri-
minate, exclude, legislate against or persecute an out-group, whereas
the latter could more generally be named affect or prejudice. Watts
(1997: 76-77) elaborates on that second concept ‘that any form of affect
(emotional response) such as prejudice or, in this case, xenophobia, ex-
ists in the individual and in the political culture as a response disposi-
tion – a potential for emotional reaction to social stimuli that can be
called up or evoked by relevant social processes. It is not ever-present
and it is not automatic; it is only a potential source of emotional and
behavioural energy and requires activation before it becomes actual’.
Such activation happens, for example, when a group of people is being
convinced that foreign residents are responsible for their economic de-
privation.
Of course, such activation cannot occur just by pushing the right but-
ton. One has to ask how and why people differ in their propensity to
adopt negative out-group stereotypes, and why some are consequently
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mobilised by political actors. First, it seems plausible that it is easier to
mobilise people in regions with economical problems. Second and
more important, the larger social context has to be accounted for. To
that end, Watts (1997: 82-87) expands his model with what he calls the
‘environmental gradient’, which stands for the contextual factors that
augment or dampen aggression or discriminating behaviour. Watts ar-
gues that the degree of political xenophobia is related to social inhibi-
tion forces, i.e. official mechanisms of repression and punishment of
racist behaviour. In other words, xenophobic expression depends di-
rectly on the degree of social legitimisation of such discourses. In a si-
milar vein, Koopmans et al. (2005) demonstrate that the success of
right-wing parties mobilising against immigration can be explained to
a large extent by discursive opportunity structures and dominant na-
tional understandings of nationhood. In their study right-wing parties
appeared to be stronger and more radical in countries with an assimila-
tionist citizenship policy and less legitimate in countries with a multi-
culturalist tradition. Similarly, pro-migrant and anti-racist mobilisation
seems to be strongest not where the positions of the migrants are
weakest but where citizenship models stand for an open and accessible
nation.
All this reminds us that ‘threat’ cannot only be framed in economic
but also in cultural terms. This becomes particularly relevant in the
context of citizenship politics since naturalisation in modern nation-
states is less related to economic interests than led by questions con-
cerning national identity. Thus, it can be expected that mobilisation
against naturalisation of foreign residents is more likely to be success-
ful in municipalities where the attitude prevails among the Swiss po-
pulation that they constitute a culturally homogeneous community. In
other municipalities where the local cohesion is less pronounced or
where a multiculturalist and/or egalitarian understanding of citizen-
ship prevail, foreigners might not be considered a cultural threat. To
understand how many and which applicants are naturalised, we need
to account for the local discursive opportunity structures or what we
call the prevailing local understanding of citizenship. Moreover, we
have to find out whether there are particular influential political actors
who defend a restrictive naturalisation policy and succeed in convin-
cing the population or other politicians.
4.3 What is to be explained: the rejection rate
Before we can test the different hypotheses and measure the influence
of the various explanatory factors on the local naturalisation policy, we
have to specify what we are going to explain respectively how we opera-
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tionalise our dependent variable, i.e. the outcome of naturalisation poli-
tics. At a first glance, the naturalisation rate, i.e. the ratio between the
yearly number of naturalisations and the averaged foreign residents,
appears to provide a useful indicator. These data have already been
used in other studies on local naturalisation politics (Piguet & Wanner
2000; Bolliger 2004) and are easily accessible since they are provided
by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. However, the application of this
indicator poses a problem as it depends on both the demand and the
supply side. A low naturalisation rate might be explained by a restric-
tive naturalisation policy and/or because the demand on the part of the
foreign population is low. Moreover, since the ratio is measured within
the overall foreign-resident population, changes of the naturalisation
rate might tell us more about the immigration flows (the denominator
in the calculation) than about the desire of foreign residents to become
naturalised (Ludwig 2004: 509-510; see also Bultmann 1999: 206-
212). For the following analysis, however, we need an indicator that de-
pends on the supply side only, for we are not so much interested in
why somebody applies for the Swiss citizenship. We would rather like
to know why in some municipalities the naturalisation policy is more
restrictive than in others. Therefore, we propose to analyse the local
naturalisation policy by means of the rejection rate that is the ratio be-
tween the rejected and the submitted applications.3 Once the applica-
tions are handed in, naturalisation candidates have no longer control
over them; whether they are rejected or not depends entirely on the
supply side that is the local citizenship policy.
Although the validity of this indicator is much better for what we
seek to explain, it is not fully unproblematic for two reasons. First, it
does not consider that certain candidates interrupt their applications
during the procedure. It may happen that applicants are recommended
to withdraw their dossier when it appears that they do not fulfil all cri-
teria for naturalisation (often because of insufficient command of lan-
guage). Unfortunately, we do not dispose of such information. In the
interviews with the responsible officials at the local administrations it
appeared that most municipalities do not exactly know how many dos-
siers are not passed through to the final decision. However, most of
them told us that withdrawn applications are normally resubmitted
some years later, for example, after candidates have improved their lin-
guistic proficiency. As we analyse a relatively long period of twelve
years, such applications should not strongly affect the validity of our in-
dicator. Second, our indicator does not consider either that some alien
residents might not apply because they do not expect to be naturalised
in municipalities with a restrictive naturalisation policy. Such a deter-
rence effect is difficult to measure and could only be analysed by inter-
viewing potential candidates who did not apply for the Swiss citizen-
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ship. Such data has not been collected systematically so far, since stu-
dies analysing the reasons to acquire the citizenship of one’s host
country have either left out this question or concentrated on freshly
naturalised candidates.
Yang (1994) provides one of the most elaborate studies to explain
the likelihood of citizenship acquisition in the United States.4 He in-
corporates in his analytical framework not only the immigrants’ indivi-
dual characteristics, but also accounts for the larger social contexts in
both the countries of origin and destination. In particular, he investi-
gates whether the size of the immigrant community in the host coun-
try and the political, social and economic situation in the home coun-
tries influence the individual desires to apply for citizenship. Consider-
ing the individual factors, he demonstrates that higher education
(however, only to a certain degree), higher social status, home-owner-
ship, having children, being married and having served in the U.S.
Armed Forces increase the likelihood for an application. Moreover, he
confirms the urban concentration hypothesis predicting a positive asso-
ciation between the size of the immigration community and the likeli-
hood of its members’ naturalisation (see also Bultmann 1999: 208-
209). In such groups assimilation into a new culture is facilitated and
members are provided with better information concerning the benefits,
procedures and experience of naturalisation. As to the country-of-origin
characteristics, the results suggest that unfavourable conditions in the
home country have a strong influence on immigrants’ naturalisation
decisions. Interesting as these results are, we do not learn whether the
formal naturalisation procedure influences in any way one’s propensity
to apply for citizenship.
In Switzerland, ethnographic studies not only investigated the moti-
vations of potential candidates to apply for the Swiss citizenship, they
were also interested in the factors leading candidates from the idea for
applying to the actual application (Centlivres et al. 1991: 157-160;
Achermann & Gass 2003: 173-179). Interestingly, they reveal that such
decisions are not always consciously taken and cannot be explained by
clearly distinguishable factors. Rather, they often seem to be accidental
and the result of a combination of causal factors and specific circum-
stances. It was found that foreign residents often apply only after they
accidentally acquired necessary information about the formal proce-
dure or after friends or relatives have drawn their attention to the op-
portunity to naturalise themselves. These studies also discuss the dis-
comfort naturalisation candidates have with some aspects of the proce-
dure and reveal that some applicants experience the naturalisation
procedure as exhausting, complicated and even humiliating to a certain
extent. Although such information reveals attitudes of candidates to-
wards the naturalisation procedure, those are the statements of persons
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who were not deterred from submitting their application. They do not
necessarily help us know whether or not and how many potential can-
didates did decide not to submit an application. On the other hand,
however, these studies show that potential candidates seem to know
the naturalisation procedures and how difficult it is to get naturalised
because they are often in contact with persons who have already been
naturalised. Therefore, one can assume that some people are deterred
from submitting an application in municipalities with a restrictive citi-
zenship policy. But it is unlikely that such a deterrence effect lowers
the rejection rate since it cannot be assumed that the local decision ma-
kers would accept more applicants if such persons submitted a natura-
lisation request. On the contrary, it is likely that even more candidates
would be rejected in municipalities with a restrictive understanding of
citizenship, assuming that such deterred persons would constitute bor-
derline cases. In this case, the rejection rate would be even higher in
such municipalities and the difference between local settings with a
generous and restrictive naturalisation policy even more pronounced.
Let us now take a closer look at the rejection rates of the municipali-
ties in our sample. To make valid explanations, we have to be sure that
there is enough variance in the dependent variable and that the differ-
ences of rejection rates are significant. This refers to a central aspect of
this study, namely that we can observe different practices of citizenship
within a nation-state. Not even the most orthodox essentialist or cultur-
alist would assert that all citizens of a nation-state have exactly the
same understanding of citizenship. To counter their arguments, it has
to be demonstrated that the differences are significant. To that end, we
have to ensure that high rates are caused by a relatively high number
of rejected applications. Keep in mind that 50 per cent of the roughly
2,800 municipalities in Switzerland have less than 1,000 inhabitants.
Consequently, the number of naturalisation applicants is very low in
these municipalities. The rejection of one or two candidates would al-
ready have a high impact on the rejection rate. For example, in one
municipality of our sample only four dossiers were submitted between
1990 and 2002, and one of them was rejected. Without looking in de-
tail at this particular case, it would be too risky to conclude that this
municipality pursues a restrictive citizenship policy by rejecting 25 per
cent of the submitted applications.
Surprisingly, we found that in almost all municipalities where only
up to ten applications were submitted between 1990 and 2002, none
of them were rejected (Helbling & Kriesi 2004: 46-48; see also Piguet
& Wanner 2000: 56-58). Does this mean that small communities pur-
sue a more generous citizenship policy? Given the very small number
of candidates, it is hard to tell, since the acceptation rate depends on
very few individual cases. Of course, it might be that in such municipa-
84 PRACTISING CITIZENSHIP AND HETEROGENEOUS NATIONHOOD
lities foreigners are better integrated, as it might be assumed that they
have more contact with the local population and get faster accustomed
to local customs and traditions. Therefore, they meet with less resis-
tance of the local population when they seek to become a full member
of their municipality. However, an opposing argument is also quite
conceivable. It might be that in such places of mostly rural character
the municipal citizens are less willing to accept new members because
they are less used to be in contact with foreigners and much sooner
consider their municipality as a homogeneous community than citi-
zens of larger towns do. Considering the small size of these commu-
nities, negative decisions are anticipated more easily and potential can-
didates deterred from submitting their dossiers.
To be sure that there are significant differences among the various
rejection rates, we decided to sort out those cases in which less than
ten applications have been submitted in the period under investigation
from 1990 to 2002. These cases correspond roughly to the group of
municipalities in our sample with less than 1,000 inhabitants. From
the 154 municipalities that provided data on submitted and rejected ap-
plications 48 cases are not considered for the following analyses. In
the remaining 106 cases an average number of 336 applications was
submitted, the standard deviation being 391. The rejection rate varies
between 0 and 50 per cent, has a mean rate of 9.6 and a standard de-
viation of 10.6. We thus can be sure that the rejection rate varies a lot
and that the variation is caused by a considerable number of rejected
applications. Excluding cases with few applications for naturalisation
entails of course that we cannot make any statements about citizenship
politics in very small municipalities.
4.4 Operationalisation of the independent variables
Asserting that cultural and political factors explain the rejection rates
and that the outcome of local citizenship politics is the result of on-
going struggles over the cultural boundaries of these communities im-
plies that we take a closer look at the prevailing understandings of citi-
zenship, the political actors implied in the naturalisation politics and
the formal decision-making structures. To control for socio-economic
and socio-structural factors, we will consider the perception of the un-
employment rate, the per cent of local foreign residents in the local po-
pulation and the share of naturalisation candidates from Muslim coun-
tries compared to all naturalisation candidates between 1990 and
2002.
The local understanding of citizenship is measured by means of mu-
nicipal results of national referenda on aliens’ acts, immigration and
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facilitated naturalisation between 1982 and 2002.5 These referenda
provide information on the attitudes of the respective municipal Swiss
population towards alien residents and on the significance of their na-
tional identity. If in a municipality laws on facilitated naturalisation are
rejected and laws limiting immigration are approved, this indicates
that the majority of Swiss citizens have a restrictive understanding of
citizenship. We carried out a factor analysis with the yes-percentages of
votes. The second resulting factor matched fairly well our conceptuali-
sation of the understanding of citizenship and was therefore retained
for the following regression analysis.
The nominal variable of the formal procedures has been transformed
in dummy-variables. Remember that decisions are taken either by the
entire population (at ballot or during municipal assemblies) or by
elected politicians (by the local parliament or the executive body). In
our analysis below we retained the variables for ‘popular votes by bal-
lot’ and ‘municipal assemblies’ in order to test whether or not more
candidates are rejected when the population takes the decision. As for
the local political actors, we have only data at hand that provide us with
information on the power of the local parties in municipal politics in
general (and not for the domain of naturalisations in particular).6 This
is a rather crude indicator, since the power structure within a munici-
pality runs only partly along the party lines, as we will see in our case
studies. However, it is the most valid indicator that we have at disposal
for a large-N analysis. This indicator relies on the perception of the
strength of the respective parties. The municipal secretaries have been
asked for each political party to indicate how important they are.7 Lad-
ner (1991: 237-238) has shown that the evaluations of the municipal se-
cretaries are congruent with the real power distribution. Such an opera-
tionalisation is better than accounting for the seats of the different par-
ties in the local parliament or the executive body insofar as the number
of received votes does not necessarily reflect the power of these parties.
Particularly in small towns and villages the position of individual actors
is often more important than the size of the party. As for the unem-
ployment rate, the secretaries of the local administrations have been
asked to what extent their municipalities have been affected.8 Contrary
to the effective unemployment rate, this operationalisation allows us to
better measure the perception of the local economic situation that
might also be influenced by the situation at the regional level. For the
share of foreigners, we simply resorted to the percentage of the popula-
tion living in a municipality that is of foreign origin.9 To account for
the impact of the number of candidates from Muslim countries we re-
sorted to the ratio between applications from immigrants from the for-
mer Yugoslavia and Turkey and all submitted applications.10
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4.5 Results
In the following paragraphs we will test the various arguments pre-
sented in the chapters above. Particularly, we would like to show
whether the local rejection rates can be explained by cultural and politi-
cal or socio-economic and socio-structural factors. Since we lack data
for the relative power of political parties for a considerable number of
cases, we retained only the variable for the influence of the Swiss Peo-
ple’s Party for the regression analysis in Table 4.1. More detailed ana-
lyses have shown that other political parties have no significant influ-
ence at all on the rejection rate. As we dispose of information of the
strength of the SVP only for a restricted number of municipalities, we
had to make sure that both the full and the restricted samples are part
of the same population. Thus, we ran the regression analysis for both
samples (see Models 1 and 2). Since it might be assumed that the
power of the SVP has an influence on the local understanding of citi-
zenship and formal decision-making procedures, the respective variable
has been included separately in Model 3. The individual coefficients
change only slightly between the three models. Therefore, it can be
presumed that both groups are from the same population and that the
indicator of the strength of the SVP has no significant impact on other
variables.
So far, the results in Table 4.1 confirm our hypotheses and discon-
firm competing explanation models: it appears that the perception of
the employment rate, the ratio of foreigners living in a municipality
and the ratio of applicants from Muslim countries have no direct influ-
Table 4.1 Rejection rates of all applications: Non-standardised regression coeffi-
cients, standard error in brackets
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Popular votes at ballot 23.3*** (3.7) 26.2*** (4.3) 28.4*** (4.1)
Municipal assembly 3.5 (2.3) 2.7 (2.7) 2.5 (2.5)
Understanding of citizenship 3.3*** (1.1) 4.7*** (1.3) 4.6*** (1.2)
Influence of the SVP – – – – 5.4** (1.8)
Unemployment rate 0.0 (1.8) 0.2 (2.2) 0.0 (2.0)
Ratio of foreign residents 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1)
Ratio of Muslim candidates 4.3 (3.7) 2.2 (4.2) 0.0 (4.0)
Constant 1.8 (3.2) 3.7 (3.6) 0.3 (3.6)
R2 (adj.) 0.43 0.50 0.55
N 103 74 74
Notes: Level of significance: ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Only municipalities have been
retained in which at least ten applications were submitted between 1990 and 2002. We lost
three cases in Model 1 because data for one or several independent variables were missing
(listwise deletion).
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ence on the naturalisation policy. Rather, political and cultural ele-
ments help us predict the outcome of naturalisation policies: in muni-
cipalities with a restrictive understanding of citizenship among the po-
pulation more applications are rejected. Moreover, it is demonstrated
that we have to account for the dominant actors and their attitudes:
municipalities in which the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) is an influential
force in local politics refuse more persons the Swiss citizenship.
The rejection rate increases immensely when the entire population
takes decisions by ballot, which confirms the commonly held opinion
that direct democratic decisions lead to a more restrictive naturalisation
policy. However, we observed no significant increase of rejected candi-
dates in municipalities in which the population decides in municipal
assemblies. This can be explained by the fact that in municipalities
with votes by ballot the individual decisions are taken in complete
anonymity, whereas in municipal assemblies one’s show of hands is ex-
posed to other citizens. But what about those assemblies at which deci-
sions are taken by closed ballot? With the data from this survey we are
unfortunately unable to distinguish such cases and to systematically in-
vestigate this aspect. But anticipating our case studies of the next chap-
ters allows us to shed some light on this question. In our sample of
case studies we have four municipalities where decisions are taken dur-
ing local assemblies: in two of them always by open ballot and in the
two others always or sometimes by closed ballot. In the former two
hardly any candidates were rejected during our period of investigation,
whereas the latter two constitute cases with a relatively high rejection
rate. Table 4.2 lists the fourteen case studies in descending order of the
rejection rates and for the sake of comparison juxtaposes them with
the formal procedures. Having more detailed information about the de-
cision-making processes at hand, we can distinguish the municipalities
in which decisions in municipal assemblies are taken by closed or
open ballot. We immediately see that in municipalities in which deci-
sions are taken by popular votes or during municipal assemblies by
closed ballot feature higher rejection rates than the other cases. A bi-
variate analysis of the variables ‘rejection rate’ and ‘decisions by closed
ballot’ reveals a relatively high correlation (r=0.7, p <0.006).11
The fact that anonymous decisions can have an impact is illustrated by
one municipality in which decisions are often but not always taken by
closed ballot. In this municipality it has happened in recent years that
individual citizens requested the decisions be made by closed ballot.
Each time the request was accepted, all applications of citizens from
Muslim countries that were up for decision were rejected. During other
assemblies, when the population voted by open ballot, almost no candi-
dates were refused. A representative of the administration of this mu-
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nicipality told us that the persons who demanded a vote by closed bal-
lot were known as quite xenophobic and normally did not attend the lo-
cal assemblies. The exceptional appearance of such ‘extreme voices’ at
these two particular assemblies provided an opportunity for a majority
of the population to reject applicants from Muslim countries. It seems
that in this municipality during the municipal assemblies – with the
exception of the two votes by closed ballot – the social control avoided
not only discriminatory decisions but also requests for votes by closed
ballot.12
Another case provides a similarly revealing example. In this town,
the municipal parliament decided on naturalisation applications until
1999, when the majority of the population voted in favour of a referen-
dum, launched by a right-wing party, which required that henceforth
decisions should be made by closed ballot. This change of procedure
generated a lot of media attention and public debates in Switzerland,
since after the change the population of this particular town regularly
took discriminatory decisions refusing most or all candidates from
Muslim countries. Decisions by closed ballot can also be an issue in lo-
cal parliaments. In one of our case studies, the local SVP successfully
instituted a requirement in 1998 that decisions of the parliament were
no longer to be taken by open ballot. They argued that some deputies
preferred not to expose their views to colleagues and the media. Unfor-
tunately, our data does not allow us to verify if this change of proce-
dure had an effect on the rejection rate.
Although our data clearly reveal that decisions by closed ballot have
a high impact, we consider the formal procedure as an opportunity
structure and not as a factor that automatically leads to very high rejec-
Table 4.2 Formal procedures and rejection rates
Rejection rate (%) Formal procedure Decisions by
closed ballot
Degree of dissatisfaction with
decisions of Federal Court
1 47 Popular vote Yes 60
2 29 Municipal assembly Yes 90
3 26 Popular vote Yes 56
4 24 Popular vote Yes 50
5 22 Parliament No 44
6 15 Executive body No 6
7 13 Municipal assembly Yes 73
8 11 Popular vote Yes 81
9 11 Parliament No 30
10 5 Executive body No 18
11 2 Parliament No 41
12 1 Municipal assembly No 32
13 1 Municipal assembly No 37
14 0 Parliament No 25
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tion rates (see Helbling 2008). Generally, it can be argued that deci-
sions by closed ballot enable more restrictive and even discriminatory
decisions because they do not have to be justified. However, it depends
after all on the attitudes of the local population whether restrictive and
discriminators decisions are taken or not. To have an effect, an oppor-
tunity not only has to be provided, it also has to be grasped by xeno-
phobic actors. As one of our case studies shows, where most decisions
are taken during municipal assemblies by open ballot, decisions by
closed ballot do not necessarily lead to a higher rejection rate. In the
past it happened several times in this municipality that representatives
of the SVP required that decisions be made by closed ballot. While
their requests were accepted each time no candidates were rejected dur-
ing these assemblies.
Interestingly, in municipalities in which all or most decisions are ta-
ken by closed ballot another understanding prevails of what it means
to become Swiss. While the various understandings of citizenship will
be addressed in more detail in the next chapters, we would like to em-
phasise one particular aspect, which is directly related to the formal
procedure. In contrast to cases where decisions are taken by the local
parliament, the municipal executive body or, during assemblies, by
open ballot, the influential actors in the other municipalities defend
the positions that, first and foremost, naturalised Swiss citizens be-
come members of their local community. Therefore, they prefer the en-
tire population taking decisions by closed ballot. This explains why a
majority of politicians in these municipalities did not welcome the ver-
dicts of the Swiss Federal Court, which in July 2003 and May 2004
decided that popular votes and decisions by closed ballot during muni-
cipal assemblies violate the Swiss constitutions. Table 4.2 reveals that
in all municipalities in which decisions are taken by closed ballot, half
or more of the local actors are unsatisfied with these decisions.The cor-
relation between these two variables is very high (r=0.83, p <0.000).
In the other municipalities only a minority is against the principles re-
quired by the Federal Court. As we will see in more detail in Chapter
6, politicians opposing the decisions of the Federal Court argue that
the local population should decide according to which procedure and
criteria alien residents should be naturalised. They clearly consider nat-
uralisations as political decision-making procedures the outcomes of
which do not have to be accountable to others. It thus seems that diver-
ging attitudes are hidden behind the formal procedures applied in the
various municipalities.
We have seen above that many incidents and controversies in the con-
text of local naturalisations refer to a particular group of people,
namely the increasing number of immigrants from the countries of
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the former Yugoslavia and Turkey. A look at the data from our survey
shows that 36 per cent of all applications in Swiss municipalities be-
tween 1990 and 2002 were submitted by people from those countries.
When it comes to the number of rejected dossiers, the ratio of these
people rises to 56 per cent. This makes clear that the majority of rejec-
tions concerns candidates from Muslim countries. Thus, it should be
tested whether or not the models in Table 4.1 mainly explain the rejec-
tion rates of applications of candidates from Muslim countries.
The results of this test are presented in Table 4.3. It immediately be-
comes clear that our explanatory model predicts the number of rejected
applications of candidates from Muslim countries even better than the
general rejection rate. The explained variance rises to 66 per cent in
Model 3. Looking at the individual coefficients it appears that the value
of the indicator for popular votes at ballot increases strongly, although
it is already relatively high in Table 4.1. The coefficients of the other ex-
planatory factors – the understanding of citizenship and the influence
of the SVP – do not change a lot. This reveals that candidates from
Muslim countries face a particularly hostile naturalisation procedure in
municipalities where the entire population decides on such requests.
Popular votes not only entail a restrictive naturalisation policy but are
also the cause of discriminatory decisions against candidates from the
former Yugoslavia and Turkey. We have also tested our hypotheses for
all rejected applications without those of candidates from Muslim
countries (results not shown here). As we expected, the individual coef-
ficients and the explained variance are very low. Concerning the level
of significance of the coefficients, however, we observed the same pat-
Table 4.3 Rejection rates of candidates from Muslim countries: Non-standardised
regression coefficients, standard error in brackets
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Popular votes at ballot 44.5*** (5.0) 51.3*** (5.3) 53.2*** (5.3)
Municipal assembly 3.9 (3.0) 1.4 (3.3) 1.3 (3.3)
Understanding of citizenship 2.0 (1.4) 4.1* (1.5) 4.0** (1.5)
Influence of the SVP – – – – 4.5* (2.3)
Unemployment rate 0.4 (2.5) 1.1 (2.7) 0.9 (2.6)
Ratio of foreign residents 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1)
Ratio of Muslim candidates 9.0 (4.9) 6.1 (5.2) 4.3 (5.1)
Constant -0.5 (4.2) 3.7 (4.5) 0.8 (4.7)
R2 (adj.) 0.52 0.64 0.66
N 103 74 74
Notes: Level of significance: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Only municipalities have been retained in which at least ten applications have been
submitted between 1990 and 2002. We lost three cases in Model 1 because data for one or
several independent variables were missing (listwise deletion).
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tern as in Tables 4.1 and 4.3. It can be concluded that the proposed ex-
planatory model explains the rejection rates for different groups of nat-
uralisation candidates and is a particularly good predictor for the num-
ber of rejected candidates from Muslim countries.
4.6 External influences I
One important aim of this chapter has been to get a first idea in which
direction we can find causal mechanisms explaining citizenship poli-
tics in Swiss municipalities. It helped us to set the stage for more de-
tailed discussions in the following chapters. We were able to demon-
strate that the outcome of naturalisation policies is influenced by cul-
tural and political factors. Thus, it appeared that we mainly have to
look into how people think about citizenship and in which way political
actors influence the decision-making processes. This is in line with our
hypotheses according to which we have to account for conceptualisa-
tions of nationhood and political struggles over cultural boundaries in
order to understand how many and which foreigners are accepted in a
nation. Although we speak of ‘cultural factors’, we clearly delineate our
theoretical framework from culturalist approaches by relating those
‘cultural factors’ to political processes. Indeed, the results in Table 4.3
point to particularly high tensions between Swiss citizens and foreign-
ers from Muslim countries. Rejection rates increase exceedingly when
the population takes the decisions. This confirms other studies that re-
vealed that the accommodation of migrants from Muslim countries
poses particular problems to European nation-states (Koopmans et al.
2005: ch. 4). But this has nothing to do with a clash of civilisations.
The study by Koopmans et al. (2005) has shown that first, groups de-
mands by migrants are much lower as is often preached by culturalists
and, second, that the intensity of group demands by Muslim immi-
grants varies a lot between different countries and depends on the re-
spective citizenship models. The idea of a homogeneous Swiss culture
defending itself can also be rejected when we take a closer look at our
case studies. As we will see in the next chapters, migrants from Mus-
lim countries are perceived very differently from one municipality to
another.
In the meantime, we would like to deal with a further important
question. We demonstrated above that municipalities indeed autono-
mously decide according to which criteria and procedures foreigners
can acquire the Swiss citizenship. Only very few cantonal and national
regulations interfere with the local naturalisation policy. Therefore, a
high variation of local citizenship politics can be expected. Though, this
does not necessarily exclude any regional clusters. This question is of
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crucial importance since we have to know whether local naturalisation
processes are isolated events or are influenced from the outside. It is
often put forward that the population of the French speaking part of
Switzerland has another relationship with its nation and with its for-
eigners than the population of the German speaking part, both being
inspired by the German and French understandings of nationhood, re-
spectively. The often evoked trench between these two language re-
gions, when it comes to questions about the political opening towards
Europe, could also be relevant in citizenship politics. Consequently, it
may be argued that municipalities in the French part of Switzerland
are inspired by the French republican citizenship model and thus pur-
sue a more generous naturalisation policy than Swiss German munici-
palities being influenced by the German ius-sanguinis principle.
Model 1 in Table 4.4 reveals, however, that the chances of becoming
a Swiss citizen do not significantly change between these two language
regions. More detailed analyses have also shown that there is no signif-
icant difference between the Italian and German speaking municipali-
Table 4.4 External influences: Non-standardised regression coefficients, standard er-
ror in brackets
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Language region 6.2
(3.2)
1.1
(3.0)
Rural municipality 6.8*
(3.1)
0.9
(2.6)
Number of inhabitants 0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
Popular votes at ballot 28.3***
(4.4)
Municipal assembly 2.6
(2.6)
Understanding of citizenship 4.7***
(1.2)
Influence of the SVP 5.9**
(2.1)
Unemployment rate 0.3
(2.2)
Ratio of foreign residents 0.0
(0.1)
Ratio Muslim candidates 0.2
(4.4)
Constant 12.9
(4.0)
4.3
(1.4)
6.3
(1.4)
-1.7
(5.6)
R2 (adj.) 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.53
N 74 74 74 74
Notes: Level of significance: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Data for ‘Rural
Municipality’ are drawn for Andreas Ladner’s dataset (see Ladner 1991).
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ties. In Table 4.4 the influence of the degree of urbanity and the size
of the municipalities is also tested. The number of inhabitants has no
impact at all on the local citizenship policy (Model 3). While it appears
in the bivariate analysis that rural municipalities reject significantly
more applicants than towns (Model 2), this influence completely disap-
pears when we control for the factors discussed above (Model 4).
Although there seem to be no regional clusters, it is not improbable
that local actors copy practices from neighbouring municipalities or
that contacts to other actors in the same region influence peoples’ atti-
tudes. We will come back to this question at the end of the next chap-
ter, which presents naturalisation politics in fourteen municipalities in
more detail.
94 PRACTISING CITIZENSHIP AND HETEROGENEOUS NATIONHOOD
5 Comparing Local Citizenship Models
5.1 Introduction
Having confirmed in the preceding chapter that naturalisation politics
can be explained with political and cultural variables and that socio-eco-
nomic and socio-structural factors have no explanatory impact, in the
following chapters we will analyse in more detail the local struggles
over the definition of cultural boundaries. Relying on data collected in
fourteen case studies, we are now going to study the national self-un-
derstandings of local politicians in relation to the criteria they establish
to select candidates for naturalisation. Besides the symbolic and cultur-
al aspects of citizenship within our municipalities, we will also account
for the local influence structures, which will enable us to distinguish
dominant discourses from minority discourses. By describing in this
chapter the variety of citizenship policies and the prevailing concep-
tions between municipalities, the relevance of this study once again
will be underscored and some more flesh will be added to the bare-
bones analytical arguments sketched out above.
More generally, this chapter aims at disaggregating the concepts of
citizenship and nationalism in order to show that they can have various
meanings in different situations and in different places. Going beneath
the national level enables us to rectify the results of various empirical
studies which have shown that despite its linguistic and religious diver-
sity, Switzerland, in general, demands a relatively high assimilation
from naturalisation candidates (Koopmans et al. 2005: 35-41; Giugni &
Passy 2006: 60-63). This chapter and those that follow will illustrate
that all kinds of citizenship politics can be observed in Switzerland,
and that it oversimplifies the facts to put Switzerland in one specific
category. By going to the municipalities and speaking to local politi-
cians, we followed Eric Hobsbawm’s (1990: 10) advice that nationhood
cannot be understood when we study the official regulations by them-
selves but only when we account for the ideas and interests of ordinary
citizens. By analysing local decision-making processes, we will also
come closer to the idea that naturalisation policies in these local set-
tings constitute political fields, as conceptualised by Bourdieu, in
which struggles over the cultural boundaries of these communities are
going on.
This chapter also lays out the basis for the next two by presenting in-
dicators for the understanding of citizenship and the degree of influ-
ence of each local actor. By means of the ‘reputational approach’ bor-
rowed from the community power studies, we will detect the political
capital of each local politician. By means of social network analysis and
more specifically block-modelling, we will be able to trace the struc-
tures of the policy fields of naturalisation politics in our fourteen muni-
cipalities. After the construction of the two main indicators – under-
standing of citizenship and influence – we will then test whether it
makes a difference or not to account for power structures when we
measure the influence of the understanding of citizenship by the ratio
of rejected applications. In line with our theoretical arguments, it will
be shown that it does not suffice to solely retain the attitudes of the lo-
cal decision makers.
In the concluding part of this chapter, we will then come back to the
question of external influences. Although we gained the impression
during the collection of our data that hardly any exchange exists be-
tween municipalities with regard to citizenship politics and that dis-
courses at the local level are sometimes little influenced by the debates
led at the national level, one element could be detected that is common
to all our case studies, which points to the fact that all fourteen munici-
palities belong to the same nation-state: when it comes to the question
of what local politicians are most proud of about Switzerland, a major-
ity of each municipality mentioned Swiss direct democracy and the
high degree of liberty which people in this country enjoy.
5.2 Understandings of citizenship
To use municipal results of national referenda on aliens’ acts, immigra-
tion and facilitated naturalisation for the operationalisation of the local
national self-understanding, as we have done in the previous chapter,
is, admittedly, a rather crude proceeding; however, it is the best that
could have been done with the data we had at our disposal for such a
large-N analysis. Having spoken to 180 local politicians, we are now in
position for a more pertinent operationalisation. As we already know,
each municipality establishes naturalisation criteria independently. The
federal law on citizenship merely stipulates that only those foreign resi-
dents can be naturalised who have lived in Switzerland for at least
twelve years, respect the legal order, do not compromise the interior
and exterior safety of the country and are integrated and familiar with
the Swiss habits and customs. The first three constitute quite clear cri-
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teria that are easy to verify and are always controlled by the federal ad-
ministration.
As for the questions of integration and familiarity, not only do they
constitute vague requirements, they are judged exclusively by local poli-
ticians and the municipal administration. Given the fact that virtually
no formal or written regulations exist at the local level and, in line with
our earlier plea for a cognitive approach, we rely exclusively on the atti-
tudes of local decision makers towards naturalisation criteria to estab-
lish an indicator that informs us about the prevailing understandings
of citizenship. Since we are only interested in the processes of becom-
ing a full member, this operationalisation of the understanding of citi-
zenship does not take into consideration cultural group rights or the le-
gal status of foreign residents as other studies have done (see Tilly
1995; Koopmans et al. 2005).
Which criteria are applied? How do local politicians evaluate applica-
tions? In the example of rejected applications presented above, we have
come to know that the representative of the local Swiss People’s Party
(SVP) justified the refusal of almost all candidates from the former Yu-
goslavia by their lack of integration, their unwillingness to take part in
the municipal life and their bad manners in everyday life. Several as-
pects are addressed here, which are often relevant when it comes to
naturalising foreigners: when is a person integrated enough to become
a new member of a nation? Does integration mean being familiar with
the basic social rules or does it require an active participation in the
new society? Is a naturalised person primarily a citizen of Switzerland
or of his or her municipality? The general position of the SVP (at the
national level and in most municipalities) is very well illustrated by this
example. How do other local politicians think about naturalisation, and
which are the prevailing positions in our case studies? To find answers
to these questions we confronted local politicians with a range of natur-
alisation criteria. The revealed attitudes show how cultural boundaries
are drawn in relation to how high the barriers are set for accepting
new members.
Unfortunately, there exists no pertinent theoretical framework for se-
lecting and classifying naturalisation criteria. Howard (2006: 446-447)
classifies citizenship policies according to three criteria: (1) whether or
not jus soli is granted, i.e. whether children of non-citizens who are
born in a country’s territory can acquire the country’s citizenship; (2)
the minimum length of residency requirement for naturalisation; and
(3) whether or not naturalised immigrants are allowed to hold dual citi-
zenship. For Howard (2006: 446-447), these three criteria constitute
the most general elements of a country’s citizenship policy: ‘They cap-
ture the two main modes of citizenship acquisition (by birth and by
naturalisation), as well as the primary deterrent that can potentially dis-
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courage immigrants to naturalise even if they are eligible (dual citizen-
ship)’. While these three elements can certainly be considered as cru-
cial aspects of naturalisation regulations, there are more relevant criter-
ia. Without giving any specific justifications, Koopmans et al. (2005:
35-41, 52-54) further retained three criteria for their classification of nat-
uralisation policies: (1) welfare and social security dependence as an ob-
stacle to naturalisation, (2) privileged access to nationality for co-eth-
nics1 and (3) knowledge of the national (or regional) language.2 Con-
trary to Howard (2006: 446-447, 452n22), who classifies countries
along a restrictive-liberal range according to the number of criteria that
have to be fulfilled, Koopmans et al. (2005) make a qualitative distinc-
tion and use their criteria to find out whether a country pursues an eth-
nic or rather a civic-territorial citizenship policy – whether it is com-
mitted to respectively, cultural monism or cultural pluralism. We have
already discussed the analytical ambiguities of these concepts in Chap-
ter 2. Treating concrete naturalisation criteria makes this distinction
even more problematic. Take, for example, ‘knowledge of the national
or regional language’. For some, this is clearly a cultural requirement,
which accepts only those belonging to an ethnic group who speak the
native language of the group. However, one might also argue that it
constitutes a criterion for structural integration in countries with a ci-
vic-territorial citizenship model, since the command of the national or
regional language is crucial for participating in economic and social
life. As for the ‘welfare and social security dependence’, it is even less
clear how the application of this criterion tells us anything about
whether a country defends an ethnic or rather a civic-territorial citizen-
ship policy. In line with our theoretical arguments and akin to Howard
(2006), we prefer to argue for a difference of degree in regard to the ef-
fect of different criteria: the more criteria have to be fulfilled, the more
restrictive is a naturalisation policy and the more closed is the social
closure mechanism of citizenship. Since we had no analytical frame-
work at hand, we have simply chosen criteria, which often come up in
debates about naturalisation in Switzerland to generate an indicator for
the understanding of citizenship. Attitudes towards the following ele-
ven criteria were collected:3
1. Required degree of integration or assimilation;
2. Required language knowledge;
3. Required knowledge of Swiss history and the Swiss political sys-
tem;
4. The right for Muslim women to wear a headscarf in public;
5. Allowance of dual citizenship;
6. Required membership in local associations;
7. Unemployment as an obstacle to naturalisation;
8. Social security dependence as an obstacle to naturalisation;
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9. Disability insurance as an obstacle to naturalisation;
10. Facilitated naturalisation for the second generation;
11. Facilitated naturalisation for the third generation.
The criterion of residency is not considered for our analysis as it is
regulated at the national level and thus constitutes a constant for all
our cases.4 The same is true for the allowance of dual and facilitated
naturalisation (the latter being regulated at the cantonal level). As these
criteria are regularly and violently discussed at the local level, the atti-
tudes towards these criteria are nonetheless revealing for capturing the
local understandings of citizenship. As Switzerland has no provisions
for the naturalisation of co-ethnics (neither at the federal nor at the re-
gional and local levels), this indicator is not being considered, either.
Table 5.1 lists the aggregated values of each indicator for each muni-
cipality as well as a summary index for each municipality (UC) in the
last column. All indicators and the summary index constitute the arith-
metic means of the individual attitudes and the individual indicators,
respectively. Taking the arithmetic mean has the advantage that the
composite measure has the same scale as the individual indicators and
can therefore be interpreted in the same manner (see Roller 2005: 71-
72). The cases are listed in ascending order of the prevailing under-
standing of citizenship (UC) in the last column and the individual indi-
cators, in ascending order of their means. The eleven indicators have
been standardised so that each one varies between ‘0’ (generous) and
‘1’ (restrictive). To make it clear from the outset, the range of variation
between generous and restrictive understandings of citizenship help us
compare the prevailing attitudes in our fourteen municipalities. How-
ever, we will not be able to judge the various positions in relation to
any absolute standard. For example, when a municipality scores 0.2 on
the summary index, one can say that its citizenship policy is half as re-
strictive as the one of another municipality scoring 0.4. But we do not
know whether the first municipality can be considered by some ab-
stract theoretical or normative standard to be very generous in naturali-
sation politics.
When aggregating individual indicators into a composite measure,
one has to decide whether they should be weighted equally or differ-
ently. In the latter case, the weighting needs to be justified either theo-
retically or empirically. As we simply chose the eleven indicators on
grounds of naturalisation criteria, which seem to be regularly applied,
we propose no theoretical framework by which to judge which indica-
tors should be considered more important than others. What about em-
pirical weighting? This is typically done by factor analysis, which is a
value-neutral technique. Choosing this alternative, we are, however,
confronted with the questions of what these weights mean and
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whether the individual politicians ascribe them the same importance
(Carley 1981: 80). A further problem is that the resulting factor load-
ings can only be interpreted if we make use of a social model or expert
opinions. Although we gained the impression during the interviews
that certain criteria are ascribed more importance than others by cer-
tain individuals, it is obvious that different criteria seem to be crucial
for the various actors in the fourteen municipalities. As we make use
of no theoretical or analytical framework to regroup the individual cri-
teria, they are equally weighted.
Now let us have a brief look at the individual criteria. We will not
only discuss the meaning of each indicator, but also show how strongly
they vary from one municipality to the other (standard deviation and
range) and in which municipalities they vary at either a rather restric-
tive or generous level, taking the mean of the summary index of the
understanding of citizenship (UC) as a dividing line (0.38; see Table
5.1).
1. Integration/assimilation: As our interviews have revealed, even the
most generous politicians require a minimal degree of integration.
This is hardly surprising in the light of our earlier argument ac-
cording to which people incessantly organise themselves in cultural
groups. The question of course remains how integrated a foreigner
has to be or whether one has even to assimilate him-or-herself to
the culture of his or her new home-country. ‘Integration’ and ‘as-
similation’ have become delicate concepts and are defined differ-
ently in the academic literature.5 We prefer to make a difference of
degree rather than of principle. While ‘integration’ means that a
person finds his or her way in the most important social domains
of the new country without giving up his or her own culture, ‘as-
similation’ stands for a complete absorption by the new cultural en-
vironment.6 As Table 5.1 shows, for all but one municipality integra-
tion is for the most part enough. The indicator varies not very
strongly at a relatively low level, both its mean and its standard de-
viation being relatively low and small. This may be explained by a
certain shift in the use of these two notions. In Switzerland today,
hardly anybody speaks of ‘assimilation’ when it comes to naturalisa-
tion. The same is true for the official use of these notions. In 1991,
the national law on citizenship replaced the notion of ‘assimilation’
by ‘integration’. ‘Assimilation’ is seen even by a lot of right-wing po-
liticians as too extreme. They argue that nobody can completely dis-
card his or her former culture. Whether this change of usage of the
two expressions also means a change in attitude is doubtful. Politi-
cians from left-wing and right-wing political parties will hardly
mean the same when they speak of ‘integration’. Nonetheless, it is
COMPARING LOCAL CITIZENSHIP MODELS 101
still surprising that only fourteen out of 180 local politicians in our
sample prefer that candidates be assimilated.
2. Language knowledge: Basic knowledge of the national language is a
minimum requirement for naturalisation in every country. The
same holds true for Switzerland: almost all interviewees agreed that
some minimal knowledge of at least one of the three national lan-
guages is necessary to manage the most important situations in
everyday life. This also appears in Table 5.1: the indicator for lan-
guage knowledge varies at a very high level. For the large majority
of municipalities in our sample, this indicator scores the highest
among all criteria. This confirms that even for persons with a rather
generous understanding of citizenship, basic knowledge of lan-
guage is important. It is thus rather interesting to look at require-
ments that go beyond basic language knowledge. While some argue
that it suffices that candidates speak one of the three national lan-
guages in Switzerland (since nobody would require from a Swiss ci-
tizen to learn another language when he or she moves to another
language region), some politicians in the German part of Switzer-
land require that candidates speak Swiss German without which
foreigners could not pretend to be really integrated.
3. History and political system: While opinions on ‘integration’/‘assimi-
lation’ and language vary either on a very low or a relatively high le-
vel, attitudes toward knowledge about Swiss history and the Swiss
political system vary even more, ranging from a relatively low to a
relatively high level, and thus appearing to be more controversial.
In most municipalities, candidates have to pass a more or less for-
malised test on Swiss history and the Swiss political system. During
the interviews, applicants are often asked questions about the most
important events in Swiss history, the principles of a democracy, or
the names of the seven ministers in the Swiss government. Some-
times candidates have to prove their knowledge about history of the
canton where they live or the political structure of their municipal-
ity. While for some this is a crucial criterion, others argue that even
Swiss citizens would often fail such tests. Critics often hold the po-
sition that such tests make the Swiss naturalisation procedures par-
ticularly difficult to pass. Interestingly, in Switzerland knowledge
about the political system is considered as much more important
than knowledge about history. For many left-wing and right-wing
politicians, it is for example crucial that future citizens understand
the democratic principles in this country. To a certain extent, this
reflects the often expressed idea that for Swiss, their national iden-
tity is mainly a political one (Kriesi 1998a: 5-23).
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4. Muslim headscarf: The increase of immigration from the countries
of the former Yugoslavia and Turkey throughout the 1980s and
1990s have led to violent debates about the integration of people
from Muslim countries. Discussions often focus on elderly Muslim
women who are in general less integrated than their husbands or
their children due to a certain lack of contacts with Swiss citizens.
Moreover, they are much more quickly stigmatised than other Mus-
lims, as they often wear the Islamic headscarf in public and thus
clearly demonstrate their religious affiliation. The headscarf is not
such an important issue in Switzerland as it is in France and Ger-
many (see, however, Ossipow 1998; Gianni 2005a: 357-363). None-
theless, some politicians are bothered by the public ostentation of
religious symbols. If they emphasise the importance of the liberty
of religion, at the same time they defend the position that in public
foreigners have to adopt Swiss ways. Once, a local right-wing politi-
cian told us that he actually would like to ask each candidate from a
Muslim country if he or she would commit him-or-herself to the Bi-
ble or the Koran in a ‘case of doubt’. He then could not tell us what
he understood by a ‘case of doubt’. However, he added that of
course he could not ask such a question since religious freedom
was an important individual right in Switzerland. Attitudes towards
the ‘Islamic headscarf’ indicate whether persons practising another
religion can become member of one’s own community. As Table 5.1
reveals, attitudes vary a lot between municipalities with a generous
and those with a restrictive national self-understanding. Opinions
regarding this matter are less restrictive than requirements with re-
gard to knowledge about Swiss history and the Swiss political sys-
tem.
5. Dual citizenship: Right-wing politicians often argue that people who
belong to a religious group other than Christian are not familiar en-
ough with Swiss norms and culture and thus do not identify them-
selves enough with this country. If that is so, how about people who
prefer to keep their old nationality when they become Swiss? Is it
possible that individuals feel at home in two countries? Politicians
with a restrictive understanding of citizenship cannot imagine hav-
ing two nationalities since, according to them, every person can
identify only with one nation-state. In Germany, for example, it is
still (at least officially) impossible to have two passports.7 In Swit-
zerland, dual citizenship has been allowed since 1992. Although lo-
cal politicians have no right to reject applicants who want to keep
their old passports, in some municipalities candidates are regularly
asked whether they would abandon their old nationality if they were
naturalised and, if not, for what reason they preferred to have two
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passports. For some, such questions allow the authorities to verify
whether candidates really identify with Switzerland. In municipali-
ties where decisions are made during local assemblies by the entire
population, it may happen that individual citizens ask the members
of the naturalisation commission whether certain candidates are
ready to abandon their old nationality. In other municipalities, such
information about the individual candidates is specified in booklets,
which are sent to all households in the run-up to a municipal as-
sembly. In six of our case studies, the majority of local politicians
would prefer that candidates give up their old nationality, the mean
of this indicator being above 0.38. In the remaining municipalities
dual citizenship seems to be widely accepted.
6. Membership in local associations: As we have already seen, some poli-
ticians require a strong identification not only with the Swiss nation
but also with the municipality where candidates live. Some of our
interviewees see their municipalities as a community where all citi-
zens should participate in social life. Candidates are often asked
during the interviews with the naturalisation commission or repre-
sentatives of the municipal authorities whether they are members
of a local association in which Swiss also participate. At the begin-
ning of a naturalisation procedure, it may sometimes happen that
candidates are advised to join a local association in order to increase
their chances of becoming Swiss citizens. While some see such a
membership as an important step towards integration, others argue
that even many Swiss are not members of any local association. In
our sample, the majority of politicians in five municipalities prefer
that applicants join local associations.
7. Unemployment, social security and disability insurance: For a lot of po-
liticians it is not irrelevant whether applicants benefit from social
security, from disability insurance or are unemployed. During our
interviews some actors sometimes referred to cantonal or municipal
regulations requiring that candidates have to financially keep them-
selves or their families. If most politicians agree on this principle,
the interpretations of what this really means diverge. For some, can-
didates benefiting from social security or from being unemployed
are considered unable to financially support themselves and their
families. Others argue that financial problems or the loss of a job
can happen to anybody, and that such persons are very capable –
with the help of the state – of supporting themselves. As a matter
of fact, foreign residents who have worked in Switzerland have the
same social rights as Swiss citizens whether they are naturalised or
not (see, however, Howard 2006: 445). Nonetheless, some right-
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wing politicians argue that ‘real’ Swiss can do without the help of
the state and that those people only immigrated to Switzerland to
profit from the social security system. According to these politi-
cians, such freeloaders should not be rewarded by granting them
Swiss citizenship. A comparison between these three criteria – so-
cial security, disability insurance and unemployment – shows that
different importance is attributed to them. In twelve municipalities
of our sample, being unemployed and/or benefiting from social se-
curity is considered a problem for naturalisation. In regard to dis-
ability insurance, we get a different picture. In ten municipalities,
the majority of politicians are rather generous with such people. In
the course of our case studies, we received the impression that
many local politicians think that losing a job or not having the
money to support his or her family is self-inflicted. On the other
hand, we were often told that to be involved in an accident that lim-
its one’s working abilities could happen to anybody.
8. Facilitated naturalisation for the second and third generations: The nine
criteria we have presented so far can be applied each time a deci-
sion is made about an application. It may be that considerations
about certain criteria are not explicitly made. As we have seen, for
example, candidates must not be refused for the simple reason that
they prefer to keep their old nationality, as this right is guaranteed
by the Swiss citizenship law. Nonetheless, this aspect is sometimes
taken into consideration when decisions are made. As for the last
two criteria, the situation is slightly different: laws on simplified
naturalisation exist only at the cantonal level. Local decision makers
are hardly ever confronted with the question of whether young ap-
plicants who have been born or have attended part of their school
years in Switzerland should profit from a facilitated naturalisation
procedure. Nonetheless, opinions on these questions allow us to
verify whether or not local decision makers think that young adults
who have lived and gone to school in Switzerland can be considered
integrated enough for naturalisation. Opinions are very diverse on
this subject. For some, applicants who have spent most of their life
in this country can be considered Swiss citizens. It is often argued
that these adolescents have almost no relation any more with the
former home country of their parents. Some, in fact, find it discri-
minatory to assert that people strongly identifying themselves with
their Swiss environment have no political rights. In some few Swiss
municipalities, all applicants that have lived for at least twelve years
in this country are automatically considered integrated enough: ap-
plicants no longer have to prove their degree of integration; rather,
opponents to an individual naturalisation have to show that candi-
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dates do not fulfil this criterion. For other politicians, having lived
in Switzerland for a certain time does not tell them anything about
how familiar these persons are with Swiss culture. They argue that
even adolescents who have been born in Switzerland may be socia-
lised mainly in the cultural environment of their families. The aver-
age positions towards these two questions score in most municipali-
ties below our 0.38 benchmark, and the standard deviations are re-
latively low compared with the other indicators. It thus seems that
the majority of politicians in all our case studies are in favour of fa-
cilitated naturalisation. This is rather surprising, as during our pro-
ject two national referenda on these two issues have been rejected
by a majority of the Swiss population.
The attitudes towards these eleven naturalisation criteria enable us to
generate an indicator for each actor on how generous or restrictive his
or her understanding of citizenship is. This indicator will be used ex-
tensively in Chapters 6 and 7. In this chapter, we are more interested
in the aggregated indicator of both local subgroups and the entire mu-
nicipalities, i.e. the summary index in the last column in Table 5.1. In-
terestingly, this new indicator for measuring the overall understanding
of citizenship of all local politicians correlates relatively highly with our
first indicator, which has been generated for the large-N analysis on
the basis of results of national referenda (r=0.69, p=0.006). The posi-
tions of the local politicians thus appear to be in line with the attitudes
of the people they represent. Moreover, we can be sure now that the
first measurement of the understanding of citizenship is a rather good
operationalisation even though it does not directly account for indivi-
dual attitudes.
As Table 5.1 displays, a whole range of understandings of citizenship
can be observed. For the sake of illustration let us briefly look at the
two extreme cases. In Bernlow, the municipality with the most gener-
ous understanding of citizenship, hardly anybody requires that candi-
dates be assimilated, give up their old nationalities, or become mem-
bers of a local association. For the large majority, it does not pose a pro-
blem when women wearing the Muslim headscarf apply for Swiss
citizenship or that young foreign citizens profit from facilitated natura-
lisation. When a candidate is unemployed, benefits from disability in-
surance, or is not very familiar with the political system in Switzerland,
only a minority opposes his or her application. On the other hand,
when someone does not speak the regional language very well or bene-
fits from social security, it becomes difficult for him or her to become
a Swiss citizen. At the other end of the scale of our fourteen municipa-
lities, the situation looks much different. While the majority of the de-
cision makers in Aargauhigh finds that integration is enough for natur-
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alisation and sees no problems in facilitating the procedure for young
candidates who have been born or went to school in Switzerland, all
other criteria feature relatively high values.
5.3 Structure and influence
Needless to say, various attitudes on naturalisation politics can be
found in each municipality. How do we know then which ones prevail
when it comes to making decisions on naturalisation applications?
Could it be that the average values in Table 5.1 are distorted by extreme
attitudes of politicians who are not very influential? To get a clearer pic-
ture of the prevailing attitudes, we have to find out who the actors are
who influence the decision-making processes. In other words, the im-
portance of a specific discourse can only be detected if we know who
uttered it, in which situation and which position the bearer of an opi-
nion has within an influence network. According to Hajer (2005), there
are two steps to measure the influence of a discourse: first, we have to
look at whether it is used by a given social unit to conceptualise the so-
cial world. Second, we have to verify whether a specific discourse solidi-
fies into institutions and organisational practices. Since we deal with
municipalities where few practices are institutionalised, it will be al-
most impossible to detect dominant discourses simply by looking at
the formal procedures and regulations; nor is it very promising to take
into consideration only the functions of the communicators of certain
discourses. Instruments borrowed from social network analysis and
community power studies constitute better and more useful means to
reveal the influential actors and therefore the dominant understand-
ings of citizenship.
In the study of power relations and social influence in local settings,
two main theoretical traditions can be distinguished: community power
studies and social network analysis (Helbling, Egli & Matter 2005). In
the community power studies that have emerged in the 1950s and
1960s in the U.S., three classic approaches for data collection and ana-
lysis have been developed that are still applied in contemporary studies.
The positional approach states that power is attributed through hierar-
chies and formal positions held by individuals in a political, bureau-
cratic, or economic system (Mills 1956). According to the decision-mak-
ing approach, one might identify the elite by detecting the actors inter-
vening in particular decision-making processes (Dahl 1961). Influential
actors either are able to implement their own problem-solving strate-
gies or they may successfully block the propositions of others. The re-
putational approach enables researchers to determine the local elite
based on an assessment of the political, economic and social actors by
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local insiders (Hunter 1953). The subjective perceptions of these insi-
ders constitute the main source of information. A strength of this ap-
proach is the consideration that power bases can translate into direct
interpersonal influence only if they are perceived as influential. The
disadvantage of this approach is, however, that the evaluation relies on
subjective assessments. Real influence is not measured and there are
no criteria for the selection and the number of ‘insiders’ to be inter-
viewed.
More recent studies began to combine these three approaches (Lau-
mann & Knoke 1987; Knoke et al. 1996). By means of the positional
and decision-making approaches, the important actors are identified.
The reputational approach, on the other hand, enables researchers to
further reveal who the more informally powerful actors are, as well as
to elicit who the most influential among the involved actors are. Once
all the involved actors are identified, everyone is asked whom he or she
considers as the most influential actor. The most often mentioned per-
sons are then regarded as the most powerful ones. In a similar vein,
we first identified the involved actors by the positional and decision-
making approaches and then located the degree of influence of each lo-
cal politician by means of the reputational approach; this approach
comes closest to our definition of powerful actors in terms of Bour-
dieu’s concept of political capital. Accordingly, those individuals are in-
fluential who succeed in convincing others of their interpretation of
the world and who are perceived by others as the legitimate holders of
power. The construction of the indicator of political capital is based on
data collected in our face-to-face interviews. We asked all interviewees
to indicate all actors from the list they thought to have some influence
in the naturalisation politics of the respective municipalities.8 Then
they were asked to indicate the three most important actors and out of
these three the one they considered to be the most influential. For the
index, we summed up the number of times an actor was mentioned as
being influential. Persons among the three most influential actors re-
ceived an additional point and those who were mentioned as the most
important actors, two additional points. This indicator was then stan-
dardised so that the most important actor in the respective municipali-
ties received the value ‘100’.
Interesting as it is to look at the actors individually, it is even more
interesting – and more revealing – to look at the entire structure of a
municipality, by defining the actors’ relative positions in the contact
network and by revealing groups of actors with similar positions. In so-
cial network analysis, the perspective that power is mainly a relational
construct has gained in importance in the last decades (see Knoke
1990). In order to discern the important actors, the conviction prevails
that it has to be observed how the actors bring each other into account,
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and it is argued that the influence of an actor depends on his or her
contacts with others and his or her position in the network (Bourdieu’s
social capital). By accounting for all ties between actors, we can go be-
yond their party affiliations and formal functions in political bodies and
get a clearer picture of the entire political field. In this way, we will be
in a better position to situate the various discourses and controversies.
As a complement to classic community power studies, several re-
search projects in the 1970s began to study local power structures in
Germany and the U.S. by means of instruments borrowed from social
network analyses (Laumann, Marsden & Galaskiewicz 1977; Laumann
& Pappi 1973). Other studies analysed the influential actors within a
specific national or local policy domain (Laumann & Knoke 1987;
Knoke, Broadbent & Tsujinaka 1996).9 In such issue networks (Heclo
1978) or policy networks (Van Warden 1992), different actors collabo-
rate in a thematically delimited field. The network approach allows for
widening the mere state-centred perspective of politics by including ac-
tors and organisations that are not formally involved or institutiona-
lised. In a similar vein, the organisational state approach (Laumann &
Knoke 1987; Knoke et al. 1996) assumes that modern states cannot be
considered any more as autonomously negotiating actors but rather as
conglomerate of interacting public and private actors, (e.g. Sciarini
1996; Serdu¨lt 2002). Such a perspective is helpful especially for stu-
dies in local settings, since it can be assumed that there are a lot of in-
formal contacts and that a large range of different actors may exert in-
fluence (e.g. Ladner 1991: 236-258).
Social network analysis not only allows us to account for relation-
ships between actors, it also provides different instruments for re-
grouping individual actors and for defining their relative position in a
group. A useful instrument that will be applied for the analysis of our
case studies is block-modelling (Wasserman & Faust 1994: 394-424). A
block is a group within an adjacency matrix that displays structurally
equivalent actors. Recall that by structural equivalence we mean that
actors are substitutable. In our case, such actors have the same pat-
terns of relationships with third persons. This does not mean, however,
that structurally equivalent actors have any direct ties to one another.
In this sense, block-modelling has to be distinguished from the analy-
sis of cliques, by which we can identify groups whose actors are all
connected. The disadvantage of analysing cliques is that it is based only
on first-order relations and does not allow us to find out where those
groups or their constituent parts are situated in the structure of the
network. A clique may consist of both rather isolated and very well-con-
nected actors.10 On the other hand, by identifying structurally equiva-
lent actors, all the contacts of all the actors and hence their relative po-
sitions in the network are accounted for. Given the fact that these ac-
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tors are connected to exactly the same nodes, they are identical with re-
spect to all structural variables and indicators of centrality (Borgatti &
Everett 1992: 7). This implies a certain cohesion or proximity between
structurally equivalent actors, as they are in the same part of the net-
work (Borgatti & Everett 1992: 9). Moreover, structurally equivalent
persons tend to have similar attitudes because they interact with the
same kind of persons (Burt 1978: 199). Whether the obtained blocks
really can be considered as issue networks, i.e. groups of actors that
pursue a similar policy, can be decided by looking at the characteristics
of the constituent actors. As a matter of fact, we observed that the var-
ious blocks of our municipalities are relatively similar in their under-
standing of citizenship. Party members with differing attitudes are re-
grouped in different blocks. We can therefore conclude that, on the
one hand, our structurally equivalent blocks are groups of actors who
discuss matters of local naturalisation politics with the same people
and thus dispose of similar information and are exposed to the same
attitudes of third persons. Information on ties between actors has been
collected in our face-to-face interviews. Each interviewee had to indicate
with whom he or she had been in regular contact to discuss matters of
local naturalisation politics.11
Table 5.2 lists the blocks of all fourteen municipalities of our sample
and thus enables us to get a clearer picture of the municipal power
structures. By means of the CONCOR method, we have divided the ac-
tors of each municipality into four blocks.12 In three cases less than
four blocks result from the calculations because groups of actors that
are structurally completely equivalent, for obvious reasons, cannot be
divided. In St. Gallenhigh (case 8 in Table 5.2), for example, all actors
are connected to each other; no subgroups can therefore be found. For
each block, we have listed the party affiliation of their members and
calculated the indicators for the degree of influence and the under-
standing of citizenship by averaging the values of the individual actors
of the respective blocks. The municipalities are listed in descending or-
der of their rejection rates (indicated in brackets) and the blocks within
each municipality, in descending order of their degree of influence.
As for the party composition of the individual blocks, it appears that in
many cases the two most influential blocks are composed of politicians
from both left and right wing parties. An exception is Bernlow (case 14
in Table 5.2), where the powerful blocks 1 and 2 are composed of either
Social Democrats or Liberals. On the other hand, in no municipality
are all politicians of the same party part of the same block. These two
observations confirm our earlier caveat according to which local power
structures cannot be strictly traced along party lines (cf. Ladner 1991:
252-256). As it turns out, resorting to social network analysis and com-
munity power studies is highly useful for finding influential actors, as
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Table 5.2 Blockmodels
Blocks N Political parties Influence UC
1. Schwyzhigh (47%)
1 2 SP, SVP 57 0.36
2 4 SVP, CVP, FDP, Admin. 40 0.59
3 2 SP, Grüne 37 0.36
4 2 SVP, CVP 37 0.50
Std. Dev. 10 0.11
2. Bernhightwo (29%)
1 3 SP, SVP, Admin. 60 0.43
2 2 SP, SVP 32 0.54
Std. Dev. 20 0.08
3. Schwyzlow (26%)
1 1 SP 55 0.09
2 4 3 CVP, SP 39 0.50
3 4 2 CVP, FDP, SP 30 0.52
4 3 3 SVP 21 0.39
Std. Dev. 15 0.20
4. Luzernhigh (24%)
1 5 3 SVP, Grüne, FDP 44 0.49
2 3 2 FDP, CVP 22 0.36
3 6 2 FDP, 2SP, SVP, CVP 12 0.31
4 3 SVP, SD, FDP 7 0.60
Std. Dev. 16 0.13
5. Bernhigh (22%)
1 8 3 FDP, 2 SVP, SP, 2 Admin. 51 0.40
2 4 3 SP, Grüne 13 0.34
3 2 2 FDP 9 0.42
4 2 EVP, SVP 2 0.18
Std. Dev. 22 0.11
6. Neuchâtelhigh (15%)
1 2 SP, PL 86 0.27
2 2 2 SP 57 0.09
3 5 SP, SVP, PL, FDP, Grüne 9 0.23
Std. Dev. 39 0.09
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Table 5.2 Blockmodels (continued)
Blocks N Political parties Influence UC
7. Aargauhigh (13%)
1 5 FDP, SVP, EVP, SP, Admin. 38 0.57
2 3 2 SVP, PA 29 0.67
3 1 SP 21 0.18
4 2 SP, Grüne 11 0.30
Std. Dev. 12 0.23
8. St. Gallenhigh (11%)
1 8 3 FDP, 2 CVP, SP, 2 Admin. – 0.39
Std. Dev. – –
9. Zurichhigh (11%)
1 7 2 SVP, FDP, SP, CVP, 2 Admin. 57 0.47
2 6 2 SVP, 2 FDP, EVP, Grüne 33 0.32
3 2 SP, Grüne 33 0.27
4 2 2 SVP 19 0.48
Std. Dev. 16 0.11
10. Neuchâtellow (5%)
1 3 POP, SP, PL 50 0.12
2 3 POP, SP, Grüne 25 0.27
3 1 SP 25 0.18
4 5 SP, Grüne, SVP, PL, FDP 18 0.27
Std. Dev. 14 0.07
11. Zurichlow (2%)
1 5 SVP, EVP, CVP, SP, Admin. 27 0.42
2 6 3 SVP, 2 FDP, SP 22 0.50
3 7 3 SP, 2 CVP, FDP, SVP 13 0.28
4 2 2 SVP 12 0.82
Std. Dev. 7 0.23
12. Aargaulow (1%)1
1 9 3 SP, AF, CVP, SVP, FDP, Admin. 73 0.37
2 2 CVP, SP 33 0.25
3 2 Admin. 33 0.58
4 1 SP 20 0.18
Std. Dev. 23 0.18
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we thereby do not start from any prior assumptions about the distribu-
tion of power.
If our hypotheses are correct, the influential blocks in municipalities
with a high rejection rate should feature high values for the under-
standing of citizenship. Inversely, municipalities in the lower half of
Table 5.2 should be dominated by groups with a rather generous under-
standing of what it means to become Swiss. Moreover, actors with opi-
nions strongly diverging from the general naturalisation policy should
be part of third and fourth blocks, which normally have little influence.
In this regard, block 4 in Zurichlow (case 11) and Aargaulowtwo (case
13), as well as block 3 in Aargaulow (case 12) are very good examples:
they are composed of actors with little influence who have a very re-
strictive understanding of citizenship in municipalities that hardly re-
ject any applicants.
Skimming over Table 5.2 does not immediately confirm the assump-
tion that the average attitudes of the most influential blocks predict the
rejection rates. There are even cases which seem to clearly contradict
our hypothesis: in the first and third cases in Table 5.2 – in Schwyz-
high and Schwyzlow – the first blocks feature very low values, which
are caused by two Social Democrats, who have a very generous under-
Table 5.2 Blockmodels (continued)
Blocks N Political parties Influence UC
13. Aargaulowtwo (1%)
1 6 SP, FDP, SVP, EVP, 2 Admin. 28 0.47
2 4 2 FDP, SP, SVP 12 0.41
3 4 2 SP, FDP, Grüne 11 0.27
4 1 SVP 0 0.72
Std. Dev. 12 0.19
14. Bernlow (0%)
1 3 2 SP, Admin. 51 0.16
2 5 4 FDP, Admin. 45 0.22
3 3 EVP, SVP, FDP 7 0.32
4 1 SVP 0 0.19
Std. Dev. 26 0.07
Abbreviations: Understanding of citizenship (UC), Liberal Party (FDP) and (PL), Christian
Democrats (CVP), Social Democrats (SP), Swiss People’s Party (SVP), Green Party (Grüne),
Evangelical People’s Party (EVP), Politarena (PA) (local right-wing association close to the
SVP), Agenda Femina (AF) (local left-wing association), person in charge of naturalisations
at the local administration (Admin.).
Scales of indicators: ‘Influence’ varies between ‘0’ (no influence) and ‘100’ (very influential).
‘Understanding of citizenship’ varies between ‘0’ (generous) and ‘1’ (restrictive).
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standing of citizenship and who have been declared as the most influ-
ential actors by the other politicians of their municipalities. This is
rather surprising, as these two municipalities clearly pursue a very re-
strictive naturalisation policy. One might of course argue that the rejec-
tion rate would be even higher if these Social Democrats did not inter-
vene in local naturalisation policies. As a matter of fact, these two poli-
ticians are politically very active – however, rather from the outside and
through their political functions at the cantonal level, since they are
not formally involved in local politics. It appeared that they are not very
well connected to other local politicians and that they do not directly
participate in local naturalisation politics. It is thus doubtful whether
they exert any real influence. It seems that these two persons were cho-
sen as very influential by their colleagues because of their regular pub-
lic appearance, rather than due to any real influence they have on the
outcome of local decision-making processes. This reveals a problem we
sometimes encountered while doing our face-to-face interviews: for
some interviewees, very active colleagues were considered as dominant
actors, even though they have never substantially influenced the local
naturalisation policy (cf. Windisch 1976: ch.2).
Having briefly presented and discussed for our fourteen case studies
the two central indicators for the analysis of local citizenship struggles
and naturalisation fields – the understanding of citizenship and the
power structure – we are now in a position to systematically study their
impact on the outcome of decision-making processes in the context of
naturalisations. Recall that in the large-N analysis in the previous chap-
ter, we operationalised these two concepts by the understanding of citi-
zenship of the entire population and the degree of influence of political
parties in local politics. For our fourteen municipalities, we have data
at hand for a more pertinent operationalisation, enabling us to distin-
guish ‘power ideas’ (Bourdieu): for each decision maker who is in-
volved in local citizenship politics we know how he or she thinks about
citizenship and how influential he or she is in this policy domain (poli-
tical capital).
There are two strategies to test whether the distribution of power-
ideas has an impact on the outcome of policy processes: We account
either for the degree of polarisation or simply for the most influential
actors (cf. Van Waarden 1992: 36; Rhodes & Marsh 1992: 198-199;
Kriesi et al. 2006). Let us start with the first strategy. In the theoretical
part, we argued that the struggles over applications for naturalisation
lead to cultural compromises, i.e. a consensus on which criteria have
to be fulfilled. This consensus might of course be more or less strong.
If it is very strong, one might expect a naturalisation policy that is very
restrictive, very generous, or somewhere between these two extremes,
depending on the prevailing attitudes. When the consensus is low, we
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additionally have to account for whether the political structure is very
polarised or not (whether there is equal distribution of power between
adversary groups or not). When one group monopolises the power, we
can expect that the rejection rate will be in line with the convictions of
the most influential group. When we have two or more powerful
groups with opposing understandings of citizenship, we should expect
rejection rates at the medium level, as the groups have to compromise.
To measure the degree of consensus (related to understanding of citi-
zenship) and the degree of polarisation (related to influence) we re-
sorted to the standard deviations listed in Table 5.2. While we cannot
expect any specific rejection rates in municipalities in which either a
high consensus or no polarisation exists, we expect modest values in
highly polarised municipalities. As Table 5.3 reveals, however, we can-
not confirm this hypothesis. In every group – and especially in group 2
– rejection rates vary from very low to very high.
Following our second strategy for analysing the impact of the power
structures, we simply account for the attitudes of the elite. We hypothe-
sise that the average understanding of citizenship of the very influen-
tial actors helps us predict the rejection rates better than the average at-
titudes of all actors involved in the decision-making processes. By
means of regression analyses, we compare the impacts of the average
values of the most powerful groups (see most influential blocks in Ta-
ble 5.2) and the average attitudes of all actors (see Table 5.1).13
Having few cases does not present a statistical problem as far as the
basic assumptions of the classical normal linear regression model are
concerned (see Gujarati 2003: ch.10; Goldberger 1991: 248-250). It is
decidedly important that the number of observations is greater than
the number of regressors and that there is sufficient variability in the
Table 5.3 Polarisation and concentration of power structures
Std. dev.
UC
Std. dev.
influence
Expected
rejection rate
Groups Municipalities (rejection rates)
Very low – 1 Neuchâtellow (5%), Bernlow (0%), Bernhightwo
(29%)
High
Low Medium 2
Zurichlow (2%), Aargauhigh (13%), Aargaulowtwo
(1%), Schwyzlow (26%), Schwyzhigh (47%),
Luzernhigh (24%), Zürichhigh (11%)
High – 3 Aargaulow (1%), Bernhigh (22%), Neuchâtelhigh
(15%)
Notes: St. Gallenhigh is not listed, as we found only one block of actors in this
municipality. The mean of the standard deviations of the understanding of citizenship is
0.13. Cases with a standard deviation below 0.09 are considered being highly consensual
(group 1). As for the distribution of power (std. dev. influence) cases are divided at its
mean value of 17.
COMPARING LOCAL CITIZENSHIP MODELS 115
values taken by the regressors. Further potential problems lurk in the
facts that small-N regression analyses lead to big standard errors and
that individual cases can easily distort general results.14 Since the ef-
fects of the independent variables are highly uncertain when we have
only a limited number of cases, a large standard error ensures that we
do not jump to conclusions, since we need much more data to reap
significant results (Goldberger 1991: 248-250). Thus, if the t-values are
low, we might too quickly accept the null hypothesis. Conversely, if the
number of observations is small and we still obtain statistically signifi-
cant results (even if they are significant at a low level), we can be sure
that we have confirmed our hypotheses. The impact of individual cases
is a more serious problem. As we have shown, however, we have care-
fully selected a representative sample of cases (see Table 2.1). Moreover,
we are in the position to compare our results with alternative analyses.
As we shall see, the results from the fourteen case studies confirm to a
large extent the findings of our large-N in Chapter 4. Thus, we can be
sure that the results presented below are not distorted by individual
cases.
In Table 5.4, the impacts of the unweighted (all actors) and weighted
local understandings of citizenship (very influential actors only) can be
compared (see Models 1 and 2). One immediately sees that accounting
for the powerful actors predicts much better the outcomes of citizen-
ship policies: whereas the coefficient of the second indicator is highly
significant, the first one is significant only at a relatively low level.
Moreover, the weighted UC explains the variance of rejection rates
much better. When in Models 4 and 5 we control for the perception of
the employment rate, the ratio of foreigners living in a municipality
and the ratio of applicants from Muslim countries – operationalised as
in Chapter 4 – the influence of the unweighted understanding of citi-
zenship decreases and is no longer significant. On the other hand, the
coefficient of the weighted indicator remains stable and is still signifi-
cant. Comparing Models 4 and 5 reveals again that more variance is ex-
plained when information about the influence structure is included.
These findings demonstrate that accounting for the power structures
gives a much clearer picture of which criteria are relevant and which ci-
tizenship policy is pursued. We further observe that the unemployment
rate and the number of Muslim candidates have no significant impact
on the rejection rates. As for the ratio of foreign residents living in a
municipality, the results are ambiguous. Contrary to the results we
have got from our large-N analysis, the negative sign seems to indicate
that fewer candidates are rejected in municipalities with a large foreign
population. In Model 6, the coefficient is significant at the 0.1 level.
As we have seen in Chapter 4, the formal decision-making structure
also has an enormous impact on the rejection rate. Our large-N ana-
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lyses in Tables 4.1 and 4.3 have shown that municipalities in which the
entire population makes decisions in naturalisation matters by ballot
reject many more applications than others (see also Helbling 2008).
Taking into account only the fourteen case studies, a bivariate analysis
revealed that not only decisions that are made by popular votes but also
those made by closed ballot during municipal assemblies lead to much
higher rejection rates (see Table 4.2). The impact of this modified vari-
able (accounting for both popular votes and decisions by closed ballot
during municipal assemblies) is also tested in Model 3 of Table 5.4: in
municipalities in which decisions are made anonymously, almost 20
per cent more applicants are rejected. The impact of this indicator is
highly significant and explains much more than the weighted under-
standing of citizenship (Model 2). However, when we control in Model
6 for other variables, it is no longer significant; its coefficient strongly
decreases and the degree of explained variance becomes smaller than
when we include the indicator for the weighted understanding of citi-
zenship (Model 5). Unfortunately, the two variables ‘weighted under-
standing of citizenship’ and ‘decisions by closed ballot’ cannot be in-
cluded in the same model as they are highly correlated (r=0.67,
p=0.009).15 This is probably due to the fact that the variable ‘decisions
by closed ballot’ not only informs us about the formal structures but
also contains information about the attitudes of local politicians. As we
have already seen in Table 4.2, local politicians in municipalities in
Table 5.4 Rejection rates of all applicants in fourteen municipalities: Non-standar-
dised regression coefficients, standard error in brackets
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Unweighted understanding of
citizenship
0.71°
(0.35)
0.51
(0.42)
Weighted understanding of
citizenship
0.61**
(0.26)
0.60°
(0.29)
Decisions by closed ballot 19.81**
(6.02)
13.51
(8.51)
Unemployment rate 0.08
(0.13)
0.12
(0.11)
0.03
(0.11)
Ratio of foreign residents -0.84
(0.52)
-1.06°
(0.48)
-0.41
(0.52)
Ratio Muslim candidates 0.23
(0.20)
0.21
(0.17)
0.18
(0.19)
Constant -11.17
(13.69)
-8.65
(10.82)
7.03°
(3.94)
5.40
(19.86)
4.57
(14.70)
11.85
(14.47)
R2 (adj.) 0.19 0.26 0.43 0.29 0.44 0.35
N 14 14 14 14 14 14
Notes: Level of significance: ° p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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which decisions are made anonymously disapproved the verdicts of the
Swiss Federal Court, declaring such procedures to violate the Swiss
constitution. In such municipalities, the opinion prevails that their po-
pulation constitutes a homogeneous group, which should have the
competence to decide who becomes member of their community. Ac-
cordingly, both indicators in Models 2 and 3 include information on
the attitudes of local politicians.
In the previous chapter, we have demonstrated that our explanatory
model explains the rejection rate of candidates from Muslim countries
much better than the general ratio. We have got similar findings for
the comparison of the fourteen case studies in Table 5.5. When we re-
place the dependent variable, all coefficients of the explanatory vari-
ables strongly increase. As for the ‘understanding of citizenship’ we ob-
serve the same patterns as in Table 5.4: The coefficient for the un-
weighted understanding of citizenship decreases and is no longer
significant when we include control variables. On the other hand, the
coefficient of the weighted understanding of citizenship does not
change and remains significant at the 0.1 level (Model 5). In line with
the results from the large-N analysis, the impact of the formal deci-
sion-making structure is much higher when explaining the number of
rejected applications of candidates from Muslim countries than when
predicting the general rejection rates.
Table 5.5 Rejection rates of candidates from Muslim countries in fourteen municipa-
lities: Non-standardised regression coefficients, standard error in brackets
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Unweighted understanding of
citizenship
1.16°
(0.58)
0.79
(0.72)
Weighted understanding of
citizenship
1.06**
(0.41)
1.03°
(0.48)
Decisions by closed ballot 35.35**
(9.02)
28.92°
(13.11)
Unemployment rate 0.10
(0.21)
0.18
(0.19)
0.04
(0.17)
Ratio of foreign residents -1.13
(0.90)
-1.52°
(0.81)
-0.29
(0.81)
Ratio Muslim candidates 0.38
(0.34)
0.34
(0.29)
0.27
(0.29)
Constant -22.16
(22.50)
-20.66
(17.21)
6.32
(5.91)
1.27
(34.01)
-3.15
(24.64)
4.57
(22.31)
R2 (adj.) 0.19 0.30 0.52 0.23 0.42 0.43
N 14 14 14 14 14 14
Notes: Level of significance: ° p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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5.4 External influences II
This chapter set out to operationalise naturalisation fields and citizen-
ship struggles as we conceptualised them in Chapter 3. We generated
pertinent indicators for the understanding of citizenship and the de-
gree of influence of each local actor and tested whether it makes a dif-
ference or not to account for power structures when we measure the
influence of the understanding of citizenship on the ratio of rejected
applications. As our findings have shown, it makes a difference
whether or not we account for the local power structures in predicting
the outcomes of naturalisation policies. Similar to the findings of the
previous chapter, we further demonstrated that our model and espe-
cially the indicator for the formal decision-making structures work par-
ticularly well in predicting the number of rejected applications of can-
didates from Muslim countries. More generally, we have also revealed
that in Swiss municipalities the implementation of citizenship politics
and the application of naturalisation criteria diverge a great deal. This
confirms our earlier observation that Swiss municipalities can be con-
sidered to a certain extent as independent political units when it comes
to naturalising foreigners. The question remains, however, whether the
attitudes of local politicians are solely the result of local struggles
(which we will discuss in more detail in Chapter 7), or whether their
opinions are also influenced by external factors. We have already seen
in the previous chapter that there are no regional clusters of citizen-
ship politics (see Table 4.4). In our interviews we learned that some ac-
tors knew and observed how other municipalities in their region dealt
with naturalisation applications. It may even happen that somebody
proposes to introduce a procedure that was successful elsewhere. How-
ever, such occurrences seem to be very rare. It appeared that hardly
anybody regularly discusses matters concerning naturalisations with
colleagues from other municipalities. We can therefore conclude that
there are no significant influences from one municipality to another
within a certain region that lead to clusters of local settings with simi-
lar naturalisation policies. As we will see in the next chapter, one can
observe very different approaches in citizenship politics even among
neighbouring municipalities.
Might there be influences coming from the national level? As we al-
ready know, there are very few regulations at the national and cantonal
levels and hardly any direct exchanges between actors at the different
levels. When it comes to the discourses of the individual actors, we no-
ticed in our interviews with local politicians that they sometimes
adopted arguments from representatives of their parties at the national
level. However, whether such influences exist or not is irrelevant, since
they constitute a constant factor for all municipalities. What is more in-
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teresting is the fact that such discourses are adopted in varying de-
grees. We observed, for example, that some local representatives of the
Swiss People’s Party, defending a very restrictive naturalisation policy,
used similar arguments as their colleagues at the national level. In mu-
nicipalities with a generous understanding of citizenship and a less ac-
tive SVP, however, such arguments were absent. This points again to
the salience of the local context.
Although we highlighted, time and again, the importance of the lo-
cal political and social context and could hardly trace any external influ-
ences, we should not treat our case studies as completely isolated fields.
After all, they are part of the same nation-state and it might be as-
sumed that they share some cultural and political characteristics. Lea-
ch’s (1965 [1954]) study illustrates that the variation of political systems
on the local level in highland Burma appears to be limited when com-
pared to other societies where political systems existed that were not
conceivable in highland Burma (see Chapter 3). In a similar vein, stu-
dies comparing local integration politics in different countries have
emphasised the influence of national citizenship models that limit the
range of conceivable politics at the local level within a nation-state (Ro-
gers & Tillie 2001; Koopmans 2004; Penninx et al. 2004a). Unfortu-
nately, there is no comparable data about local understandings of citi-
zenship in other European countries. Such information would allow us
to evaluate whether, on average, conceptions of citizenship are more re-
strictive or generous in other nation-states.
Instead of comparing local citizenship models in different countries,
another strategy is to look for commonalities of Swiss municipalities
and to evaluate whether local politicians in different places share some
cultural and political values despite diverging citizenship politics. This
can be done by studying how local decision makers think about Swit-
zerland and what they feel proud about in this country. In each of our
municipalities, at least 56 per cent of our interviewees, and an average
of 77 per cent, are very or rather proud of Switzerland.16 This might
not be so surprising given the fact that we talked to local politicians. It
gets much more interesting when we look at what these people are
proud of. As is shown in Table 5.6, in each municipality by far the
most often mentioned characteristics were the direct democratic sys-
tem and the high degree of liberty prevailing in this country. Both as-
pects were conceived as existent together, since by ‘liberty’ most people
understood rights and opportunities to express one’s opinion and to
participate in the political processes. Of all eighteen characteristics that
came up in this open-ended question, these two traits of the country
were mentioned by 59 per cent of all interviewees. Indeed, in the indi-
vidual communities, how many politicians are proud of direct demo-
cratic institutions varies a great deal. In virtually all cases, however, it
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is by far the most often mentioned characteristic of Switzerland. Even
in the municipality in which ‘direct democracy’ and ‘liberty’ have been
indicated as points of pride the fewest times, 40 per cent of the local
actors still have mentioned it. Only in three municipalities have other
characteristics been mentioned more often than 40 per cent. The sec-
ond most often mentioned characteristic, ‘cultural diversity’, scores (on
average) only 23 per cent and the remaining ones, 19 per cent or less.
By ‘cultural diversity’, most understand the four national linguistic
groups. A few left-wing politicians also included the cultural diversity
of immigrants in this category. In some individual municipalities, peo-
ple are also proud of the peaceful cohabitation of different (indigenous)
cultures, the social wealth of this country, its politics of neutrality and
the prevailing law and order.
Table 5.6 Pride of Swiss local politicians
Characteristics Municipalities
Over-
all %
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 Direct dem./liberty 59 50 71 50 64 56 67 64 44 60 40 43 88 60 63
2 Cultural diversity 23 20 18 42 9 19 50 18 22 0 7 43 35 20 25
3 Social wealth 19 25 6 8 36 19 0 9 33 20 27 7 29 0 50
4 Peaceful cohabitat 18 30 12 33 27 25 33 27 11 0 13 7 6 10 13
5 Law and order 15 15 18 8 9 6 0 36 0 20 27 14 12 0 38
6 Neutrality 13 10 24 25 9 13 0 18 0 20 7 14 12 20 13
7 Nature 11 20 6 17 0 3 8 18 11 0 13 21 18 20 0
8 Constitutional state 10 20 12 8 0 31 8 9 0 0 20 14 6 0 13
9 Welfare state 7 5 0 0 0 6 0 9 0 20 13 14 18 0 13
10 Tolerance/generosity 7 5 6 17 9 6 8 0 11 0 13 14 0 0 13
11 Level of education 6 5 6 0 0 6 0 0 22 20 0 14 6 10 0
12 Assiduity 5 15 0 0 0 0 17 9 0 0 13 14 0 0 0
Notes: Only those characteristics are listed that were mentioned by at least 5 per cent of all
interviewees. In total, eighteen characteristics came up in the interviews. Characteristics
mentioned by less than 5 per cent are ‘self-assuredness’, ‘federalism’, ‘consociationalism’,
‘Christian values’ and ‘Switzerland as a financial centre’. Some were also proud of the fact
that most politicians at the national level are not professionals (militia-system).
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Similar patterns can be observed when we compare how proud the
representatives of different local political parties are. With the excep-
tion of the members of the Green Party, of which only 25 per cent are
very or rather proud of Switzerland, in all other groups only a minority
is not proud of Switzerland. Needless to say, differences can be ob-
served between the Social-Democrats (SP) and the Swiss People’s Party
(SVP), of which 64 per cent and 97 per cent, respectively, are proud of
this country. As for ‘direct democracy’ and the ‘high degree of liberty’,
those are again by far the most crucial characteristics of Switzerland
for a majority of the representatives of all political parties (results not
shown here).
More detailed analyses have shown that there is no correlation be-
tween the most often mentioned characteristics and the rejection rates
(results not shown here). This shows that local politicians in Swiss mu-
nicipalities have some common ideas about the Swiss nation-state,
even though they pursue different naturalisation policies and have dif-
ferent ideas about who can become a member of this nation-state. The
fact that a large majority is proud of this country’s direct democratic in-
stitutions confirms the commonly held view that political institutions
constitute a crucial part of Swiss citizens’ national identity (Kriesi
1998: 5-12; Chollet 2006: 86-124). Of the three fundamental political
institutions in Switzerland – neutrality, federalism and direct democ-
racy – the last one is considered as the most important one since it
heavily determines political life in this country (Kriesi 1998: 90). Some
even speak of Switzerland as the oldest democracy, referring to the un-
ion of the first three cantons in the 13th century. Given the cultural het-
erogeneity of this country, it is possible to contend that political institu-
tions constitute a crucial denominator for all groups. Accordingly, Swit-
zerland is often considered as a nation by action of the will rather than
a nation based on cultural homogeneity (Kohn 1967 [1944]; Deutsch
1976; Theiler 2004).
It can be concluded from this short excursus on what Swiss local po-
liticians are proud of Switzerland that they share some common ideas
about this country despite diverging understandings of citizenship.
While we discussed in this chapter our hypotheses by comparing ag-
gregated data of fourteen case studies, in the next chapter we will illus-
trate in more detail the decision-making processes and the various un-
derstandings of citizenship by looking more closely at the politics of ci-
tizenship in four municipalities.
122 PRACTISING CITIZENSHIP AND HETEROGENEOUS NATIONHOOD
6 Four Naturalisation Fields
6.1 Introduction
Having compared the prevailing ideas of citizenship and the local in-
fluence structures among our fourteen case studies, we are now taking
a closer look at two pairs of municipalities by investigating in detail
their decision-making structures and the attitudes of their politicians.
This chapter mainly serves to confirm our hypotheses with more quali-
tative data and to illustrate in more detail the conclusions of the pre-
vious two chapters. Besides the meaningful generalisations we seek in
our study, we will highlight that each municipality has interesting and
important stories to tell us. For the sake of feasibility and not to bore
the reader with endless accounts of local naturalisation politics, only
four cases will be discussed in more detail.
Two ideas guided the selection of the four cases: first, we wanted to
guarantee a certain variety among the cases covering the range of citi-
zenship politics, which we encountered in the previous chapter. Sec-
ond, we made sure that the two cases of each pair are as similar as pos-
sible in order to control for a range of intervening variables. Out of the
fourteen case studies we first selected the two municipalities with the
most generous and the most restrictive understandings of citizenship
(see Table 5.1). As we selected most of the fourteen municipalities in
pairs (see Table 3.1), we then simply retained the two cases that be-
longed to the first two cases; these two are situated somewhere in the
middle between the two extreme ends of the scale of understandings
of citizenship. One case of each pair has a high and the other one a
low rejection rate. Looking at Table 6.1, where some key features of the
four cases are listed, we notice that the number of inhabitants, the ra-
tio of foreigners living in these municipalities and the local unemploy-
ment rate are relatively similar for each pair and that there seems to be
hardly any relation between these variables and the rejection rate.
Although there are very few regulations at the cantonal level that could
interfere with local naturalisation policy, we selected municipalities of
the same canton. This allows us to show that even within the same re-
gion naturalisation politics and understandings of citizenship can vary
a lot. Moreover, the selected pairs of municipalities have the same for-
mal decision-making procedure. In Bernhigh and Bernlow, the final
decisions regarding naturalisation applications are taken by the local
parliament, whereas in Aargauhigh and Aargaulow the population de-
cides during municipal assemblies whether the applicants can acquire
the Swiss citizenship. Although similar with regard to a range of char-
acteristics, the averaged rejection rates between 1990 and 2002 do dis-
play differences upon critical inspection. While Bernhigh and Aargau-
high refused 22 per cent and 13 per cent of the applications respec-
tively, Bernlow and Aargaulow accepted almost all candidates.
As we will see in the course of this chapter, the idea of citizenship is
problematised in a completely different manner in the municipalities
with restrictive naturalisation policies and those with generous natura-
lisation policies. The detailed description of these four case studies –
first of Bernhigh and Bernlow, then of Aargauhigh and Aargaulow –
therefore mainly concentrates on the attitudes of the local decision ma-
kers in order to show that it is to a certain extent their conceptions that
help us understand whether a candidate is naturalised or not. In con-
trast to the previous chapter, we will not content ourselves with quanti-
tative indicators; we will present in more detail the discourses of local
politicians. By doing so, we will not lose track of the power-and-influ-
ence structures within each municipality that facilitate or constrain cer-
tain ideas.
On the basis of documents and expert interviews with representa-
tives of the local administration, we will for each case first present the
respective formal naturalisation procedure and concentrate especially
on the question which actors are involved in which function and at
Table 6.1 Key features of the four case studies
Bernhigh Bernlow Aargauhigh Aargaulow
Rejection rate 22% 0% 13% 1%
Understanding of citizenship 0.42 0.20 0.51 0.37
Formal decision-making
procedure
Parliament Parliament Assembly Assembly
Kind of municipality Small
industrial
town
Small
industrial
town
Rural
commuter
municipality
Small town
Canton Bern Bern Aargau Aargau
Residents in 2002 14,284 10,803 8,421 10,776
Foreign nationals in 2002 21% 17% 18% 26%
Unemployment rate in 2002 2.5% 1.8% 1.8% 2.7%
Notes: The understanding of citizenship (UC) varies between ‘0’ (generous) and ‘1’
(restrictive) and has been generated according to the procedure discussed in Chapter 5.
The information for ‘kind of municipality’ has been extracted from Andreas Ladner’s
dataset that is based on three surveys in all Swiss municipalities (cf. Ladner 1991).
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what moment of the process. This will allow us to find out whether
certain individuals or groups of persons through their formal positions
have an influence on the decision-making processes. More generally,
the brief presentation will show in detail how municipal naturalisa-
tions proceed, that even in relatively small political units many differ-
ent actors are involved in the decision-making processes and that the
evaluation of the candidates’ dossiers happens at various stages. This
once more reveals the contentious nature of local naturalisation pro-
cesses and that both recommendations and final decisions depend a lot
on the attitudes of individual actors. Finally, looking at how the dos-
siers are treated, in which way information about candidates are gath-
ered, how recommendations are made and how the broader population
is informed, already tells us a lot about how restrictive the local natura-
lisation policy is.
The power structures within the local political fields of naturalisation
will be sketched by resorting to the indicators that we generated in the
previous chapter. Again, we will be able to show the positions of indivi-
dual persons within each municipality. These preliminary analyses
mainly serve to better situate the importance of the discourses of indi-
vidual actors and political parties. Thus, we will be able to distinguish
dominant and minority discourses, conflict situations and the degree
of heterogeneity of ideas within each municipality.
The discourses of local politicians will then be presented and com-
pared in relation to three relevant questions which we have already
dealt with in the previous two chapters:1 (1) first and foremost, we will
present attitudes towards naturalisation criteria for which we have so
far used an aggregated indicator. In contrast to the previous discussion
on the eleven naturalisation criteria, only the attitudes towards aspects
that are judged by the local actors as being crucial have been retained
for the following analysis. (2) We repeatedly noticed that our explana-
tory model works particularly well to predict the ratio of rejected appli-
cations from Muslim countries. We will therefore present in more de-
tail the attitudes towards this group of candidates. It will be revealing
as to whether people from Muslim countries are seen as very different
from Swiss citizens or not with regard to their culture and more speci-
fically their attitude towards the state. More generally, we will demon-
strate how those people are categorised and whether or not and to what
extent stereotypical thinking is present in the heads of local politicians.
Interestingly, it will appear that problems of integrating oneself into a
new social and cultural environment are explained very differently: for
those with a rather restrictive understanding of citizenship it is the dif-
ferent cultural background of the applicants that is crucial, whereas
those with a rather generous understanding of citizenship emphasise
individual characteristics such as education or social class as relevant
FOUR NATURALISATION FIELDS 125
for a successful integration. Moreover, politicians requiring a lot of cri-
teria to be fulfilled also use a more xenophobic vocabulary than those
with a more generous understanding of citizenship. Using terms like
‘tribes’, ‘niggers’, ‘potential criminals’ and ‘profiteers’ when talking
about naturalisation candidates, not only shows how high the barriers
are set by such actors, but also what image they have of certain foreign
residents. (3) Finally, we are also interested in views of the verdicts of
the Swiss Federal Court that were taken one year before we started our
case studies. Attitudes towards these decisions will be an indicator of
whether the interviewees see naturalisations as political rather than ad-
ministrative procedures. As our interviews have revealed, those people
regard naturalisations as political procedures who think the local popu-
lation should have the last word to say in naturalisation matters. They
have a restrictive understanding of citizenship and most often hold the
opinion that a naturalised citizen becomes primarily a member of a lo-
cal community and not of the Swiss nation-state.
6.2 Bernhigh and Bernlow
Formal procedures and power structures
In both municipalities, Bernhigh and Bernlow, the formal naturalisa-
tion procedures and the kind of actors involved are more or less the
same. However, some minor aspects already point to a more restrictive
naturalisation policy in Bernhigh. In Bernhigh, after candidates have
submitted their applications at the local administration, the sufficiency
of the documents and the formal requirements (mainly the years of re-
sidence) are verified. In contrast to procedures in many other munici-
palities, applicants are then invited for more or less formal interviews
with representatives of the local administration (in most municipalities
candidates only meet the naturalisation commission). These interviews
mainly serve to let the authorities to get to know the candidates – to
find out their reasons for naturalisation and to verify their knowledge
of language and degree of integration. In some cases, possible criminal
records or outstanding tax debts in the past are addressed. In Bern-
high, it regularly happens that information is gathered from employ-
ers, schoolteachers and housekeepers. In Bernlow, it appears to be
rather exceptional for schoolteachers and employers to be contacted. In
contrast to Bernhigh, in Bernlow representatives of the executive body
(local government) are always present during these interviews. On the
basis of the interviews and recommendations from third persons, the
local administrations of both towns make an application for acceptance
or rejection.
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The dossiers are then handed over to the naturalisation commission
consisting of representatives of the local parliament. Each candidate’s
application is discussed by the members of the commission who often
adopt the recommendations of the administration. In Bernlow, it rarely
happens that the commission invites candidates for a second interview.
In Bernhigh, this may occur in some borderline cases when candidates
seem to have violated a traffic rule. Since the commission does not dis-
pose of any written documents in such a case, candidates are invited to
clarify the incident. After having discussed each dossier, the commis-
sion also makes an application for acceptance or rejection. If a candi-
date is not recommended for naturalisation, he or she is given the op-
portunity to withdraw his or her application. In Bernhigh, about 25 per
cent of the applications are withdrawn each year and submitted again
one or two years later. In Bernlow, very few dossiers are recommended
for rejection. This means that the difference in the rejection rates be-
tween both municipalities would be even higher if all submitted dos-
siers in Bernhigh were passed through the process to the final decision
in the local parliament.
The members of the commission are in direct contact with the par-
liamentary groups and inform them about the individual dossiers. As a
consequence, the attitudes of the deputies are taken into account by
the commission and its recommendations are often followed after the
dossiers have been handed over to the legislative body. In both munici-
palities, the executive body also discusses the dossiers but virtually
never challenges a recommendation of the administration or the com-
mission. Since representatives of the executive body in Bernlow inter-
view the candidates together with the person in charge at the local ad-
ministration, the opinions of its members already flow into the very
first recommendation. Interestingly, in Bernhigh freshly naturalised
candidates are invited for a more or less formal ceremony during
which the documents are handed over. In Bernlow, however, such cere-
monies were abolished some years ago since hardly anybody attended
to them.
Looking at the formal procedures, we can see that in Bernhigh the
candidates appear to be screened more systematically, more informa-
tion is gathered from third persons, and it is recommended to more
persons that they withdraw their applications. It seems that more cri-
teria are verified and a higher level of integration is required. All this
constitutes an initial explanation for the different rejection rates and
points to local politicians with more restrictive attitudes towards natur-
alisation candidates in Bernhigh. The existence or non-existence of a
naturalisation ceremony might also be considered an indicator for the
importance that is attributed to the citizenship acquisition. To elaborate
on these impressions, we now have to specify who the actors are who
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decisively influence the decision-making processes. In both commu-
nities, the local administration seems to be an important actor, since
their representatives are among the few persons that encounter the
candidates. Actually, only in Bernlow do some other actors – members
of the executive body – regularly meet the applicants. The recommen-
dations of the administration are therefore crucial for the decisions of
both the naturalisation commission and the local parliament. In Bern-
high, the naturalisation commission itself is certainly another impor-
tant actor. Its members verify the dossiers a second time and work out
recommendations for the parliament. During the decision-making pro-
cesses, they are constantly in contact with other members of the local
parliament and inform them about their decisions. In Bernlow, the ex-
ecutive body can be considered the second most important collective
actor, since it is involved already at the very beginning of the naturali-
sation procedure.
These impressions are confirmed in Table 6.2, which lists the rela-
tive influence of each interviewee in comparison to the most powerful
actor in the political field of naturalisations of each municipality.2 The
two persons in charge of naturalisations at the local administration and
the members of the commission are among the most influential indivi-
Table 6.2 Relative influence and understanding of citizenship of local actors
Bernhigh Bernlow
Actor Party Function Infl. UC Actor Party Function Infl. UC
1 – Administration 100 .10 1 – Administration 100 .23
2 FDP Executive 96 .23 2 SP Executive 89 .13
3 – Administration 61 .63 3 FDP Executive 63 .28
4 FDP Nat. Commission 26 .55 4 FDP Mayor 53 .10
5 SP Nat. Commission 22 .20 5 SP Parliament 47 0
6 SP Nat. Commission 22 .25 6 – Administration 16 .30
7 SP Nat. Commission 13 .13 7 EVP Nat. Commission 11 .43
8 SVP Nat. Commission 13 .43 8 FDP Nat. Commission 11 .18
9 SVP Nat. Commission 9 .48 9 FDP Executive 5 .20
10 FDP Nat. Commission 9 .35 10 FDP Executive 5 .10
11 FDP Parliament 9 .38 11 SVP Nat. Commission 0 .40
12 Grüne Parliament 9 .28 12 SVP Parliament 0 .18
13 FDP Executive 9 .38
14 SVP Parliament 4 .20
15 SP Parliament 0 .50
16 EVP Parliament 0 .13
Abbreviations: Influence (Infl.), Understanding of citizenship (UC), Liberal Party (FDP),
Social Democrats (SP), Swiss People’s Party (SVP), Green Party (Grüne), Evangelical
People’s Party (EVP).
Scales of indicators: ‘Influence’ indicates the relative influence of actors in comparison to
the most powerful actor (100). ‘Understanding of citizenship’ varies between ‘0’ (generous)
and ‘1’ (restrictive).
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dual actors in Bernhigh. The executive body in Bernhigh has no influ-
ence except for one person who is also a member of the naturalisation
commission. In Bernlow, in addition to the two persons in charge of
naturalisations at the local administration, three members of the execu-
tive body and one representative of the local parliament constitute the
most important persons. The naturalisation commission seems to be
fairly unimportant.
Table 6.2 also lists the individual understandings of citizenship
(UC). A brief look at the table reveals that, except for one representative
of the local administration, the important actors in Bernhigh have a
more restrictive attitude than their counterparts in Bernlow. Interest-
ingly, the party affiliation of the influential members seems not to be a
very good predictor of the individual understandings of citizenship. In
both municipalities, members from the Liberal Party (FDP) and the So-
cial Democrats (SP) constitute the most influential actors, while repre-
sentatives of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) are rather unimportant.
Nonetheless, the naturalisation policy in Bernhigh is much more re-
strictive than that in Bernlow.
Attitudes towards naturalisation criteria
Now that we have a clearer picture of the structures of the local natura-
lisation fields and know who the dominant actors are, we would like to
explore and compare in more detail the various discourses on citizen-
ship and particularly the criteria that have to be fulfilled for naturalisa-
tion (for a summary of this analysis see Table 6.3 below). Without
knowing who the influential actors are, we would not be able to distin-
guish influential attitudes from less relevant opinions. In the following
discussion we will therefore always specify whether certain positions
are taken by powerful politicians or not.
As we have seen in Table 5.1 above, knowledge of the regional lan-
guage is an important criterion in most of our case studies.3 The ob-
vious difficulty for examiners is how to evaluate whether the language
ability of a candidate is good enough for naturalisation. In most muni-
cipalities, local politicians verify the language abilities of examinees
during an interview in an informal way. For candidates who are judged
to have an insufficient command of the required language, it is often
recommended that they attend a language course before continuing
the naturalisation procedure. Quite exceptionally, Bernhigh in 2003 in-
troduced a standardised language test that should enable the local deci-
sion makers to evaluate the individual candidates according to a stan-
dardised European language folio.4 Different actors in Bernhigh ar-
gued that it was now easier to prepare for these language tests because
the expected level was better specified.
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While such language tests avoid discriminatory decisions, they may
lead to other problems. The most influential actor in Bernlow, the per-
son mainly responsible for naturalisations at the local administration,
opposed such language tests because they discriminated against illiter-
ates, candidates from regions with other alphabets, persons with a low
education and elderly people. According to her, it sufficed to evaluate
their language knowledge during the regular interviews. Anyway, she
continued, the interviewers in Bernlow did not consider the command
of German very important. It was only when they had the impression
that candidates really did not understand anything at all that they
would suggest to them that they attend a language course before the
application process was carried further. Compared to Bernhigh, the dif-
ferent attitudes towards the criterion of language knowledge became
most apparent when she told us that even if candidates did not im-
prove their German during such a language course, they were natura-
lised simply because they showed some willingness to integrate them-
selves.
When asked about the most important criteria a naturalisation candi-
date had to fulfil, most actors in Bernlow either did not mention lan-
guage knowledge at all or attributed to it less importance than their
colleagues in other municipalities. An influential member of the SP ar-
gued that she expected that young candidates would have a minimal
command of German, but those persons who immigrated to Switzer-
land as adults would not be expected to speak German. Another actor
of the same party held the attitude that it was important that applicants
were able to communicate in school or at their workplace. It had to be
taken into consideration, however, whether these persons had any op-
portunity at all to learn German. A representative of the administration
observed that nobody felt bothered when a French-speaking Swiss
moved to Bernlow and did not speak German even after twenty years;
if an Italian did not speak German after having lived in Switzerland for
many years, why should it pose a problem, he rhetorically asked. On
the other hand, most actors of the slightly less important right-wing
group required either broken German or another national language.
Two politicians even brought up the question of whether English
should be acceptable. Language knowledge was an important criterion
for only one influential right-wing politician. According to him, candi-
dates had to be able to speak and read but not write German. However,
under certain circumstances and because of Bernlow’s proximity to the
French-speaking part of Switzerland, he could also accept somebody
who only spoke French.
In Bernhigh, most actors seemed to agree that the command of a lan-
guage was a very important criterion to prove a certain degree of inte-
gration. Surprisingly, for some influential actors it seemed to suffice to
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speak a national language, although they all supported the new lan-
guage test by which only knowledge of German is verified. A left-wing
member of the executive body told us that if a person spoke one na-
tional language, this already showed that he or she wanted Swiss citi-
zenship for other than purely self-serving reasons. Not all representa-
tives of the left-wing parties, though, seemed to have the same opinion
concerning this matter. Indeed, the two members of the naturalisation
commission believed that it was only by learning the regional language
and thus through linguistic integration, that one could become a Swiss
citizen. One of them told us that otherwise contact with Swiss citizens
and the accomplishment of everyday tasks would be impossible. She
gave us the example of her foreign cleaning lady who damaged her fur-
niture because she did not understand her instructions and used the
wrong cleaning agent. The much-less-influential representatives of the
left-wing parties defended other positions. One of them argued that an
insufficient command of German did, indeed, complicate a successful
integration, but that this was no reason to prevent someone from be-
coming a Swiss citizen. The representative of the Green Party pre-
sented an argument similar to that of some actors in Bernlow, namely,
that it sufficed if candidates tried to learn the language; this effort al-
ready proved that they were willing to integrate themselves.
Notice two observations: (1) despite the fact that in Bernlow the cri-
terion of ‘knowledge of language’ is attributed much less importance
than in other municipalities, it is still much more relevant than other
criteria in this municipality (cf. Table 5.1). (2) In Bernhigh, this criter-
ion is much more relevant than in Bernlow. However, nobody required
it for cultural integration. Rather, it was argued that speaking the regio-
nal language facilitates everyday life in a new home country. As we
have already argued in Chapter 5, it appears that the application of this
criterion does not necessarily tell us whether naturalisation policy is
led by an ethnic conception of citizenship or a civic-territorial one. On
the one hand, it constitutes an important criterion even in municipali-
ties with a rather generous understanding of citizenship. On the other
hand, in municipalities where it is rather difficult to get the Swiss pass-
port, language knowledge might be required for a structural rather
than a cultural integration.
In some municipalities, controversies are ignited when candidates
for naturalisation benefit from social security or disability insurance or
are unemployed (cf. Table 5.1). Some right-wing politicians are opposed
to the idea that the Swiss state has to financially support such persons.
Others are rather concerned about naturalising persons that, in their
opinion, unjustifiably profit from the Swiss social security system.
They want to be sure that candidates have serious reasons for benefit-
ing from social security and disability insurance. Such debates are all
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the more interesting in light of the fact that foreigners eligible for nat-
uralisation already have the same social rights as Swiss citizens. There-
fore, granting the Swiss citizenship never implies any additional costs
for the municipalities or the Swiss state. As will become clearer in the
next few paragraphs, opposing the naturalisation of such candidates
does not reflect any economic interests, but rather expresses the atti-
tude that ‘good’ Swiss citizens do not depend on the state.
The very influential person in charge of naturalisation at the local
administration in Bernhigh first explained to us that, in principle,
there was no obstacle for naturalisation of such persons. However, with
regard to unemployment, he then made a distinction between persons
that were unemployed though they had made an effort to find a job
and those that were just too lazy to work. According to him, in Bern-
high it often happened that applications of young persons were reset
because the naturalisation commission had the impression that the
young people were not motivated enough to find a job. He concluded
that such persons lacked a certain ambition and did not share the
Swiss mentality in terms of diligence. After all, negative decisions were
even some kind of ‘development aid’ for such persons because they
forced them to find a job. Interestingly, in Bernhigh representatives
from both left-wing and right-wing parties preferred to verify why ap-
plicants were unemployed. An influential member of the Social Demo-
crats told us that it posed a problem for her if a person had no job only
because he or she was too lazy to find one. Another person in charge
at the local administration required that concrete and clear reasons had
to be presented before such a person could be naturalised.
It also seems, as just asserted by the representative of the adminis-
tration, that cases of candidates benefiting from social security and dis-
ability insurance are more controversial. For a right-wing politician and
influential member of the naturalisation commission, it did not suffice
if candidates benefiting from disability insurance could provide medi-
cal attestations since some doctors handed them out even to persons
that had no disability or illness at all. Surprisingly, a representative of
the Swiss People’s Party, who is politically rather isolated in Bernhigh,
confided to us that he is no longer against naturalisations of persons
who have debts, are sick or disabled, for it was incredible how many
applicants benefited from social security or disability insurance nowa-
days, and it was simply impossible to reject them all. After all, he told
us, they also got the money without naturalisation. How important it is
for some politicians in Bernhigh that candidates do not financially de-
pend on the state provides a final example: a representative of the
Swiss People’s Party explained to us that a command of German was
one of the most important criterion for naturalisation. However, his
party allowed some exceptions. Recently, the SVP had been in favour
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of a naturalisation of an elderly couple that had been living in Bern-
high for twenty years but only spoke German badly. But, according to
the representatives of the SVP, they had worked their whole lives and
had never made any financial demands on the state, which in large
measure justified accepting them for naturalisation.
In Bernlow, the person in charge of naturalisations at the local ad-
ministration told us that the social status of a candidate was no obsta-
cle for the acquisition of the Swiss citizenship. For most influential ac-
tors, ‘social security’, ‘disability insurance’, or ‘unemployment’ were
not issues that should influence decisions on naturalisation. An impor-
tant representative of the SP argued that these persons had every right
to benefit from these services since they had paid taxes in Switzerland
for many years. Only for one person was it important to verify such
cases because, according to her, it sometimes happened that asylum
seekers refused to work and thus unjustly benefited from social secur-
ity. For her, it posed a problem if such persons applied for citizenship
later on. Some right-wing politicians, indeed, preferred to verify in de-
tail the dossiers of persons with financial difficulties. However, they
were not opposed to applicants who benefit in one way or another from
the state. They saw it rather as a problem if candidates had debts or
did not pay their taxes.
While national criteria are vague regarding most aspects of naturali-
sation, they are quite clear on the requirement that alien citizens have
to respect the legal order and must not compromise the interior and
exterior safety of the country if they want to acquire Swiss citizenship.
Criminal records are verified by cantonal and national authorities and
can make naturalisation impossible. Therefore, it is even more surpris-
ing that local politicians in Bernhigh worried about possible criminal
records of candidates. In contrast to actors in Bernlow, some in Bern-
high when asked about the most important naturalisation criteria, ex-
plicitly required that applicants have no criminal records. Agreeing
with the attitudes in other rather restrictive municipalities, some actors
in Bernhigh argued that breaking traffic rules was not always regis-
tered, or was deleted, after several years.5 Merely looking at criminal re-
cords therefore did not suffice to verify if a candidate had violated any
law in the past. As we have already seen, when the naturalisation com-
mission is suspicious of a candidate, he or she is invited for an addi-
tional interview. For a right-wing politician of the naturalisation com-
mission, even ‘youth sins’ have to date back quite a few years before
the person could be naturalised. For a left-wing representative of the
commission, candidates should not have committed any ‘gross’ crimes.
A colleague of his told us that applicants should not be criminals,
although small acts of thievery and youthful escapades should not be
an obstacle. Only one member of little influence in the Social Demo-
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crat Party defended the position that even criminals should have the
right to acquire the Swiss citizenship. In Bernlow, the matter of ‘crim-
inal records’ was only mentioned by some uninfluential right-wing po-
liticians.
Attitudes towards candidates from Muslim countries
Besides the attitudes on criteria that have to be fulfilled for naturalisa-
tion, perceptions of candidates, especially with regard to their national-
ity and their ability to integrate themselves in Switzerland, constitute
another helpful indicator for the identification of different conceptions
of citizenship.6 In Bernhigh, we were told by two representatives of the
local administration that for the local decision makers, the country of
origin and especially the religious affiliation played an important role
when it came to judging the different applications. A lot of actors, they
continued, were quite critical towards Muslims and persons from the
countries of the former Yugoslavia, since such people were often asso-
ciated with crimes reported by the media. After all, the statistics
showed that in most violent crimes people from countries of the for-
mer Yugoslavia were involved, and personal experiences and incidents
such as brawls during the weekly evening sales in Bernhigh simply
confirmed this. They held the opinion that the Muslim headscarf was
often interpreted as a sign of extremism and that a lot of inhabitants
were scared by international events such as the terrorist attacks in New
York, the wars in the former Yugoslavia or the conflict in Palestine.
These remarks are confirmed to a large extent by the opinions of the
local decision makers. Almost all right-wing politicians agreed that per-
sons from Muslim countries, in contrast to people from Western Eur-
ope, experienced many difficulties integrating themselves in Switzer-
land because of their very different cultural and religious background.
Some mentioned also Africans as a group of persons having such diffi-
culties. On the other hand, Tamils and Vietnamese were considered as
adaptive and friendly persons. Often we heard that Muslims had an-
other image of the role of women. A lot of local actors felt uneasy with
the headscarf because they see it as a sign of oppression of women.
Some stated that persons from Muslim countries placed religion over
the state and democratic institutions. A person in charge of naturalisa-
tions at the local administration distilled these opinions with the asser-
tion that Muslims had a ‘special’ relationship with the state. A very in-
fluential Social Democrat and member of the naturalisation commis-
sion told us that certain ‘tribes’ such as the Roma or the Kosovars had
another way of thinking and followed different laws. She gave us the
example of a Roma who had killed another Roma and then had paid
his victim’s family money as an act of reconciliation. This man had not
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understood, according to her, why he was put in prison by the Swiss
state and therefore in his eyes punished twice.
Some related the allegedly violent attitudes of people from the for-
mer Yugoslavia toward the wars of the last decade in their region. A
right-wing politician and member of the naturalisation commission
told us that these violent attitudes might be explained by the violent
and criminal past of these regions. According to her, it would take
many years before these people were no longer violent. And then she
added that, after all, persons from the former Yugoslavia also had a
brutal physiognomy. A colleague of hers explained the Muslims’ lack of
integration mainly by the fact that – unlike Italians and Spaniards –
what he called ‘pride people’ always stuck together and avoided the
contact with the Swiss. Sometimes a link between immigration from
Muslim countries and the Swiss welfare system was established. A
member of the influential naturalisation commission asserted that cer-
tain persons came to Switzerland with excessive expectations (he re-
ferred to the image of Cockaigne). According to him, when they rea-
lised that they did not get what they wanted, they just took it. The re-
presentatives of much lesser importance in the left-wing parties in
Bernhigh also held the opinion that persons from Muslim back-
grounds had more difficulty adapting to West European culture. They
underscored, however, that the capacity for integration mainly de-
pended on the individual persons and their education and less on their
cultural background.
Different perceptions could be observed in Bernlow. The person in
charge of naturalisations in Bernlow told us that in her municipality,
in the last years Muslim women wearing a headscarf were naturalised
without any problems. She assumed that most politicians did not even
notice that women with a headscarf had acquired Swiss citizenship
and that in contrast to other municipalities female applicants were not
asked to take off their headscarves during the interviews with local de-
cision makers. The dominant left-wing politicians in Bernlow agreed
that there were no differences at all between candidates from different
countries concerning their ability for integration. For one of them it de-
pended a lot on how the different cultural groups collided with Swiss
society. Tamils, for example, were better accepted because they were
much quieter and remained within their own groups. Swiss people
therefore hardly noticed them. Albanians, on the other hand, were
much more communicative and attracted more attention. She con-
cluded therefore that it was mainly a matter of how the Swiss perceived
the different groups that facilitated or complicated the integration of
foreign residents.
Contrary to the opinions of many local politicians in Bernhigh, a col-
league of hers was convinced that persons from countries of the former
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Yugoslavia were very much liked at their working places because they
were assiduous and learnt German quickly. She stated that the high
crime rate among immigrants could be explained by the fact that the
Swiss society did not want to integrate such persons. Therefore, it
hardly surprised her that they behaved differently. She concluded that
integration depended on each individual and on his or her character.
The representative of the local administration who is in regular contact
with left-wing politicians, held a slightly different position. He asserted
that people from the former Yugoslavia had more difficulties integrat-
ing themselves and were more violent than persons from West Eur-
opean countries. He argued that this had nothing to do with their parti-
cular culture but could rather be explained by the fact that these people
often were refugees who had undergone very hard experiences.
Even most right-wing politicians in Bernlow argued that the ability
for integration of candidates of the former Yugoslavia could be ex-
plained mainly by the particular situation in their home countries. Of-
ten they linked difficulties in integrating to individual characteristics or
the willingness to undertake the necessary efforts. One representative
of the Liberal Party deplored the fact that Swiss society did not commu-
nicate clearly enough what is expected from foreign residents. As for
the Muslim headscarf, he saw no problem for naturalisation, as long as
it was not worn at school. He defended the French position that the
wearing of headscarves in schools should be forbidden in public, as-
serting that such a manifestation of religious affiliation might provoke
unnecessary aggression. Moreover, Swiss pupils would then demand to
wear caps in school with the argument that this was their religion.
Attitudes towards the decisions of the Swiss Federal Court
The narratives presented so far give a clear picture of the various atti-
tudes of the influential local decision makers. We get some important
impressions of how naturalisation candidates are perceived and how ci-
tizenship is conceptualised. In Bernhigh, more criteria have to be ful-
filled, a higher integration or assimilation is required and candidates
from Muslim countries are perceived much more mistrustfully. In
Bernlow, the attitudes towards the acquisition of the citizenship are
quite different. They could be summarised by a statement of the very
influential person in charge of naturalisations at the local administra-
tion that their municipality does not consider naturalisations an act of
state. Whereas in Bernhigh the influential right-wing politicians espe-
cially wanted to make sure that applicants identified with the Swiss na-
tion, in Bernlow the attitude prevails that Swiss citizenship should be
granted even if foreigners apply for it for purely practical reasons; for
example, because it makes travelling much easier.
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This difference of attitude leads us to the more general issue of
whether naturalisations should be considered administrative or politi-
cal procedures. This issue is not only a matter of competence but more
generally concerns the question of whether municipalities can be con-
sidered communities that should have the right to decide according to
which procedure and criteria foreigners become a member of their so-
ciety, or whether naturalisations constitute clearly regulated procedures
similar to those for issuing a driving license. Concerning this matter,
attitudes towards the verdicts of the Swiss Federal Court from July
2003 are good indicators. It may be argued that this indicator is less re-
levant for understanding the current naturalisation politics since it
does not directly concern the question of who might become a Swiss
citizen. However, those attitudes give us a more general picture of how
citizenship is perceived and might indicate whether subjective discri-
minatory decisions are in general accepted or not.
In Bernlow, virtually all actors welcomed the decisions of the Federal
Court. They all agreed that decisions taken by the whole population at
ballot were nonsense, since such a system favoured discriminatory de-
cisions. Most actors agreed that candidates must not be rejected solely
because they are coming from a certain country. Some saw it as an ad-
vantage for better integration that, henceforth, negative decisions had
to be justified. In such cases, candidates knew exactly what they had to
improve before they applied a second time. Only one isolated represen-
tative of the SVP was completely against the decisions. In Bernhigh,
many of the important politicians were also in favour of the ban on
popular votes and of the right of candidates to appeal negative deci-
sions. Some of the important right-wing politicians, however, expressed
their ambivalence with parts of the decisions. Others were against the
right of appeal because they thought that this amounted to a right for
naturalisation and therefore diminished the position of the municipal-
ity. All but one of the SVP politicians were against popular votes. Two
persons of the naturalisation commission were against the obligation
to justify decisions. They argued that some foreigners simply did not
fit into their community and that it happened sometimes that they just
did not like an applicant and that, in such cases, decisions simply
could not be justified.
In contrast to the attitudes towards the other issues presented above,
the positions of the influential politicians in Bernhigh and Bernlow
with regard to the decisions of the Swiss Federal Court are less dispa-
rate. This can be explained mainly by the fact that the crucial part of
the verdicts – the ban of popular decisions at ballot – did not concern
the current practices in Bernhigh and Bernlow. In most municipalities
where decisions had been taken until recently by the population
through a closed ballot, a large majority of local politicians completely
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disapproved of the verdicts (see Table 4.2). Table 6.3 summarises the
qualitative analysis of the various attitudes of the local decision makers
that decisively influence the respective naturalisation processes. The
findings show that the politicians in Bernhigh not only defend a re-
strictive naturalisation policy with a high level of requirements, but are
also quite hostile towards candidates from Muslim countries. In Bern-
low, on the other hand, discriminatory attitudes hardly exist and there
are only few criteria that are required for naturalisation.
6.3 Aargauhigh and Aargaulow
Aargauhigh and Aargaulow are not directly affected by the ban on pop-
ular votes by ballot because decisions are taken in these two neighbour-
ing municipalities during the municipal assemblies. They are, however,
confronted with the problem of justifying negative decisions. For it is
almost impossible to know why a majority of citizens who are in atten-
dance are not in favour of a particular naturalisation application. Given
the fact that their naturalisation procedure also relies on popular deci-
sions, it may be assumed that local politicians are opposed to the ver-
dicts because they fear an interference with municipal political autono-
my and local democracy. However, and in line with our hypothesis,
only the influential local politicians in Aargauhigh criticised the ver-
dicts, whereas the decision makers in Aargaulow were mostly in favour
of them. These findings are commensurate with the different attitudes
towards candidates from Muslim countries and correspond, though
less clearly, to the different levels of requirements in both municipali-
ties (see Table 6.5 below).
Given the fact that in Aargauhigh and Aargaulow the population has
the final word in naturalisation matters, it might be objected that we
did not talk to the people who actually take the decisions. It could ea-
sily be argued that the attitudes of the politicians involved in the natur-
alisation processes in Aargauhigh and Aargaulow do not help us pre-
dict how many applicants are refused Swiss citizenship, since the po-
pulation takes the final decisions during the municipal assemblies.
There are, however, two reasons why our data very readily constitute va-
lid indicators of the respective prevailing conceptions of citizenship.
Table 6.3 Summary of qualitative analysis of conceptions of citizenship
Attitudes towards… Bernhigh Bernlow
Naturalisation criteria Restrictive Generous
Candidates from Muslim countries Hostile Open
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First, the interviewed politicians are also citizens of these municipali-
ties. They can be considered as a representative group of the respective
populations insofar as most of them are elected politicians. Given the
small size of the municipalities and the low degree of institutionalised
politics, the distance between the population and the political elite is
very narrow, in contrast to the situation at the national level.
Second, the actors directly involved in the naturalisation processes
know the candidates and their dossiers, on the basis of which they is-
sue recommendations for the citizens attending the local assemblies. It
can be assumed that these recommendations have an effect on the de-
cisions of the individual citizens. Finally, we have already shown above
that attitudes of the populations in our fourteen case studies strongly
correlate with the positions of their local representatives (r=0.69,
p=0.006). It thus seems that our data on local politicians’ attitudes is
quite pertinent to predict the rejection rates. Let us now turn to the for-
mal procedures and power structures of these two municipalities to get
a clearer picture of what is going on in Aargauhigh and Aargaulow.
Formal procedures and power structures
In both municipalities of Aargauhigh and Aargaulow, foreign citizens
who seek to acquire the Swiss citizenship submit the required docu-
ments at the local administration. The persons in charge at the munici-
pal administration verify the formal requirements and contact the can-
tonal police, the employers and the teachers of the candidates. In Aar-
gauhigh, candidates are given booklets that inform them about the
municipality and the political rights in Switzerland. They receive an-
other booklet about the political structure of Switzerland after they
have filled in the forms. When the person responsible for naturalisa-
tions in Aargauhigh has the impression that prospective candidates
have an insufficient command of German, he advises them to refrain
from applying right away when they ask him for the forms. If such
persons still apply, he discusses the matter with the mayor.
For a short time, the local administration has offered the possibility
of inviting applicants for a language test. During the test, candidates
are required to copy a text and to write a short curriculum vitae. If
someone fails the language test, he or she has to attend a language
course before his or her command of German is verified again and the
procedure is carried on. After the person has passed the exam, the dos-
siers are handed over to the naturalisation commission, which consists
of the mayor, the secretary of the municipal administration and four re-
presentatives of the local parties. The commission has existed since
2000 and was constituted after the startling rejection of two young
Muslim women (see below), with the aim of reinforcing recommenda-
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tions among the population. Before, only the mayor and a person in
charge of naturalisations at the local administration interviewed the ap-
plicants.
The commission invites the candidates for a second interview and
for a test about the Swiss political system. Each member of the com-
mission separately interrogates individual applicants or couples and
discusses with them the results of the test. After the individual inter-
views, the commission meets without the candidates for a discussion
of all dossiers. Recommendations for acceptance or rejection are
handed over to the executive body, which almost always follows the de-
cisions of the commission. Finally, the population of Aargauhigh votes
on the individual applications during a municipal assembly. In the
run-up to the municipal assembly, all citizens receive a booklet with in-
formation about the candidates. Each applicant is presented with a
photo and specifications such as their nationality, profession, employer,
etc. Before the local assemblies, the president of the executive body in-
forms the presidents of the local parties about the dossiers. For ten
years votes have been taken by closed ballot. Such a procedure has
been chosen because the impression emerged that some people other-
wise do not dare to express their real opinion. After the assembly, can-
didates are informed in written form about the decisions.
In Aargaulow, the administration does not interview the candidates,
and the completed dossiers are directly handed over to the naturalisa-
tion commission, which is composed of six members: the president of
the executive body, the secretary of the administration and four inhabi-
tants of Aargaulow. In contrast to Aargauhigh, the members of the
commission are not necessarily representatives of the local parties but
often persons who work in organisations that deal with foreigners. In
the past, the commission tested the knowledge of the Swiss political
system of each candidate. After they had noticed that applicants
learned the answers by heart, the commission abandoned the tests
and, henceforth, has verified the integration of the applicants during
the interviews in a more informal manner. The applicants are asked if
they know some Swiss citizens personally, if they are members of an
association, how well they know the municipality of Aargaulow and
how they pass their spare time. Families are also interrogated about
the education of their children. Then a recommendation for acceptance
or rejection is made by the commission that is handed over to the ex-
ecutive body, which normally follows up on these decisions. Negative
decisions are discussed with the applicants, and it is recommended
that they withdraw their application. In a pattern similar to that in Aar-
gauhigh, around 10 to 15 per cent of all applications are withdrawn,
mostly because candidates do not speak German well enough. The po-
pulation of Aargaulow is informed about the applications in the run-up
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to a local assembly. So far, no pictures of the candidates have appeared
in the information leaflets; however, some members of the commission
suggested following the example of their neighbour municipality of
Aargauhigh. The executive body refused this idea, arguing that such
pictures would favour subjective judgments. Decisions at the local as-
sembly are taken by open ballot. In both municipalities no celebration
is held for the freshly naturalised candidates.
In contrast to Bernhigh and Bernlow, one notices that in Aargauhigh
and Aargaulow the involvement of the local citizens in the decision-
making processes alters the formal decision-making processes. Not
only does the municipal population take the final decisions, they are
also informed by the local administration and the naturalisation com-
mission. The information-booklets that are sent to each household and
especially their contents have let, time and again, to violent debates in
Switzerland. It is debated whether such leaflets are derogatory for can-
didates or whether they violate their privacy. While many prefer to
abandon such ‘information-campaigns’ or to limit the information ap-
pearing in these booklets, others wonder whether it is possible at all
for local citizen to get an idea of the applicants on the basis of such
leaflets, which for the large majority constitutes the only information
about them. Many hold the opinion that it is particularly questionable
whether pictures of candidates contain any relevant information that
should be taken into account for the final decisions. To augment the
chances to get the Swiss passports, applicants often have their pictures
taken by professional photographers. In this respect, it is particularly
noteworthy that no pictures of the candidates appear in the informa-
tion leaflets in Aargaulow. While many politicians in Aargauhigh hold
the opinion that such pictures show their citizens how friendly an alien
resident might be, in Aargauhigh a majority of the local actors argue
that such pictures contain no relevant information about the candi-
dates.
Despite the direct democratic decision-making procedure in Aargau-
high and Aargaulow, the local administration and the municipal politi-
cians are still strongly involved in the naturalisation processes. As in
most of our case studies, the persons in charge of naturalisations at
the local administrations play a crucial role during the naturalisation
procedures. In Aargauhigh, the responsible person at the local admin-
istration seems to be a particularly influential actor, since together with
the mayor he verifies the German knowledge of all candidates and re-
ceives them for a first interview, before the naturalisation commission
talks to them. In Aargaulow, representatives of the administration do
not meet the candidates and make no recommendations. Moreover, the
composition of the naturalisation commission further distinguishes
the two procedures: in Aargaulow only few politicians are members of
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the commission. This might point to the fact that in this municipality
naturalisations are considered an administrative rather than a political
issue.
Table 6.4 confirms that, compared to other actors in their municipa-
lities, the representative of the local administration in Aargauhigh is
much more important than his colleague in Aargaulow. Very influen-
tial actors are the mayors of both municipalities, since they are in-
volved at different points during the naturalisation processes. The party
affiliation seems to be a better predictor in these two municipalities
than in Bernhigh and Bernlow: in Aargauhigh the president of the
SVP and another person who has a lot of affinities with the Politarena
– a political right-wing association – are judged more important than
the members of the naturalisation commission. In Aargaulow, with
one exception, the influential actors are members of the centre or left-
wing parties. Beside the respective mayors, the other members of the
executive bodies are seen as rather unimportant.
Attitudes towards naturalisation criteria
With regard to the command of the German language, knowledge of
the Swiss political system and candidates benefiting from social secur-
Table 6.4 Relative influence and understanding of citizenship of local actors
Aargauhigh Aargaulow
Actor Party Function Infl. UC Actor Party Function Infl. UC
1 FDP Mayor 100 .45 1 CVP Nat. commission 100 .35
2 PA Party president 46 .85 2 FDP Mayor 100 .63
3 SVP Party president 33 .73 3 AF Nat. commission 100 .15
4 - Administration 29 .50 4 SVP Nat. commission 100 .68
5 SVP Nat. commission 25 .53 5 - Nat. commission 67 .35
6 SP Nat. commission 21 .18 6 Grüne Nat. commission 67 .20
7 SP Nat. commission 21 .53 7 SP Nat. commission 60 .20
8 EVP Nat. commission 17 .55 8 SP Executive 47 .10
9 SP Party president 17 .10 9 - Administration 47 .43
10 SVP Executive 8 .33 10 - Administration 40 .50
11 Grüne Party member 4 .50 11 - Executive 27 .65
12 CVP Executive 20 .40
13 SP Party president 20 .20
14 SP Nat. commission 13 .10
Abbreviations: Influence (Infl.), Understanding of citizenship (UC), Liberal Party (FDP),
Christian Democrats (CVP), Social Democrats (SP), Swiss People’s Party (SVP), Green
Party (Grüne), Evangelical People’s Party (EVP), Politarena (PA) (local right-wing
association close to the SVP), Agenda Femina (AF) (local left-wing association).
Scales of indicators: ‘Influence’ indicates the relative influence of actors in comparison to
the most powerful actor (100). ‘Understanding of citizenship’ varies between ‘0’ (generous)
and ‘1’ (restrictive).
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ity or disability insurances, the dominant actors in Aargauhigh and
Aargaulow defend different positions. However, the differences are not
as much pronounced as between Bernhigh and Bernlow. Strongly di-
verging attitudes between the two municipalities of the canton of Aar-
gau can, however, be observed, when it comes to deciding whether or
not naturalised Swiss should be allowed to keep their old nationality.
By virtue of a motion that has been accepted by the municipal assem-
bly in Aargauhigh some years ago, all applicants have to indicate
whether they would give up their old citizenship in the case of naturali-
sation. Different actors in Aargauhigh confided to us that, although
dual citizenship had been permitted in Switzerland since 1992, they
wanted to have this information in order to know whether candidates
were really serious about their application. During the municipal as-
semblies, it regularly happens that individual citizens ask the naturali-
sation commission whether the candidates preferred to keep their old
nationality or not. The person in charge of naturalisation at the local
administration told us that alien citizens who declared that they would
give up their old nationality had a much better chance of being ac-
cepted. This very influential actor seemed to be very attracted to the
idea that candidates should sign a notice of abandonment to make sure
that they turned in their old passport after a successful naturalisation.
He recognised, however, that such a procedure was legally impossible.
An influential member of the naturalisation commission and represen-
tative of the SVP argued that naturalised citizens should abandon their
first citizenship because otherwise they could easily escape Switzerland
when they had committed a crime. In Aargaulow, on the other hand,
dual citizenship seems not to be of an issue at all. A lot of important
actors argued that freshly naturalised Swiss should keep their culture
and therefore also their old citizenship. Only one representative of very
little influence in the local administration held the opinion that candi-
dates from Western Europe could keep their old nationality, whereas
naturalised Swiss from the countries of the former Yugoslavia must
not have two passports.
Attitudes towards candidates from Muslim countries
Quite a large gap between Aargauhigh and Aargaulow can also be ob-
served concerning the different attitudes towards candidates from Mus-
lim countries. The three most influential actors in Aargauhigh took the
view that persons from Muslim countries had considerable difficulty
integrating themselves into Switzerland. The mayor, as one of them, ar-
gued that they had, for example, diverging perspectives on marriage. It
was often problematic when Muslim men married non-Muslim wo-
men. In such situations, he argued, kidnapping of children by one of
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the parents had already occurred. He then went on to tell us that peo-
ple from the former Yugoslavia had more difficulty to live in Western
European countries because they had had to survive for many centuries
under Tito’s dictatorship and were therefore not used to living in a de-
mocratic country. The second most important actor in Aargauhigh who
has a lot of affinities with the right-wing association Politarena ex-
pressed the opinion that not only people from the Balkans and Turkey
but also Blacks (he used the term ‘nigger’) were persons who inte-
grated themselves with more difficulty. Such people had another cul-
ture, often dealt with drugs and knew quite well how to sell them-
selves. He was also convinced that they lived in clans and were always
ready to kill other people to protect themselves. He concluded that
such people did not like to work, just took the money where they could
and pitilessly drew on the Swiss social security system. Everybody in
Aargauhigh does not share such extreme positions. However, most
right-wing politicians agreed with the basic arguments that have just
been presented. Even the left-wing actors who had little influence did
not seem to completely disagree with such stances. The SP representa-
tive in the executive body supported the opinion that people from the
Balkans were not used to living in a democratic system and the presi-
dent of the SP in Aargauhigh argued that the behaviour of foreigners
in their daily life and their readiness to integrate themselves depended
a lot on their ‘race’.
The perceptions of citizens coming from Muslim countries were dif-
ferent in Aargaulow. Only the very influential mayor’s attitude re-
sembled those of the restrictive positions in Aargauhigh. For example,
it posed a problem for him when Muslim women wore a headscarf. He
argued that they did this only to affront the social environment of their
host country and held the opinion that people from the Balkans inter-
acted with each other in a very ruthless manner and had misguided at-
titudes toward governmental institutions. They simply thought that the
state was responsible for everything outside their domiciles. Some
other influential actors in Aargaulow agreed that foreigners from Mus-
lim countries had more difficulty integrating themselves in Switzer-
land than people from Western European countries. However, they did
not seem to be that much preoccupied with this question or had no
real explanation for this phenomenon. One influential member of the
naturalisation commission argued that people from African or Asian
countries had such difficulties simply because of the cold temperatures
in Switzerland. The president of the Social Democrats, who had rela-
tively little influence, explained the difficulties persons from Muslim
countries had by the fact that Islam was 700 years younger than Chris-
tianity. For him, such countries were in another ‘historical phase’ than,
for example, Switzerland. She then added that the social class of a can-
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didate explained a lot more than other factors about one’s ability to
adapt to another culture. In general, a lot of actors in Aargaulow
agreed that the individual characteristics of a person were much more
decisive for a successful integration than their cultural background.
Attitudes towards the decisions of the Swiss Federal Court
Since both municipalities of Aargauhigh and Aargaulow were affected
by the decisions of the Federal Court, it is even more surprising that
the reactions were so different. One of the most important politicians
in Aargauhigh told us that it was an unbounded cheek that the Federal
Court tried to take the responsibility for naturalisations away from the
people. For him, decisions by ballot should still be possible and they
should not have to be justified. The influential mayor had a rather am-
bivalent attitude towards the verdicts. On the one hand, he was against
an arbitrary naturalisation policy. On the other hand, he preferred that
the decisions be taken by the population; and since the citizens decided
at closed ballot in Aargauhigh, he concluded that it was impossible to
know why they refused a particular candidate. Anyway, he did not see
the reason why Swiss citizens should justify their decisions about nat-
uralisation, for nobody asked them – so his comparison ran – to justify
why they voted, for example, for a particular candidate during an elec-
tion. Altogether, he preferred decisions by closed ballot, because in this
case people did not have to expose their personal attitudes. Moreover,
there were legitimate reasons to fear reprisals from foreign citizens if
everybody could see how they voted. This seems to be an issue that
concerns politicians in Aargauhigh here and there. A member of the
naturalisation commission confided to us that in the commission they
had already discussed several times whether its members exposed
themselves to any danger when they rejected applications.
In contrast to Aargauhigh, the opinions in Aargaulow were very
much in favour of the verdicts. Only two actors were opposed to parts
of the decisions. The mayor and a member of the naturalisation com-
mission held the opinion that the verdicts had mainly caused confu-
sion and uncertainty. Both agreed that the Federal Court decided about
a political matter it had not been competent to decide on. They, how-
ever, disagreed about whether popular votes by ballot should be possi-
ble and whether decisions should be justified. The other members of
the naturalisation commission agreed that decisions have to be justi-
fied and that candidates should be given the opportunity to appeal nat-
uralisation decisions. After all, so their arguments ran, the right to ap-
peal had to be part of every democratic decision. One actor expressed a
certain doubt as to whether applicants would really make use of this
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right. Another person argued that justifying a negative decision also
would help the candidates to better prepare for a second application.
Table 6.5 summarises the various attitudes in Aargauhigh and Aar-
gaulow. The influential decision makers in Aargauhigh require a lot of
criteria to be fulfilled by applicants, are very hostile towards candidates
from Muslim countries and, in contrast to Bernhigh, completely op-
pose the decisions of the Swiss Federal Court. In Aargaulow the local
politicians support the decisions of the Federal Court and have no dis-
criminatory attitudes towards candidates from Muslim countries. As
for the positions towards naturalisation criteria: they point to a less re-
strictive naturalisation policy that, however, does not seem to be as gen-
erous as in Bernlow.
6.4 Controversies and occurrences
This chapter allowed us to illustrate the results of the foregoing chap-
ters with more qualitative data and to discuss the various discourses of
local politicians in more detail. The comparison of two pairs of case
studies enabled us to make appear different citizenship politics in mu-
nicipalities with similar socio-economic characteristics, situated in the
same regions of Switzerland. While in this study we mainly concen-
trate on the number of criteria that have to be fulfilled for naturalisa-
tion, a more detailed discussion of attitudes towards candidates from
Muslim countries and the recent decisions of the Swiss Federal Court
opened additional ways to analytically grasp the local understandings
of citizenship. At the same time we have got a clearer picture of the
formal decision-making processes and to what extent they reflect the
prevailing understandings of citizenship. The involvement of different
actors at various stages of the decision-making processes clearly shows
that naturalisations are not administrative procedures in which only re-
presentatives of the local authorities take a share. Rather, both political
and administrative actors struggle over the question of who might be-
come a Swiss citizen.
However, naturalisation politics is not always controversial and has not
the same political salience in all municipalities. Interestingly, when
Table 6.5 Summary of qualitative analysis of conceptions of citizenship
Attitudes towards… Aargauhigh Aargaulow
Naturalisation criteria Restrictive Rather generous
Candidates from Muslim countries Hostile Open
Decisions of the Swiss Federal Court Opposed In favour
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comparing cases with high and low rejection rates, we noticed that nat-
uralisation politics is rather more controversial in municipalities where
a lot of candidates are rejected. The four case studies discussed in this
chapter are particularly good examples in this regard. In Bernlow and
Aargaulow 87 per cent and 100 per cent of all actors respectively had
no objections to the current naturalisation policy. On the other hand,
in the two municipalities of Bernhigh and Aargauhigh 31 per cent and
41 per cent of the involved actors from various parties told us that they
were opposed to several aspects of the citizenship politics of their mu-
nicipalities. It regularly happens in both municipalities that actors with
a restrictive understanding of citizenship demand a tightening up of
the naturalisation procedures. Moreover, we have observed fiercer de-
bates, highlighted by particular incidents in recent years, which indi-
cate how controversial naturalisation politics in these municipalities is.
As we have already alluded to above, in 1995 and 1996 the munici-
pal assembly in Aargauhigh twice rejected two young Muslim women
who were said to have refused to shake hands with the mayor when
they met for an interview. These rejections were widely echoed in the
regional newspapers and discussed among the population and local po-
liticians. The two women told the mayor that their religion would not
allow them to touch a man who is not a member of their family. For
many local politicians such an attitude was a clear indication of lack of
integration. The mayor, who was in charge of all applications at this
time, recommended that the municipal assembly not accept these two
candidates for naturalisation.
Quite exceptionally, in Bernhigh some years ago the different parties
involved did not come to an agreement as to whether to recommend a
particular candidate for naturalisation. The administration was some-
what, but reluctantly, in favour of the candidate because he more or
less fulfilled all the criteria. However, the commission preferred not to
recommend that candidate. They justified their decision simply by the
assertion that he was not a friendly person. After the executive body
had backed the decision of the commission, the candidate in question
appealed the recommendation. The cantonal authority in charge of nat-
uralisations rejected the decision and remanded the dossier to Bern-
high. During our interviews, most actors in Bernhigh referred to this
incident to criticise either the decisions of the naturalisation commis-
sion and the local naturalisation policy in general or the interference of
cantonal and judicial authorities in local politics.
Such incidents might be exceptional even in municipalities with a
restrictive naturalisation policy, and we do not claim that they are al-
ways a result of their respective politics or that they tell us everything
about the attitudes of local politicians. But they indicate that naturalisa-
tions constitute a controversial issue in these municipalities and mobi-
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lise political actors. On the other hand, the absence of such incidents
and the high degree of satisfaction with the local procedures, as we
have observed in Aargaulow and Bernlow, point to the fact that local ac-
tors are not that much preoccupied by the question of who should be-
come a Swiss citizen.
It is of course quite difficult to quantify such local occurrences and
to judge whether they have clouded local discussions on naturalisations
for a longer period or only at the time of our data collection. Nonethe-
less, we have tried to find out for each of our municipalities whether
incidents such as the ones described in the foregoing paragraphs have
occurred. We have only retained incidents that were mentioned by var-
ious local actors and/or were discussed in regional newspapers. Table
6.6 clearly reveals that they can indeed be observed mainly in munici-
palities with high rejection rates (r=0.79, p=0.001). Table 6.6 also lists
the degree of dissatisfaction with local naturalisation policy expressed
by local actors. The relation between this indicator and the pursued
naturalisation policy (rejection rate) is, however, rather ambiguous
(r=0.44, p=0.12). As the example of Bernhightwo shows, even in muni-
cipalities with a high rejection rate can a large majority of local politi-
cians be happy with the current naturalisation policy (when there are
no left-wing politicians questioning the way alien residents are natura-
lised). On the other hand, it might very well be that a rather generous
citizenship policy is criticised by right-wing politicians as the example
of Zurichlow demonstrates.
Table 6.6 Controversial occurrences and degree of dissatisfaction
Municipality Rejection
rate (%)
Controversial
occurrences
Degree of dissatisfaction
with local naturalisation policy
Schwyzhigh 47 Yes 50
Bernhightwo 29 Yes 20
Schwylow 26 Yes 71
Luzernhigh 24 Yes 71
Bernhigh 22 Yes 31
Neuchâtelhigh 15 No 19
Aargauhigh 13 Yes 41
St. Gallenhigh 11 No 25
Zürichhigh 11 No 85
Neuchâtellow 5 No 21
Zurichlow 2 No 40
Aargaulow 1 No 0
Aargaulowtwo 1 No 17
Bernlow 0 No 13
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7 Local Social Influence Networks
7.1 Introduction
This last empirical chapter seeks to analyse naturalisation processes
from a further perspective that so far has been treated only at the mar-
gins. After a large-N analysis, a comparison of local citizenship models
and a detailed discussion of four naturalisation fields, we now concen-
trate our attention on the individual decision makers and on the factors
influencing their individual understandings of citizenship.
In the introduction to Chapter 4, we have presented a newspaper re-
port in which a representative of a local Swiss People’s Party (SVP) jus-
tified the rejection of several candidates from Muslim countries. He
thereby exposed the fact that he personally requires from candidates a
high degree of integration into the local community. Why does he have
such a restrictive understanding of citizenship? Might it be due to bad
experiences he had with foreign residents from Muslim countries? Is
he looking for a job and fears that naturalised foreigners might be pre-
ferred to him? Does he fear that Switzerland loses its cultural charac-
teristics by allowing too many alien residents to become Swiss? Or did
his parents teach him to be wary of foreigners? All these aspects might
have an impact on his attitude towards naturalisation candidates. Ac-
cording to our theoretical model presented in Chapter 3, there is a
further explanatory variable that we will discuss in more detail in this
chapter: the influence of the local social environment.
So far, we have mainly demonstrated how local politicians struggle
over the definition of their nation and thereby how they contribute to
the production and reproduction of social reality. As we argued above,
such groups of local politicians are not rational associations of self-in-
terested actors. Rather, their attitudes towards naturalisation candidates
and their perception of citizenship are shaped by, among other factors,
interactions in the context of decision-making processes. By emphasis-
ing such socialisation processes, we argue that struggles about cultural
boundaries are more about conviction than suppression of minority po-
sitions: those arguments prevail or become accepted that appear to be
more legitimate than others. Or as Wimmer (2002) would put it: such
struggles can be considered as negotiation processes leading to cultural
compromises or agreements inhabiting a common arena about basic
principles, meanings, moral and social categories that structure, for ex-
ample, naturalisation politics. While cultural compromises are the re-
sults of established and internalised modes of meaning-making, they
in turn influence the direction in which further struggles develop by
limiting the horizon of possibilities within which individual actors in-
terpret and experience social reality (Wimmer 2002: 35). In other
words, local interactions can be considered as secondary socialisation
processes (Berger & Luckmann 1967: 129-146), which decisively influ-
ence the actor’s habitus (Bourdieu 1977, 1990), constraining his or her
attitudes towards foreign residents applying for Swiss citizenship.
As we have repeatedly seen above, in the context of naturalisations
interactions happen exclusively within municipalities, external influ-
ences being virtually inexistent. Cultural compromises thus emerge in
relatively isolated local policy fields. It thus can be assumed that the
prevailing naturalisation policy and the attitudes of the dominant ac-
tors influence the opinions of other politicians and that the range of at-
titudes is limited in each municipality. To test these hypotheses and to
explain more systematically how interactions with other local politi-
cians shape one’s attitudes towards candidates for naturalisation, we
propose an analytical framework that draws on theories in social psy-
chology and social influence networks.
7.2 How to explain individual understandings of citizenship:
classic approaches
To be clear from the outset, by investigating the influence of the local
social environment on the understanding of citizenship of municipal
politicians, we do not claim that contacts with other politicians during
decision-making processes are the unique explanatory factor for indivi-
dual attitudes. Each human being has been socialised in various con-
texts during his or her life. Attitudes towards foreigners and the way
people think about their nation are influenced to various degrees by
their education, personal relationships to alien residents, experiences
at work, etc. We merely seek to demonstrate here that the local social
environment constitutes a further important variable that should not
be neglected.
Before we present our main theoretical framework, let us briefly dis-
cuss some alternative explanations by resorting to theories on xenopho-
bia. Xenophobia – commonly defined as the fear of the ‘other’ or the
‘stranger’ – is closely linked to nationalism and our concept of under-
standing of citizenship. The attitude toward foreigners and their desire
to become members of one’s community depend largely on one’s na-
150 PRACTISING CITIZENSHIP AND HETEROGENEOUS NATIONHOOD
tional identity, its definition, and especially its openness toward citi-
zens living outside one’s community: ‘Racism1 and nationalism are
both ideologies. They are bodies of knowledge (a word that denotes in
this context neither validity nor reliability), which make claims about
the way the social world is and, crucially, about the way it ought to be.
This knowledge is mobilised in the definition of criteria of group mem-
bership and principles of exclusion’ (Jenkins 1997: 84; see also Hall
2000: 7-8).
Whenever people have organised themselves in groups throughout
human history, they have excluded others. As Taifel (1981, 1982) has
shown in his experiments, such processes occur not only among indivi-
duals that possess similar convictions or feature cultural characteristics.
Even arbitrarily arranged groups begin to form their own group identi-
ties and to mark themselves off from other groups through categorisa-
tion and over-accentuation of common characteristics within a group
and differences in relation to other groups. In the age of nationalism,
this disposition to exclude others from a nation can be called xenopho-
bia (Wimmer 2002: 5; Scho¨neberg 1987: 44). In other words, under-
standing of citizenship and xenophobia/racism are the two sides of the
same coin: the way we perceive ourselves heavily influences the way
we exclude others; a person with a very restrictive understanding of ci-
tizenship can also be considered as very xenophobic.2 Accordingly, the-
ories explaining xenophobic behaviour can also be resorted to in order
to explain the degree of understanding of citizenship of individual citi-
zens.
Arguing that in modern nation-states xenophobia constitutes a po-
tential disposition to exclude others is far from a socio-biological ap-
proach elaborated by such researchers as Van den Berghe (1978, 1981).
By claiming that somebody always is excluded and that xenophobia
and racial differentiation are specific dimensions of nationalism, we
make no statement about the content of xenophobia or about who is
excluded. Just as there are many different contents of nationalism, so
there are also various forms and degrees of racism and xenophobia.
Thus, the crucial question is not whether or not somebody is excluded
but who and how many are denied Swiss citizenship.
Contrary to our theoretical model claiming that specific contents of
nationalism, ethnicity or xenophobia are the outcome of political strug-
gles, Van den Berghe (1978, 1981) argues that ethnicity tends to be as-
criptive, defined by common descent, generally hereditary and often
endogamous. For him, ethnic groups and nations are extensions of pri-
mordial kinship networks. That is why for him such powerful senti-
ments as nationalism or xenophobia can easily be mobilised even in
modern societies. He acknowledges that common ancestry is always
partially fictive as a result of migration and conquest and partially in-
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strumentalised. However, he is convinced that ethnicity is primordial
and that myths ‘will only be believed if members of an ethnic group
[or a nation] are sufficiently alike in physical appearance and culture
and have lived together and intermarried for a sufficient period (at a
minimum three or four generations) […]’ (Van den Berghe 1995: 360).
According to this view, fear and aggression toward others that look or
behave differently are natural and very old protective mechanisms (see
Ja¨ger 1995: 28-29). For exponents of the socio-biological approach, xe-
nophobia is the consequence of incompatible cultures: a country’s po-
pulation rejects immigrants because of their inability to integrate into
the structure and culture of the new home country.
Although Van den Berghe relativises his socio-biological explanation
by considering social and cultural aspects, his emphases on physical as-
pects and ethnic durability cannot account for the considerable variabil-
ity, wide range and frequent absorptions and dissolutions of instances
of ethnic affiliation and exclusion. Smith (1998: 149) criticises Van den
Berghe for forgetting that, for example, the Romans and English em-
phasised in their myths of common ancestry their varied origins, and
that the contents of these myths changed considerably over time.
Against the argument of cultural homogeneity, one could also put for-
ward the example of Switzerland, where the idea of cultural heteroge-
neity and its four linguistic groups is often successfully mobilised to
construct a national identity (Chollet 2006). As Smith (1998: 150)
rightly comments, socio-biological approaches fail to discriminate be-
tween various forms of exclusion over time and space and do not ac-
count for how exclusion is socially and politically organised. As for the
rejection of immigrants, Wimmer (2002: 205-208) offers an explica-
tion that asserts that so-called ‘objective cultural distances’ and ‘racial
distinctiveness’ are mainly the results of framing processes. In most
countries, it can be observed how the perception of a certain group of
foreigners can change from a view of complete distinctiveness to wide
acceptance. A case in point are Italians who immigrated to Switzerland
in the 1950s and 1960s. Their culture was first widely regarded as in-
compatible with Swiss culture. Today, they constitute one of the best-in-
tegrated foreign groups in Switzerland, whereas recently arrived mi-
grants from the countries of the former Yugoslavia and Turkey are of-
ten seen as too different from Swiss citizens (Stolz 2001: 60;
Niederberger 2004).
Besides the socio-biological approach, nowadays completely out-da-
ted, there are various other theories seeking to explain xenophobic atti-
tudes. Approaches can be divided into two groups, one emphasising
the dimensions of structural elements, the other, the dimensions of in-
dividual characteristics (Ja¨ger 1995: 27-50; Heitmeyer 2002: 28). Ap-
proaches explaining tensions between ethnic and national groups with
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socio-economic and socio-structural factors have already been discussed
in Chapter 4. We thus concentrate the following brief discussion on
the second dimension. Following Heitmeyer (2002: 27-30), we will
first distinguish four explanatory variables on the micro-sociological le-
vel: social class of individuals, contacts with foreigners, authoritarian-
ism (including unbounded flexibility) and social disintegration (includ-
ing relative deprivation).3 We will also discuss whether education has
an influence on xenophobic attitudes. In the following paragraphs, we
will briefly present the different theories and how we operationalised
the respective indicators.4 The hypotheses will then be tested below in
Table 7.1.
1. Social Class: Related to theories emphasising structural changes are
those approaches explaining xenophobic attitudes by social class. It
is argued that globalisation and the opening of national markets
mainly pose problems for people from lower social classes
(Bornschier & Helbling 2005: 32-36). It has been shown that such
people more readily vote for radical-right and populist parties
(Mughan et al. 2003; Kitschelt & McGann 1995). These so-called lo-
sers in the globalisation processes might perceive immigrants as
competitors on the job market. More generally, their precarious si-
tuation might lead to feelings of anomie and relative deprivation.
We operationalised social class with the job of the interviewees.5 Ac-
counting for the rise of the new middle class in Western European
countries, Kriesi (1998b) has developed a useful class structure with
eight categories that goes beyond the traditional class divide of the
working class and the old middle class and that discriminates be-
tween more and less privileged groups. People of the middle class
are divided in three groups: those who fulfil administrative or com-
mercial tasks (office workers, managers, etc.), technical specialists
(engineers and those working in a natural-science domain) and so-
cio-cultural specialists (teachers, nurses, etc.). A further distinction
is made between qualified and unqualified workers. The last three
categories consist of farmers and self-employed persons exercising
traditional jobs (craftsmen, salesmen, etc.) and other self-employed
persons. There were no unskilled workers, socio-cultural specialists,
or other self-employed persons among our interviewees. As there
are only four farmers in the dataset, this category has been put to-
gether with those exercising traditional jobs. In Table 7.1, the four
remaining categories are retained as dummy-variables, the category
of office workers and managers serving as a reference category.
2. Education: Various studies have empirically demonstrated that a ris-
ing level of education reduces negative attitudes toward foreigners
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(Wagner & Zick 1995; Vogt 1997; Hagendoorn & Nekuee 1999;
Heyder 2003). It is often argued that education influences our cog-
nitive faculties, social competences, value orientation and social sta-
tus (Heyer 2002: 78). Education has thus not only an impact on
our attitudes towards foreigners but is also closely related to the so-
cial class of a person and influences one’s social integration (cf.
Heyder & Schmidt 2000). It is disputed why and how education re-
duces xenophobia. Some argue that individuals with a low level of
education have limited cognitive capacities for differentiated percep-
tions and information processing and are therefore inclined to
stereotypical thinking and much more susceptible to interpersonal
influence (Case et al. 1989; Hyman et al. 1990; Maykovich 1975;
Stouffer 1955). As the reference to ‘susceptibility’ makes clear, peo-
ple with limited education are not automatically xenophobic; a so-
cial environment is still needed to trigger negative attitudes towards
foreign residents. Political mobilisation processes conditioning the
presence of perceptions of threat and conceptualising social causa-
tions are still a necessary condition to produce a restrictive under-
standing of citizenship. Others argue that educated people are bet-
ter integrated and thus consider immigrants not as competitors.
Still others hold the opinion that better-educated people mix in a so-
cial environment where xenophobic attitudes are considered as so-
cially not desirable (see Ku¨hnel & Schmidt 2002: 85). To measure
the impact of education, we use a dichotomised indicator differen-
tiating whether or not a respondent has a general qualification for
university entrance (A-level).
3. The contact hypothesis: It is often observed that persons who are par-
ticularly xenophobic have very few contacts with foreigners. For ex-
ample, it has been demonstrated that among different ethnic
groups in Germany, Sinti and Roma are especially disliked although
very few Germans have any contacts with members of these groups
(Wagner et al. 2002: 98). A common argument, which has been
empirically proved, therefore asserts that personal contacts with for-
eigners in the neighbourhood or at the workplace reduce negative
attitudes towards those people (Wagner et al. 2002: 99-101). It has
been argued that knowing people from other ethnic groups helps
relativise one’s own cultural and ethno-centrist standards (Pettigrew
1997; Thomas 1996). Such relationships help people to learn and
accept that different cultural backgrounds might lead to different
behaviours. Of course, it also has to be taken into account whether
contacts to foreigners are positive or negative. Unsurprisingly,
Wagner et al. (2002: 100-101) have shown that people are less xeno-
phobic when in the recent past they had been helped by foreigners
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or when they have had the opportunity to conduct an interesting
conversation with such persons. The problem of causality concern-
ing xenophobia is, however, not yet completely solved. Against the
contact hypothesis it might be argued that people with negative atti-
tudes try to avoid contacts with foreigners. In assessing our local
politicians we were in a particular situation, as most of them were
in contact with foreign residents in the context of naturalisation
processes. However, we still wanted to know how often they met
foreign residents privately or at their working places and whether
these contacts were positive or negative. Astonishingly, no less than
96 per cent told us that their relationships to foreigners were rather
or very positive. Even among those people with a very restrictive un-
derstanding of citizenship, who had no reason to give socially desir-
able answers, only a very few of them reported negative experiences.
Eighty-six per cent were regularly or very often in contact with for-
eigners. Only two persons indicated that they hardly knew any alien
residents or immigrants. Given the very small variance in the fre-
quency of contacts, it is unclear whether this variable has any im-
pact at all.
4. Authoritarianism: A large range of studies concentrate on individual
psychological characteristics to explain xenophobia. The work of
Adorno et al. (1950) on the authoritarian personality, seeking to pre-
dict one’s potential for fascist and antidemocratic behaviour, stands
at the beginning of this research tradition (see Altemeyer 1996;
Heitmeyer & Heyder 2002; Heyder & Schmidt 2000). It is argued
that an authoritarian character is developed during childhood and
the result of a specific socialisation. An authoritarian character
needs to maintain control and prove superiority over his or her so-
cial environment and is rooted in a worldview populated by ene-
mies and empty of equality and empathy. Such persons are there-
fore particularly xenophobic. Authoritarianism is often related to
the following characteristics: group dependency, ethnocentric orien-
tation, coercion to conformity and hierarchical and dogmatic think-
ing (Ja¨ger 1995: 31). Those characteristics result in mental and so-
cial rigidity and immaturity (Roghmann 1966: 76). Therefore,
authoritarianism comes close to the concepts of anomie and social
disintegration. For the operationalisation of an authoritarian charac-
ter, we asked our interviewees whether they think that we need lea-
ders who tell us what to do, whether they agree that children should
follow their parent’s convictions, whether school should mainly
teach discipline and performance and whether criminality should
be combated more aggressively. For each question, respondents had
to indicate on a scale from 1 to 6 to what extent they agree with
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those statements. A summary indicator (Authoritarianism) has been
generated by averaging the attitudes towards those statements.
5. Social disintegration and relative deprivation: According to the social
disintegration hypothesis, those people are xenophobic who have lit-
tle or no access to parts of their society (e.g. labour market), who do
not have the resources to participate in public life, who have a feel-
ing of political powerlessness or, more generally, who are not so-
cially integrated (Endrikat et al. 2002). According to Heitmeyer
(2002: 29), closely related to this hypothesis is the concept of rela-
tive deprivation emphasising the subjectively felt degree of disad-
vantage in comparison with people of the same group (individual
relative deprivation) or compared with other groups (collective rela-
tive deprivation) (Runciman 1967). As Endrikat et al. (2002: 37-39)
argue, modern societies indeed offer differentiated structures, plur-
alistic values, individual lifestyles and thus many opportunities for
self-realisation. On the other hand, however, increasing structural
inequalities, rapid social changes, experiences of senselessness and
the dissolution of social relations present precarious situations for
individuals. People, especially when they have the feeling that what
they are doing is not appreciated, or when they do not succeed in
life, develop negative attitudes towards foreigners (Kronauer 2002;
Honneth 1992). In the light of the social-disintegration hypothesis,
local politicians constitute a particular group, as they are presum-
ably rather well-integrated socially through their public functions.
This does of course not foreclose the possibility that they may feel
excluded in other domains. To measure relative deprivation and so-
cial disintegration, we rely on two indicators that inform us about
whether people think that the increasing ratio of foreigners aggra-
vates the labour market (Economic threat), and whether they no
longer feel at home where they live due to an increasing number of
alien residents (Alienation). For each question, respondents had to
indicate on a scale from 1 to 6 to what extent they agree with those
statements. The above-presented variable for social class might par-
tially also be considered for the operationalisation of relative depri-
vation, as people with a low social status may perceive foreigners as
an economic threat.
7.3 Social influence and norm formation
Some of the approaches to xenophobia, presented in the foregoing
paragraphs, emphasise socialisation and interaction processes as expla-
natory factors for negative attitudes towards foreigners. It is widely
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agreed that the social environment constitutes a crucial element for
forming attitudes and norms. For our local politicians, the environ-
ment of local citizenship politics provides a sub-world different from
all other contexts in which they have been socialised, as it is common
to all actors of a specific municipality. While municipal politicians
might have grown up in different regions, educated by different par-
ents and teachers and work at different places, they all have experi-
enced citizenship politics in the same municipality. None of our inter-
viewees has ever been active in local politics of another municipality.
On average, all interviewed politicians have been involved in local nat-
uralisation politics for ten years and only 16 per cent for less than four
years – four years being one term of office for those who are elected.
As for the time of residence, on average they have lived for 29 years in
the municipality where they are currently politically active – 28 per
cent less than twenty years and only 11 per cent less than ten years.
Their municipality and its political system thus become an important
environment, in which their attitudes towards naturalisation have been
shaped. This becomes all the more relevant when we look at how
strongly those politicians identify with their municipality: not very sur-
prisingly for local politicians, 96 per cent of them identify rather or
very strongly with the town or village where they live. We can therefore
conclude that for the large majority of the interviewed persons their
municipalities constitute an important political environment for form-
ing ideas about citizenship. They present their opinions about naturali-
sation along with those of other local politicians, confronting those
other opinions, trying to impose their own or modifying them when
convinced and influenced by other arguments. To understand how
such influence mechanisms work, we resort to theories in social psy-
chology.
In social psychology, the concept of ‘social influence’ refers to ways
in which the attitudes of individuals have an impact on each other and
conformity or norms are created. If it is hard to imagine attitudes that
are not in some way exposed to those of others, social influence varies
along a continuum according to the degree of pressure exerted on the
individual. Homans (1961) argues that idiosyncratic norms may indeed
exist when a person perceives that a feeling, thought or action is appro-
priate and correct for one or more persons in particular circumstances.
However, it is difficult to maintain one’s perception in the presence of
disagreement among significant others. Therefore, for Homans, most
norms are shared norms by virtue of the process that links the develop-
ment of normative content to the recognition that it is a shared norm.
If a person adapts his or her opinion to the attitudes of his or her so-
cial environment, a distinction has to be made whether such an adapta-
tion happens because the respective individual has been convinced by
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new arguments (informative social influence) or because he or she
changes his or her personal point of view for reasons of social desir-
ability (normative social influence) (Van Avermaet 1996). As for politi-
cians, the second mechanism might often apply. Since politicians are
also strategists, it is certainly possible that they change their openly de-
clared opinions in order to represent the attitude of a majority or to
avoid antagonising their electorate. In our interviews, however, all ac-
tors were explicitly asked in face-to-face interviews to tell us their perso-
nal opinions and not that of a particular party or organisation of which
they are a member. Indeed, they often told us that their personal opi-
nion did not correspond to the official position of their party, or they
confided to us thoughts they would not express in public. We are thus
convinced that the responses we have gotten from our interviews re-
flect the personal opinions of these actors and are the result of infor-
mative social influence processes.
Sherif’s (1935) seminal study on norm formation still belongs
among the classical works in this research field. He demonstrated that
people’s judgments about the characteristics of an ambiguous phenom-
enon tend to converge when their disagreements are made visible, and
that such emergent agreements shape people’s judgments about the
same phenomenon when they experience it at a later point in time.
Sherif’s experiments showed how the judgments of different actors
converged when the addressed question could be answered objectively.
Hardy (1957) conducted analyses to see if similar results could be ob-
tained when persons were asked to comment on rather normative
questions. His experiments with small groups debating issues such as
divorce led to the insight that the majority influences the judgments of
both the public and private attitudes of individuals of the minority
group.
The question remains why local politicians adapt their personal judg-
ments, for we are dealing with actors who are involved in a political de-
cision-making process and are supposed to defend their personal con-
victions. In this regard, the insights of Asch’s (1960) experiments are
highly relevant. He discovered that changes of judgments occurred
even when the test persons were clearly convinced of their judgments
at the beginning of the experiment. Festinger (1954) and more gener-
ally social comparison theory (Erickson 1988: 101-102) explain that
such adaptations occur because human beings tend to evaluate their
opinions and skills by comparing them with other persons through in-
terpersonal communication. People feel uncomfortable when they are
not sure whether their attitudes are correct. Especially in situations in
which normative considerations influence the decision-making and
when no objective standards are at hand, advantages and disadvantages
of alternative arguments are deliberated and measured. According to
158 PRACTISING CITIZENSHIP AND HETEROGENEOUS NATIONHOOD
Festinger (1954), such a comparison is sought in circumstances when
important decisions have to be made and personal opinions or skills
become highly relevant. Attitudes tend to be unstable in the absence of
interpersonal agreements, since actors are not confident that their atti-
tudes are correct when there are no influential others who agree with
them. Decisions in the context of naturalisations and the evaluation of
naturalisation applications clearly demand normative judgments. The
judgment whether a foreigner may become a new citizen depends on
the understanding of citizenship, which constitutes a highly subjective
question.
Arguing that local actors are influenced by the opinions of the actors
surrounding them in their individual opinion-making processes, we
have to tackle the problem of causal relation, since similar attitudes
among interacting individuals at a specific point in time could result
either from selection or socialisation (Kandel 1978: 427-429; Baron &
Tindall 1993: 269-270). It could easily be argued that actors mainly
maintain relationships with those persons who share the same opi-
nions or that they deal with people of the same political party (Erickson
1988: 101). This problem mainly applies in situations in which indivi-
duals are free to choose their contact persons. The opinion-making be-
fore general elections or referendums, when voters compare their opi-
nions or preferences with those persons surrounding them could be
such an example: are people influenced by the opinions of their friends
and colleagues at work or did they choose people as friends defending
similar values? It seems quite plausible that someone will compare
and come to agree with close colleagues or friends rather than with po-
litical enemies (Erickson 1988: 102). However, there are many situa-
tions in which the choice of others is not free and where relationships
are constrained by impersonally determined opportunities to interact
(Feld 1981). Many policy fields, including our own, constitute such ex-
amples. Eighty-two per cent of our actors are formally involved in the
decision-making process.6 They are members of a naturalisation com-
mission, the local parliament, the executive body, or the municipal ad-
ministration. They were delegated by their party and/or elected by the
local population and thus confronted with other politicians they did
not choose to deal with.
Even if we are sure that each local actor talks to different colleagues
during decision-making processes, however, we cannot attribute the
same relevance to all relationships. Although most politicians inces-
santly try to convince others of their opinions, not all are equally suc-
cessful. Those who enjoy a great reputation or those who are in contact
with many others have particular success in imposing their convic-
tions. The more frequently people interact, the more opportunities they
have to interpret each other’s attitudes accurately. We thus not only
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have to look at the relationships between actors but, again, also at the
degree of influence of individual actors and at the frequency of contacts
between actors (e.g. Baron & Tindall 1993; Erickson 1988: 102-105).
7.4 Explanatory model and results
Our explanatory model is heavily influenced by social influence net-
work theory (Friedkin 1998, 1999, 2001; Friedkin & Johnsen 1999).
According to Friedkin (2001: 171), social influence network theory in-
cludes French’s (1956) formal theory of social power and DeGroot’s
(1974) consensus formation model, and ‘describes an influence process
in a group of N persons in which the members’ attitudes and opinions
on an issue change as they revise their positions by taking weighted
averages of the influential positions [of ] other members’ (Friedkin’s em-
phasis). In line with our theoretical arguments and Bourdieu’s ‘field-
theory’, social influence network theory accounts for both symbolic (at-
titudes) and material (structure and power) aspects of influence pro-
cesses. Arguing that individuals form their opinions in a complex inter-
personal environment in which powerful opinions are in disagreement
and liable to change, Friedkin (1999) has probably developed the most
elaborate account of how social influence networks affect attitudes and
opinions. His theoretical model takes into account how actors modify
their opinions by taking into consideration their own circumstances
and the influences of others and how the configuration and strength of
interpersonal influences in particular populations depend on the social
structure.
All the aforementioned studies have compared attitudes before and
after the experiments to reveal influence mechanisms. Since we were
not in an experimental setting and resources as well as practical con-
siderations did not allow it, data for our analyses were collected for one
period only. As we argued above, initial opinions can be assumed to
change at the moment they are actively voiced in local naturalisation
politics, since it is a situation in which political actors with a priori dif-
ferent attitudes, none of whom chose to deal with each other, confront
each other. For the index measuring the individual understanding of ci-
tizenship, we resort to the indicator we have generated in Chapter 5.
The social environment of an actor has been operationalised by aver-
aging the attitudes of all persons with whom an actor is in contact dur-
ing the decision-making processes.
How can we measure the degree of influence of particular actors? In
Friedkin’s (1999) experiments the participants were asked to record
their opinions at the beginning and at the end of the experiment. To
solicit information on relative interpersonal influences, the participants
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had to estimate the extent to which each group member influenced
their final opinion. As Friedkin (1999: 17) admits himself, there are ob-
vious difficulties with such a measurement: actors may over-or-under-
estimate the importance of others or their own susceptibility to be in-
fluenced by others. Especially in a political field, actors may present
themselves as resistant to other opinions. In our study, we have mea-
sured two constructs in order to weight the opinions surrounding an
individual actor: the first weight concerns the intensity of contact. Each
respondent was given the possibility of indicating a maximum of three
persons with whom he or she was more often in contact than with the
other indicated actors. Each interviewee then also indicated which one
of these three was the most intensive contact.7 Values of colleagues
with whom a politician had intensive or very intensive contacts have
been doubled and tripled respectively.
The second weight is the relative power of each actor, as presented
in Chapter 5. While the interviewees indicated with whom they dis-
cussed naturalisation politics most often, they were not asked who in-
fluenced their personal opinion but which actors were influential dur-
ing the decision-making processes in general. The strength of such a
measurement is that we do not rely on subjective judgments for mea-
suring particular interpersonal influences. At the same time, it is an ad-
vantage that we measure the subjective judgments of the general influ-
ence of other actors, for power bases can only translate into direct in-
fluence if they are perceived as such.
As we have already argued above, our politicians are in contact with
colleagues from different parties with whom they did not choose to
deal. However, they are free to decide with whom they discuss matters
in naturalisation politics more often. It might be that intensive contacts
exist mainly between persons defending similar ideas. It can thus be
assumed that the averaged attitudes of the social environment
weighted with the intensity of contacts correlates relatively highly with
the individual attitudes. On the other hand, the relative influence of ac-
tors does not depend on individual decisions and is therefore the more
‘objective’ weight.
Rather surprisingly, our analyses revealed that only 41 per cent of
those contacts indicated by our interviewees as intensive relationships
are contacts between actors with similar attitudes. If we consider only
the most intensive contacts of our interviewees, 48 per cent of them
happen between politicians with similar attitudes.8 It appears that local
politicians discuss naturalisation matters not exclusively with collea-
gues defending the same positions. On the contrary, a lot of intensive
exchange happens between politicians with different understandings of
citizenship. In other words, due to structural constraints and their for-
mal involvement in various political bodies, local politicians are regu-
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larly confronted with opposing ideas in naturalisation politics. None-
theless, we expect a higher impact of our indicator of social environ-
ment when we weight it with the intensity of contacts than when we
weight it with the actor’s relative influence. After all, almost half of the
weighted interactions happen between actors with similar attitudes.
The construction of our main independent variable and our explana-
tory model can be summarised as follows:
E1 ¼ 1
n
ðw11y1 þ w12y2 þ . . . þ w1NyNÞ ð1Þ
SE2 ¼ 1
n
ðw21y1 þ w22y2 þ . . . þ w2NyNÞ ð2Þ
Table 7.1 Individual understandings of citizenship: Non-standardised regression coef-
ficients, standard error in brackets
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Social environment 1 (SE1) 0.43***
(0.08)
0.30***
(0.07)
Social environment 2 (SE2) 0.36**
(0.11)
0.23*
(0.10)
Social class: self-employed 0.00
(0.04)
0.01
(0.04)
Social class: technocrats 0.07
(0.06)
0.07
(0.06)
Social class: skilled workers -0.02
(0.03)
-0.03
(0.03)
Education -0.07*
(0.03)
-0.07*
(0.00)
Contacts -0.01
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.02)
Authoritarianism 0.04**
(0.01)
0.04**
(0.02)
Economic threat 0.05**
(0.02)
0.05**
(0.02)
Alienation 0.03**
(0.00)
0.03**
(0.01)
Constant 0.19***
(0.04)
0.29***
(0.03)
0.07
(0.08)
0.15
(0.08)
R2 (adj.) 0.13 0.05 0.40 0.36
N 175 175 170 170
Notes: Level of significance: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. ‘Social environment 1’ is
weighted by the frequency of contacts and ‘Social environment 2’, by the actors’ relative
power.
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yi1 ¼0 þ 1SE1þ 2SelfEmployed þ 3Technocratsþ a4SkilledWorkers
þ 5Educationþ 6Contactsþ 7Authoritarianism
þ 8EconomicThreatþ 9Alienationþ ui ð3Þ
yi2 ¼0 þ 1SE2þ 2SelfEmployed þ 3Technocratsþ 4SkilledWorkers
þ 5Educationþ 6Contactsþ 7Authoritarianism
þ 8EconomicThreatþ 9Alienationþ ui ð4Þ
Equations 1 and 2 describe how we constructed our main independent
variable, the social environment (SE) of each local politician. The actors
with whom an individual is in contact during the decision-making
processes are . The individual attitudes of the actors with whom an in-
dividual politician is in contact are weighted either by the intensity of
contact () (Eq.1) or by their relative influence () (Eq.2).9 The individual
values have been summed up and divided by the number of contact
persons. By doing so, we got an indicator for the social environment
measuring the averaged and weighted attitudes of the political environ-
ment that influences the opinions of the individual actors. Equations 3
and 4 display the model we test inTable 7.1 below. Besides our differ-
ently weighted main variable (SE1 and SE2), the two equations include
indicators generated on the basis of more classic approaches to xeno-
phobia we discussed above: the social class of the respondents, the de-
gree of their education, the degree of their contacts with foreigners,
whether or not they have an authoritarian character, whether or not
they perceive foreigners as an economic threat and whether or not they
feel alienated due to an increasing number of alien residents.
In Table 7.1 we first compare the two differently weighted indicators
for the social environment (SE1 and SE2) without controlling for other
factors. As predicted, the indicator in Model 1 has a higher impact than
the second indicator in Model 2, as a large part of the intensive (41 per
cent) and most intensive contacts (48 per cent) occur between actors
with similar attitudes. However, the impact of the second indicator also
remains statistically highly significant for predicting one’s attitude to-
wards naturalisation candidates: local politicians have a more restrictive
understanding of citizenship when they are in contact with powerful
actors who require a limitation of naturalisations. However, this indica-
tor explains only 5 per cent of the variance.
As Models 3 and 4 reveal, the coefficients of the two indicators de-
crease but remain significant when we control for alternative hypoth-
eses. Of course, other elements also influence one’s attitudes since
every person has been socialised in different social environments.
While the social class seems to have no impact – at least for those
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groups for which we have respondents – the perception of foreigners
as an economic threat, a feeling of alienation and an authoritarian
character leads to a more restrictive understanding of citizenship. Gi-
ven the fact that both politicians with restrictive and those with a gen-
erous understanding of citizenship are often in contact with foreigners,
the contact variable does not vary a lot and thus has almost no impact.
Nonetheless, the negative sign seems to indicate that people who are
regularly in contact with foreigners are less xenophobic. It is further
demonstrated that better educated actors are less susceptible to the in-
fluence of xenophobic ideas.
7.6 Conclusion
As we have argued in Chapter 3, to understand the dynamic nature of
nations, the contentious nature of citizenship politics and more gener-
ally the ongoing processes of cultural boundary drawing, we have to
conceive of individuals as both improvising and socialised human
beings. Naturalisation politics can be considered as political fields in
which different understandings of citizenship are pitted against each
other. At the same time, those controversies can be seen as social nego-
tiation processes, in which individuals adapt their attitudes when they
are confronted with more convincing arguments. While we have seen
in Chapters 5 and 6 to what extent powerful actors within a naturalisa-
tion field influence the outcomes of naturalisation processes, in this
chapter we discussed how the local social environment shapes indivi-
dual attitudes towards candidates for naturalisation. We have revealed
that the attitudes of those colleagues with whom an individual politi-
cian is in contact influence his or her understanding of citizenship.
This is all the more astonishing when we recall that many intensive
contacts occur between individuals who do not share the same convic-
tions in citizenship politics. Although the indicators for the individual
social environments remain significant when we include other influ-
ence factors in our models, our main variables explain relatively little
of the variance in the understanding of citizenship (see Models 1 and 2
in Table 7.1). Nonetheless, we are able to demonstrate that the negotiat-
ing processes in the context of citizenship politics have an impact on
personal convictions.
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8 Contingent Citizenship Politics
8.1 Local struggles over cultural boundaries
Having arrived at the end of our study, we hope to have achieved two
aims: on the one hand, our intention was to shed some light on what
is going on when alien residents are naturalised in Switzerland, and to
better understand why some municipalities pursue a more restrictive
citizenship policy than others. On the other hand, we sought to make a
more general contribution to the study of citizenship and nationalism
and more specifically to the debate about the social construction of na-
tions. Today, most researchers in this field agree that nations and eth-
nic groups are not fixed and bounded entities, but rather contingent
and fluent. Despite this wide consent, the scholarly debate is far from
resolved. Do constructivists believe that there are no such things as na-
tional and ethnic groups? Are cultural group characteristics and identi-
ties completely open to free choice? Our theoretical arguments and em-
pirical results should have made it clear that the answer to the second
question is clearly ‘no’. As for the first question, we have argued that
nations and ethnic groups are neither a matter of essential commonal-
ity nor a matter of free-flowing constructions. What are nations and
ethnic groups then? In this concluding chapter we will summarise our
main results and discuss to what extent our project on local citizenship
politics in Switzerland has helped us find an answer to this question.
When it comes to naturalisations, Swiss municipalities are accorded
many rights that normally belong to the competencies of nation-states.
Within the framework of vaguely defined criteria at the national level,
municipal politicians or the entire local population decide according to
which formal procedure candidates are naturalised and which are the
criteria applicants have to fulfil to get a Swiss passport. The political
systems and the social structures of Swiss municipalities make the
study of municipal citizenship politics highly relevant: not only do they
enjoy much more autonomy in various policy fields than municipali-
ties in other countries, even small municipalities dispose of a distinct
party system and have a relatively high ratio of foreigners. As a conse-
quence, we have observed a large variety of citizenship politics and dis-
tinctive ways of regulating the access to the Swiss nationality. The dif-
ferences in citizenship policy might not be as big as those between na-
tion-states. As we have seen, our local political units clearly have some
cultural traits in common. When it comes to the question of what local
politicians are proud of about Switzerland, a majority in all our case
studies agreed that the direct democratic system and the political lib-
erty people enjoy in this country are crucial characteristics of Switzer-
land. This confirms the commonly held view that political institutions
constitute a crucial part of Swiss citizens’ national identity. But the key
question still remains to be answered: why do some municipalities pur-
sue a more restrictive naturalisation policy than others?
Data from a large-N analysis allowed us to pave the way for a more
thorough investigation (see Chapter 4). We were able to demonstrate
that socio-economic and socio-structural factors have no influence on
which naturalisation policy is pursued in a municipality. A high unem-
ployment rate, a large ratio of foreigners or a growing number of appli-
cants from Muslim countries seem not to preoccupy the people who
decide how many and which alien residents become Swiss citizens.
Rather, cultural and political factors are decisive: the rejection rates in-
crease when the local population has a restrictive understanding of citi-
zenship, when the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), a populist right-wing
party, is influential in local politics and/or when decisions are taken at
open ballot. It thus clearly appears that it is how people think about ci-
tizenship, in which way political actors influence the naturalisation
procedures and how decisions are made, which tells us which policy is
pursued. This points to the contentious and political nature of citizen-
ship and is a first confirmation of our main hypothesis according to
which the outcome of a specific naturalisation policy is the result of on-
going political struggles over the questions of who we are and who be-
longs to us.
Citizenship politics were then analysed in more detail in fourteen
case studies (see Chapter 5). By generating an indicator for the indivi-
dual understanding of citizenship of local actors, we were able to dis-
tinguish diverging ideas on how cultural boundaries are drawn and
how foreign residents who apply for Swiss citizenship are perceived.
As we made clear from the outset, solely accounting for the way local
politicians think about their nation leaves us in a somewhat unsatisfied
situation. How do we know which attitudes are relevant when it comes
to the final decision? To distinguish majority and minority positions
and to explain why a specific construction prevails, we proposed to in-
clude the local power structures in our study. In order to trace the ways
in which influence is exerted, we resorted to community power studies
and social network analysis. As it turned out, accounting for both the
symbolic and material aspects of naturalisation politics enabled us to
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explain rejection rates and to distinguish various local citizenship mod-
els.
While Chapter 5 provided a quantitative comparison of fourteen citi-
zenship models, Chapter 6 illustrated our hypotheses by means of qua-
litative data collected in four municipalities. A detailed discussion of
the naturalisation procedures, the attitudes of the municipal politicians
involved in the decision-making processes and the local influence
structures once more revealed the highly political nature of naturalisa-
tions: at different stages various actors confront each other with their
convictions of who should become a member of their community. Each
municipality has an interesting story to tell us about how foreigners be-
come citizens of Switzerland. This becomes most clear when diverging
attitudes are presented toward topics that have been moulding naturali-
sation politics in Switzerland in recent years. In municipalities pursu-
ing a restrictive naturalisation policy, not only do local political actors
screen the candidates more systematically and gather more informa-
tion about them, but as we have already seen in Chapter 5, in such mu-
nicipalities more criteria have to be fulfilled to get a Swiss passport. It
is often requested that the candidates speak the local dialects, that they
know a lot about the political systems of Switzerland, their canton and
their municipality, that they are members of local associations, are will-
ing to give up their old nationality and/or that they have a job and do
not benefit from social security or disability insurance.
Local debates on the decisions that have recently been taken by the
Swiss Federal Court have revealed whether citizenship politics constitu-
tes a political or rather an administrative issue for municipal politi-
cians. Some hold the opinion that naturalised citizens become first and
foremost citizens of a local community, and therefore local politicians
or the entire population should be accorded the right to decide on each
application individually. Opponents of the existing system criticise the
arbitrariness of this system and demand that procedures be standar-
dised. We were also interested in the opinions on candidates from
Muslim countries. In recent years, the increasing immigration of peo-
ple from the countries of the former Yugoslavia and from Turkey has
led to violent debates on the question of how they can be integrated in
Switzerland. It is thus all the more interesting to observe that opinions
on whether they can and should be naturalised diverge a lot. While
some defend the position that the cultural background of those immi-
grants is incompatible with Swiss traditions, others relate difficulties of
integration to individual characteristics such as class or education.
Emphasising that naturalisation policies are the outcome of political
struggles and that not only the ideas of local actors but also the local
power structures are relevant to understand them reveals that under-
standings of citizenship are constructed in socially and culturally
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shaped fields which, in turn, influence the attitudes of individual politi-
cians. This aspect has been investigated more thoroughly in Chapter 7.
By drawing on theories in social psychology and social influence net-
works, we have demonstrated how the individual habitus of local politi-
cians are influenced by their contacts to other politicians in the course
of decision-making procedures. We were thus able to demonstrate that
local politicians involved in naturalisation processes are both actors
and agents or improvising and socialised human beings. Not only do
they contribute to the production and reproduction of citizenship poli-
tics, their opinions are structured during the decision-making pro-
cesses.
One might easily criticise that inference from the Swiss case of natio-
nalisation procedures is not possible as the heterogeneity of citizenship
politics is simply due to its highly decentralised system. Of course, we
can observe so many different naturalisation policies because munici-
palities take the decisions autonomously. But when we look at other
countries, we observe that variations in regional practice of naturalisa-
tions are strong in both federal and unitary states. Moreover, studies
analysing integration politics in European cities also revealed diverging
citizenship paradigms as a major explanatory factor for policy out-
comes. It thus appears that the Swiss case is not as exceptional as one
might first think. Rather, it constitutes a unique opportunity to ap-
proach citizenship politics from new directions and forces us to reflect
on existing analytical instruments. Our object of study not only enabled
us to demonstrate that citizenship can take different forms and mean-
ings within a nation-state. It also allowed us to go beyond formal citi-
zenship regulations and to look closely at the moments when naturali-
sation laws are applied and interpreted. By talking to local politicians
and observing how they come to an agreement on which criteria are re-
levant to become a Swiss citizen, we were in the comfortable position
to study the ways ordinary citizens conceptualise citizenship and how a
specific naturalisation policy emerges in a local setting.
8.2 Towards a sociology of citizenship and nationalism
Our results clearly refute the arguments of essentialists who would ex-
pect a much more homogeneous naturalisation politics both among
and within our municipalities and much less variation of the individual
understandings of citizenship. The close look we have taken at local
naturalisation politics has revealed that it becomes highly problematic
to speak of the Swiss citizenship policy or of a clearly defined Swiss na-
tional identity. Our analysis also disproves Van Evera’s (2001) argu-
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ments who is one of the very few scholars still openly defending a pri-
mordialist position. Van Evera (2001: 20) recognises that ethnic identi-
ties are not stamped on our genes at birth, but holds the opinion that
they can become fixed after having been adopted through socialisation.
According to him, identities especially harden when mass literacy is
achieved (because literacy allows to store identity and to purvey it to a
mass audience), in situations of violent conflicts with others (due to an
emotional impact of recorded national memories that is enhanced) and
among non-immigrant ethnic groups (because they did not have to as-
similate to another culture). In our study we focused on a highly edu-
cated society where ethnic conflicts are absent and on local politicians
who have spent most of their life in Switzerland – and even in the
same village or town. Nonetheless, cultural boundaries are drawn dif-
ferently from one municipality to the other.
Our findings are also opposed to the arguments of instrumentalists
and adherents of rational choice theories who see groups as artefacts of
cultural engineers and/or as being mobilised on the basis of economic
interests. We have demonstrated that socio-economic and socio-struc-
tural factors have no direct impact on the outcome of naturalisation po-
licies. This is in line with one of our main arguments according to
which citizenship is about the symbolic aspects of national member-
ship. Noteworthy in this regard are the attitudes of local politicians to-
wards candidates who are unemployed and/or depend on social secur-
ity or disability insurance. Our qualitative analysis has shown that
when politicians refuse to naturalise such candidates, they do this, not
because they are not willing to financially support them but because ac-
cording to them, ‘good’ Swiss citizens do not depend on the state.
Against extreme instrumentalists – hardly represented in the theoreti-
cally more sophisticated debates – we argue that culture is not infi-
nitely malleable: elites are not free to choose aspects of culture, and the
masses do not always follow the elite. The role of elites – be they politi-
cians or intellectuals – and their attempts to mobilise the masses are
certainly crucial to understand the formation of nations and national
identities, but these processes do not happen in a cultural vacuum.
Elites must select from a range of symbols that are traditionally em-
bedded in a group and mobilisations must take place on the wave-
length to which the public is ready to tune in. As we have seen, elites
are also a product of their social environment and they have to negoti-
ate on citizenship politics with other actors defending opposing posi-
tions.
In our study we have put forward an approach that helps us bridge
the rigid divide between these two research traditions. Following many
others, we have first pleaded for a cognitive approach. We fully agree
with Brubaker (2004) that we have to conceive ethnicity and nation-
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hood in terms of practical categories, cognitive schemes and discursive
frames. However, solely taking into account how people perceive their
social environment does not allow us to grasp the dynamics of nation-
alism and citizenship politics. As Calhoun (2003) rightly fears, claim-
ing that ethnicity, race and nationhood are not things in the world, but
perspectives on the world might easily lead one to underestimate the
importance of the social. Pure cognitivism also bears the danger of
being a-historical as it neglects broader social structures and events.
Brubaker (2004: 86) rightly reminds us that ‘there is nothing intrinsi-
cally individualistic about the study of cognition’ and that schemes of
perception is always ‘socially shared knowledge of social objects.’ Our
aim was to elaborate on this aspect in order to better understand why
specific perceptions on the world appear and disappear.
To avoid an individualistic approach and methodological idealism,
we have to be aware that no human being lives outside of particularis-
tic solidarities. People have always organised themselves in cultural
groups. In the age of nationalism they do this in nation-states, which
give human beings a sense of belonging, offer rescue from alienation,
solitude and anonymity and assure individuals that they enjoy equal
status (cf. Tamir 1995: 433-435; Greenfeld 1992: 487-488; Calhoun
2003: 546-550). How individuals depend on their social environment
became most obvious in our discussion on social influence and norm
formation (see Chapter 7). We came to the conclusion that the way we
conceive a social phenomenon is partially shaped by the attitudes of in-
dividuals whom we are in contact with. Especially when we have to
take normative judgments and no objective standards are at hand, and
when in processes of interpersonal communication convincing argu-
ments are brought up, alternative arguments are deliberated and mea-
sured.
Emphasising that nations and, more generally, groups are both a so-
cial reality and a social necessity does not mean that they are in any
way bounded and clearly defined. When human beings begin to (re-)or-
ganise themselves in cultural groups, neither we as researchers nor the
members of the emerging groups do know which culture will be
blessed by success. A contrasting argument would imply that forms of
culture exist prior to the formation of groups or that any cultural traits
automatically lead to group-consciousness. Culture might indeed be
the basis of political action, but it is also the result of political efforts.
Any form of social closure – and in the light of our study especially na-
tional citizenship – is intrinsically political. Consequently, we argued
that a specific naturalisation policy is the outcome of struggles, and
that it is in the course of such processes that nations are constructed.
Accordingly, claiming that nations are socially constructed does not
simply mean that people imagine their nation, but rather that they con-
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front different ideas about how to draw the cultural boundaries and
come to a temporarily stable agreement. Those processes make nations
real without ascribing them any fixed cultural boundaries.
To analytically grasp such struggles, we proposed to study citizen-
ship politics by means of Bourdieu’s analytical instruments. Bourdieu
has never specifically written on nations and nationalism, but he stu-
died neighbouring themes such as regionalism and identity (Bourdieu
1980) and the genesis of groups (Bourdieu 1984). The political sociol-
ogy that he has elaborated in these works and elsewhere provides chal-
lenging analytical tools to bridge the rigid division between essential-
ists/culturalists/objectivists and instrumentalists/ cosmopolitanists/
subjectivists, namely by accounting for how in ongoing processes
dominant interpretations emerge out of different representations of the
social world.
Resorting to his analytical instruments enabled us to conceive of na-
tions as ‘political fields’ in which, according to Bourdieu, actors strug-
gle over the legitimate manipulation of the comprehensive view of the
social world. In those fields ‘power-ideas’ between those defending a
prevailing perception of the world and those challenging it can be ob-
served. It is the political capital of the involved actors that helps us
trace the power structures and predict which ideas have more chances
to become dominant. According to Bourdieu, ‘political capital’ includes
the prestige and legitimacy a person enjoys and his or her relationships
to others. Correspondingly, powerful are those people who succeed in
convincing others of their interpretation of the social world. To under-
stand these dynamic processes, Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus’ was of
great importance. ‘Habitus’ can be considered as a general perception
or action-scheme that structures an individual’s reactions to new situa-
tions. It helps us understand that people’s identity is shaped by their
social environment, but that they also exercise choice and thus may
claim or reject common cultural values.
With Calhoun (2003: 549) we can conclude that groupness and its
related aspects of identity and social closure are ‘neither simply a mat-
ter of inheritance and essential commonality nor a matter of free-flow-
ing ubiquitous and undetermined construction. [They are] socially pro-
duced, shaped by material factors, culturally organised and yet also
open to human action.’ Such social production processes cannot only
be observed in Swiss municipalities. They are the engine of every na-
tion-state and help us explain why nationalism and citizenship politics
change their forms over time and space. We therefore think that the
theoretical framework discussed in this study might lay the basis for a
more coherent theory of nationalism and citizenship politics.
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8.3 Contingent naturalisation politics: arbitrary decisions
Having come to a conclusion why certain municipalities pursue a more
restrictive citizenship policy and reject more applicants for naturalisa-
tion than others, we are already confronted with the next question:
why does a more restrictive understanding of citizenship emerge in
some municipalities more than in others? We have demonstrated that
there are no regional clusters of citizenship policies. The language re-
gion, the number of inhabitants and the degree of urbanisation have
no impact. This finding underlines that explanatory factors have to be
found at the local level and lends force to our argument according to
which the outcome of a specific naturalisation policy is the result of on-
going political struggles. But how can we predict which direction such
struggles take, and why are local politicians with more xenophobic atti-
tudes more successful in certain local settings than in others?
To completely understand the ways people confront each other with
their ideas about citizenship, we would have to observe such processes
over a longer period of time. A longitudinal analysis would be neces-
sary to fully apply our theoretical framework and to grasp the interac-
tion processes between individual and systemic levels. For comprehen-
sible reasons we have neither had the financial resources nor the time
to undertake such an ambitious project. As written documents about
local politics hardly exist, such a research programme would require
observing local struggles over a period of at least ten years. We would
then probably see how certain politicians get powerful, how they con-
vince others of their ideas, how certain constellations of actors favour
specific solutions and pave the way for further developments, etc.
Thereby we would trace the actual sequence of the actor’s moves and
reactions to the others’ moves and reconstruct the particular strategies
and struggles. We would be able to demonstrate that particular ways of
thinking and talking about nationhood are reinforced and activated at
specific moments and in particular institutional settings and produce
effects of path dependency. When convincing arguments were brought
up against an established naturalisation policy, we would then observe
that a path is abandoned again and that changes become possible.
It appears that interactions between actors, to which extent actors
adapt themselves to negotiated and established politics and how oppo-
nents try to challenge these politics constitute the crucial aspects we
would have to investigate. Emphasising these aspects of life in general
and citizenship politics in particular brings us back to Bourdieu’s meta-
phor of sports games. To understand, a soccer game for example we
have to know the rules and the abilities of the two teams. If we fol-
lowed games in the past and know how the teams and the individual
players have recently performed, we might dare to make a bet which
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team will win. But as the rules do not regulate every tiny aspect of the
game and any training and coaching does not determine the player’s
performances, our knowledge at the beginning of the game does not
help us foresee the reactions of the players of one team to the other
team’s changing constellations they are faced with in the course of the
game. Similarly, any social processes involve complex and open-ended
series of interactions among numerous actors and groups. This makes
it difficult to predict with certainty who will win respectively which po-
litical decisions will be taken.
This does not mean that on the field where the soccer game takes
place or in political fields of nations a complete chaos prevails. Nor
does it mean that the reactions of the players to an attack of the other
team or decisions of local politicians in the context of naturalisation
politics are unreasonable, only because they take unforeseeable turns.
Both players and politicians pursue specific strategies, and both soccer
games and decision-making procedures can always be retrospectively
reconstructed to a certain degree. But even if you can explain why a for-
eign resident has been denied Swiss citizenship, the decision might ap-
pear arbitrary when we compare decision-making processes and come
to the conclusion that between municipalities or even for different ap-
plicants within a municipality different criteria were applied. How can
it be that within a nation-state the chance to become a full member de-
pends on the location where you (by accident) are living at the moment
of application? Those defending the current system argue that you first
and foremost have to please the people who live in the same village or
town because you have to deal with them in everyday life. Opponents
require that criteria be standardised and be the same for all municipali-
ties and that the local administrations or the executive body take the fi-
nal decisions as these organs are better capable or more willing to ap-
ply clearly defined criteria. As it seems, this issue will continue to pre-
occupy Switzerland in the years to come. Interestingly, these struggles
not only turn around the questions of how to define the Swiss nation
and how high to set the barriers to become a full member of it. They
also include a debate on whether you are primarily a citizen of a muni-
cipality or of a nation-state.
CONTINGENT CITIZENSHIP POLITICS 173

Notes
Chapter 1
1 The Diet was a regular meeting of representatives of the cantons of the Swiss Con-
federation. It had only limited governmental capacities and operated essentially as a
meeting place for strictly instructed ambassadors of the sovereign cantons.
2 See articles 37 and 38 of the Swiss Constitution from 1999 and articles 14 and 15 of
the Federal Law on the Acquisition and Loss of the Swiss Citizenship (141.0) from
1952.
3 A big exception is the canton of Geneva, where municipalities are not involved in the
decision-making procedures and naturalisations are centralised at the cantonal level.
4 More detailed descriptions of the local decision-making processes in the context of
naturalisations can be found in Chapter 6, which discusses citizenship politics in
four municipalities. Various local naturalisation procedures are presented in Steiner
and Wicker (2000, 2004) and Achermann and Gass (2003). For an overview of the
formal aspects of the procedures in all 26 cantons, see Boner (2000), Schaffhauser
(2001) and Schweizerischer Gemeindeverband (1998).
5 Strictly speaking, in Switzerland naturalisation politics does not constitute a classic
case of executive federalism, as the federal state does not explicitly delegate this task
to the cantons and municipalities. On the contrary, local citizenship regulations ex-
isted long before regulations on national citizenship came into being.
6 For this reason, Baubo¨ck (2003) suggests strengthening municipal autonomy in im-
migration and foreign policy. Among other suggestions, he proposes formalising lo-
cal citizenship, which would be based on residence and disconnected from national-
ity.
7 Compared with other European countries, only France has more small municipalities
with an average number of 1,500 inhabitants, while in Austria and Germany on aver-
age 3,300 and 7,300 people live in a municipality, and Swedish municipalities have
on average 29,800 inhabitants. The number rises to 123,000 in Britain (Ladner
1991: 47).
8 Part of this high ratio might be explained by the fact that Switzerland is a small, rich
country in the middle of Europe that attracts a lot of foreign workers, whose num-
bers therefore grow faster as a percentage of the population than they do in bigger
countries. It can also be explained by the low Swiss naturalisation rate.
9 For example, the fourteen case studies we will present below have on average 15,000
inhabitants and a ratio of foreigners that varies between 9 per cent and 39 per cent
(25 per cent on average).
10 For an overview of the competences of Swiss municipalities, see also Linder (2005:
160-163), Geser (2002: 427-432) and Meylan et al. (1972).
11 Further legal aspects of laws about naturalisation were reviewed by Burckhardt
(1914), Ilg (1922), Ruth (1937), Benz (1986), Fasel (1989), Grendelmeier (1969), Bur-
ger (1971) and Hottelier (1991). The development of the norms of naturalisation dur-
ing the 19th and 20th century are analysed by Aargast (2007), Arlettaz (1990), Wan-
ner (1997), Kreis and Kury (1996), Wanner (1998) and Steiner and Wicker (2000). A
history of the naturalisation processes in the second half of the 19th century in the
canton of Valais is provided by Windisch (2004). Additional work discusses the con-
cepts of assimilation, integration, and the national identity of foreign residents in
Switzerland (Arlettaz 1985; Centlivres et al. 1991; Kleger & D’Amato 1995; Ossipow
1996).
Chapter 2
1 Tilly (1999: 252) differentiates between government and state, designating the for-
mer as any organisation that controls the coercive means within some substantial ter-
ritory and reserving the latter for those governments that do not fall under the juris-
diction of any other government. Thus, Switzerland qualifies as a state, whereas
Swiss municipalities can be considered as governments. Such a differentiation high-
lights the fact that citizenship is not necessarily and exclusively related to a state. Si-
milarly, Mackert and Mu¨ller (2000: 12) make a distinction between the concept of ci-
tizenship (they use the English notion) and the widely used German translation of
‘Staatsbu¨rgerschaft’ (literally translated: ‘States-Citizenship’) that is often used as a sy-
nonym. While the latter clearly designates citizenship in a state, the former can be
understood as a membership status of various territorial and/or social entities (cities,
European Union, etc.). Similar discussions turn around the question of whether citi-
zenship should and could be disentangled from the idea of nationality (Habermas
1992, 2001; Wiener 1999; see also Calhoun 2004b; Soysal 1994).
2 For an overview of the normative debates on citizenship, see Mackert and Mu¨ller
(2000: 19-31). On individual and collective citizenship rights, see Kymlicka (1995:
especially ch.3; Shapiro & Kymlicka 1997; Glazer 1997); and on the debate on liberal,
republican and communitarian ideas of citizenship rights see, among many, Miller
(1995, 2000), Baubo¨ck (1996), Kymlicka (1995: ch.4), Taylor (1994), Walzer (1983:
ch.2) and Young (1998).
3 A distinction has to be made between discretionary and as-of-right systems. In the
former, candidates can be rejected even if certain conditions are fulfilled. In the latter,
mostly concerning candidates of the second generation, individuals have a right to ci-
tizenship when they meet certain conditions; negative decisions must be justified
and can be appealed. Ordinary naturalisations (first generation) happen in many
countries, including Switzerland, according to a discretionary system (Weil 2002;
Brubaker 1989: 108-109).
4 This does not mean, however, that migrant movements and their claims have no im-
pact on citizenship politics over a longer period (Joppke 1998, 1999; Kastoryano
2002).
5 In our project, we have even received the impression that it is rather exceptional that
potential candidates move to another municipality where the chances to obtain Swiss
citizenship appear to be higher.
6 The actual legal reality was much more complex, since there was not only the status
of citizens and non-citizens but also those of privileged inhabitants and others. For
details, see Brubaker (1992: 203n43).
7 On rights for non-national residents in various nation-states see Baubo¨ck (1995) and
Guiraudon (1998, 2000); see also Howard (2006: 445).
8 There are, however, a considerable number of nation-states where all or part of the
permanent residents get electoral rights on the local and regional and more seldom
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on the national level (Baubo¨ck 2005). In Switzerland, denizens have political rights
at the local and regional levels in some cantons.
9 By this we mean that no costs arise for the state when permanent residents are nat-
uralised. On the contrary, in some (rather exceptional) circumstances the state might
even profit from naturalisations when the candidates have to pay to get a passport.
Until recently, naturalisations in some few Swiss municipalities were quite costly.
For some municipalities, naturalisations were an important source of income (see
Steiner 2004b). Since 2006, and according to the Federal Law on the Acquisition
and Loss of the Swiss Citizenship (141.0; art. 38), only taxes covering the costs of the
proceedings are allowed to be collected at the federal, cantonal and municipal levels.
Fees can be waived for impecunious persons at the federal level.
10 Smith (1998: 223) concludes his overview on the various approaches of nationalism
with the rather pessimistic observation that ‘the field [of nationalism] is so riven by
basic disagreements and so divided by rival approaches, each of which addresses only
one or other aspect of this vast field, that a unified approach must seem quite unrea-
listic and any general theory merely utopian.’
11 Our argument is thus far away from any socio-biological arguments. Claiming that
human beings have a natural tendency to organise themselves in groups does not en-
tail that there is any natural characteristic automatically unifying a group of people.
As we will argue in the course of this and the next chapters, the definition of what
constitutes a nation (or any other group) is not a given but the result of political
struggles over cultural boundaries (see also our arguments on xenophobia in Chapter
7).
12 For similar definitions, see also Breuilly (1993: 3), Hobsbawm (1990: 9), Calhoun
(1997: 69), Hastings (1997: 3-4).
13 Or as Best’s (1982: 29) often quoted argument goes: ‘Historians of nationalism agree
to differ in their estimates of how much of it [nationalism] (and what sorts of it) al-
ready existed in the Atlantic world of 1785. They are at one in recognising that the
world by 1815 was full of it, and that although each national variety had of course its
strong characteristics, those varieties had enough in common for it to constitute the
most momentous phenomenon of modern history’.
14 For a very thorough critique of modernist theories of nationalism, see Gorski (2000).
15 Exceptions to this rule are nation-states in which all or certain groups of foreigners
are allowed to participate in the democratic processes after some years of residence
on the national, regional and/or local level (Baubo¨ck 2005).
16 Scho¨neberg (1987: 49) argues that the principle of democratic majority leads to op-
pression and exclusion of minorities. See also Montagu (1997[1942]).
17 Most widely cited is Brubaker (1992). Comparisons of citizenship models in France,
Germany and other countries such as Britain, the United States, the Netherlands and
Switzerland can be found in Koopmans et al. (2005), Giugni and Passy (2006),
Greenfeld (1992), Joppke (1999), Kastoryano (2002) and Schiffauer (1993).
18 For that reason, some introduce a second dimension in the citizenship typology and
distinguish to what extent Western nation-states require cultural assimilation (Tilly
1995; Koopmans & Kriesi 1997; Koopmans et al. 2005). Those models provide, in-
deed, a more detailed analytical framework for the study of citizenship politics as
they account for both how discriminatory the individual access to citizenship is and
to what extent cultural group rights are granted. This second dimension has not been
retained for our analysis, however, since we are only interested in the process of be-
coming a full member of a nation-state.
19 Some argue that Renan’s arguments were developed in the highly political context of
the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany (Weil 1996; Silverman 1992). Thus,
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Renan’s lecture can also be seen as a political intervention intended to counter Ger-
man claims to this territory.
Chapter 3
1 See also Tilly’s (2005: 3-6) criticism on what he calls dispositional accounts in Green-
felds (1992, 2003) approach to nationalism.
2 Elias (1977: 111-112) even points out that essentialist thinking closely corresponds to
grammatical patterns of Western languages.
3 Or as Tamir (1995: 433-435) has put it, membership in a nation promises individuals
redemption from personal oblivion, offers rescue from alienation, solitude and anon-
ymity, and assures individuals that they enjoy equal status. See also Greenfeld (1992:
487-488) on national identity as a matter of dignity.
4 Lacking the space to discuss in detail the contributions of those researchers, it should
be added that they pursue a rather moderate political instrumentalist approach.
5 Weber further highlights the roles of the conscript army and the centralised commu-
nication networks linking all the French provinces.
6 For explanations on how elites can convince their followers to adopt false beliefs, see
Fearon and Latin (2000).
7 A case in which most individuals seem to share the same attitudes towards other eth-
nic groups is discussed by Gil-White (1999).
8 Nonetheless, some researchers in the field of citizenship studies (Koopmans et al.
2005: ch.1; Hagedorn 2001) criticise Brubaker’s model and his argument of the citi-
zenship’s historical rootedness for being too rigid and not allowing for variation over
time. This interpretation might be explained by the fact that Brubaker does not allot
the variability of citizenship models a very important place in his book.
9 Different studies demonstrated that citizenship models in France, Germany and
other countries have varied a lot within the last two decades (Weil 2001; Koopmans
et al. 2005; Ludwig 2004).
10 A similar example on limited variation over schemes is provided by Wimmer (1995)
demonstrating different stories on the foundation of an Indian village in Mexico.
11 Systematically collected data are provided by Boner (1999), Schaffauser (2001) and
the Association of Swiss municipalities (Schweizerischer Gemeindeverband 1998).
However, they list only very general information on the naturalisation procedures at
the local level.
12 To attain a high rate of return we proceeded according to Dillman’s (1978: 160-199)
total design method, which describes the step-by-step details of how to conduct suc-
cessful mail surveys.
13 As it turned out, however, no such difference exists (see Chapter 4).
14 In one group we only disposed of municipalities from different cantons: Bernhight-
wo and Aargaulowtwo are, however, in the same region.
15 Decisions are taken either by the local parliament or the executive body.
16 For the detailed questionnaire, see Annex.
Chapter 4
1 Remember that 162 municipalities (78 per cent) have responded to our survey and
154 municipalities (74 per cent) have provided data on their rejection rates.
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2 We analysed all 174 incidents reported between 1992 and 2005, which are accessible
online on the following webpage: www.gra.ch (see also Stutz 2001). This time period
corresponds more or less with the period for which we have collected our data (1990-
2002).
3 As for the submitted applications only those have been considered that entered the
naturalisation procedure. The persons in charge at the local administrations who
filled in the questionnaires were asked not to include applicants who submitted in-
complete dossiers or did not fulfil the criteria pertaining to the number of years of re-
sidence.
4 For an overview of the few and mainly descriptive and impressionistic studies on the
reasons for naturalisation in the United States, see DeScipio (1987). Wunderlich
(2005) provides a detailed study on the subjective dimensions of naturalisation proce-
dures in Germany.
5 References to such referenda are also made in other studies to measure locally pre-
vailing attitudes toward foreigners or citizenship politics (Ireland 1994: ch.6; Cattacin
& Kaya 2005: 309-318; Piguet & Wanner 2000: 66-73; Bolliger 2004). The Swiss
Federal Statistical Office provided the data for this indicator. The following referenda
were considered for the measurement of the indicator: Aliens Act (1982), Federal Re-
solution on the facilitation of certain naturalisations (1983), Federal Law on the resi-
dence and establishment of foreigners (1987), Asylum Act (1987), Initiative on the
limitation of immigration (1988), Revision of the federal regulation of the facilitated
naturalisation of young foreigners (1994), Federal Law on sanctions against migrants
(1994), Initiative against illegal immigration (1996), Asylum Act (1999), Initiative
against the misuse of asylum rights (2002).
6 The variables on the perception of the strength of political parties and of the unem-
ployment rate have been taken from a dataset provided by Andreas Ladner and his
collaborators at the University of Berne who carried out three national surveys in all
Swiss municipalities in 1988, 1994 and 1998 (see Ladner 1991).
7 The municipal secretaries have been asked how important, according to their opi-
nion, party X is in the political life of their municipality – whether they are ‘very im-
portant’, ‘important’, ‘rather unimportant’ or ‘unimportant’. For the regression analy-
sis the party variables have been dichotomised (important/unimportant).
8 The municipal secretaries have been asked whether their municipalities have been af-
fected ‘very much’, ‘partly’ or ‘not at all’ by increasing unemployment. This variable
has been dichotomised (not affected/partly or very much affected).
9 Unfortunately, we had no variable at hand that measures the perception of the pre-
sence of alien residents.
10 We are conscious of the fact that all candidates emigrated from the countries of the
former Yugoslavia are not Muslims, nor are we sure whether all Muslim applicants
from the former Yugoslavia or Turkey are religious. It is estimated that around 10 to
15 per cent of all Muslims in Switzerland practise their religion (Gianni 2005b: 10).
As a matter of fact, Muslims from Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina constitute by far
the largest immigrant group from the former Yugoslavia (see CFR 2006: 7-8; Gianni
2005b: 13-17). Moreover, we are mainly interested in how applicants are perceived.
We observed that even local politicians consider candidates for naturalisation from
the countries of the former Yugoslavia and Turkey as a homogeneous group. Stolz
(2005: 558-560) has shown that Swiss do not make a big difference between Muslims
in general and those from specific countries and regions.
11 For a multivariate analysis see Chapter 5, Tables 5.4 and 5.5.
12 For a detailed discussion of the effect of the formal decision-making procedures, see
Helbling (2008).
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Chapter 5
1 Examples for this indicator are, for example, regulations in Germany facilitating nat-
uralisations of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the Balkans whose ances-
tors have left Germany (Aussiedler). Another example is Israel’s ‘law of return’, which
gives Jews all over the world the right to Israeli citizenship. In some countries, resi-
dents of Overseas Territories and former colonies profit from facilitated naturalisa-
tion.
2 They also retained the actual naturalisation rates as an indicator for nationality acqui-
sition. As this indicator constitutes no naturalisation criterion (but rather is close to
our dependent variable), we did not consider it for our analyses.
3 For the exact wording of the questions, see Annex (questions 4 to 12). For an over-
view of naturalisation criteria in European and other countries, see Weil (2002).
4 However, some cantons and municipalities require that a part of the twelve years re-
quired at the national level have been spent on their territory.
5 For a discussion of these concepts, see Hoffmann-Nowotny (1973), Esser (2001), Gor-
don (1964), Brubaker (2001) and Matter (2005).
6 This definition was given to all our interview-partners. See Annex (question 4).
7 For the diverging application of this principle, see Hagedorn (2001: 109-110).
8 See Annex (questions 20 to 23).
9 For studies analysing national policy structures in Switzerland, see Kriesi (1980), Je-
gen (2003) and Kriesi and Jegen (2001). For analyses of local policy structures in
Swiss municipalities, see Kissling-Na¨f (1997), Ku¨bler et al. (2003) and Serdu¨lt
(2000).
10 For further problems connected with analysing cliques, see Erickson (1988: 107-108).
11 See Annex (questions 16 to 19).
12 The CONCOR approach (CONvergence of iterated CORrelation) was applied for the
analysis of the local networks and the structural equivalence of the individual actors
(Wasserman & Faust 1994: 376-381). Similar to hierarchical cluster analysis, this ana-
lytical instrument permits us to regroup actors with similar characteristics and to
analyse the structure of the naturalisation field. CONCOR begins by correlating each
pair of actors. Each row of this actor-by-actor correlation matrix is then extracted and
correlated with each other row. Through repeated correlations, groups of actors are
divided into two subgroups consisting of actors that are as similar as possible. This
operation can be repeated, whereby the regrouped actors are again divided into two
groups. We have divided each municipality into four blocks for practical reasons. Re-
grouping all actors into two groups only would not have allowed us a very differen-
tiated analysis. Running the regrouping three times, we would have ended up with
eight blocks, most of them consisting of one or two actors only. For the analysis of
the network data, we used the programme Ucinet 6.59 (Borgatti, Everett & Freeman
1999).
13 One actor in groups 1 and 3 is not a member of a political party.
14 Since the first blocks in Schwyzhigh and Schwyzlow are outliers, we retained the sec-
ond most influential blocks for these two cases.
15 Regarding the problem of large standard errors: it appears that, at a theoretical level,
few observations and multicollinearity are essentially the same problems (Achen
1982: 80-82; Gujarati 2003: ch.10; Goldberger 1991: 248-250).
16 In a Klein test we got the following results: R
2
(adj.) = 0.69, VIF = 3.18.
17 For the wording of these questions, see Annex (questions 25 to 27).
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Chapter 6
1 See Annex (open questions 2, 3 and 13 and closed questions 4 to 12).
2 The construction of this indicator is based on data collected in our face-to-face inter-
views. Each interviewee had to indicate which actors exert a certain influence on the
respective local naturalisation procedures (reputational approach). For a theoretical
elaboration of this indicator, see Chapter 5. For the exact wording of the questions,
see Annex (questions 20 to 23).
3 Remember that Switzerland has four national languages. All municipalities dis-
cussed in this chapter are located in the German-speaking part of Switzerland.
4 The rather exceptional introduction of such a language test in Bernhigh may be due
to the fact that the responsible person at the local administration who proposed to in-
troduce this test is a linguist. In recent years, formal language tests have also been
introduced in other municipalities. Each time, violent debates could be observed in
Switzerland on whether such tests are an appropriate instrument to evaluate if the
language knowledge of candidates is good enough for naturalisation.
5 These arguments also have to be seen in connection with national statistics that were
published at the time of our data collection and showed that young men from the
countries of the former Yugoslavia were more often involved in car accidents than
young Swiss. A fierce debate started after a car insurance company announced its in-
tention to increase the insurance premium for such persons.
6 We first asked all our interviewees in open questions whether it was more challen-
ging for some foreigners to integrate themselves than for others, and if yes, for
whom and for what reasons it was more difficult. We then more specifically wanted
to know whether it posed a problem when a Muslim woman wearing a headscarf in
public applied for Swiss citizenship. See Annex (questions 7 and 13).
Chapter 7
1 Jenkins uses the term ‘racism’ in the same way we use the term ‘xenophobia’.
2 How closely related the concepts of xenophobia and understanding of citizenship are
can also be demonstrated empirically by comparing attitudes towards naturalisation
criteria with a more classic operationalisation of xenophobia. Our indicator for xeno-
phobia includes questions on whether foreign residents constitute a cultural enrich-
ment, whether the ratio of foreigners should be reduced, whether one-day immi-
grants from Turkey living in Switzerland will be completely integrated, and whether
due to the rising ratio of foreigners Swiss no longer feel at home. Unsurprisingly,
both variables correlate relatively highly (r=63, p <0.000) compared with Heitmeyer’s
comparison of xenophobia and racism correlating at 0.69 (Heitmeyer 2002: 31-
32n4). For the exact wording of the questions, see Annex (questions 28a, b, c and d).
3 Heitmeyer (2002: 29) also lists anomie as a further independent variable explaining
xenophobia with processes of disorientation and alienation in a faster-growing social
world (see also Ku¨hnel & Schmidt 2002). This concept has not been retained for our
analysis due to a lack of data for its operationalisation and because it comes close to
the concept of social disintegration.
4 For the exact wording of the questions, see Annex (questions 28 to 32).
5 In the rare cases in which the respondents were not the main wage earners, we re-
tained the job of the respondent’s partner.
6 The remaining 18 per cent are informally involved in the decision-making processes
mostly through their membership in a local political party.
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Chapter 8
1 For the exact wording of the questions, see Annex (questions 16 to 19).
2 For each relationship that was indicated by an actor as one of his or her intensive (or
most intensive) contacts, we verified whether the attitudes of the indicated actors
were within a range of ten points of the respondent’s attitude. For example, if a parti-
cular actor had an understanding of citizenship of 0.38, a contact with another politi-
cian with an understanding of citizenship of 0.28 or 0.48 would be considered as a
relationship between actors with similar attitudes.
3 W1 takes the values ‘1’ for non-intensive, ‘2’ for intensive and ‘3’ for the most inten-
sive contacts. W2 varies between ‘0’ and ‘1’.
Annex
1 Because school systems vary a lot between countries, we did not translate the differ-
ent categories, but rather only provided approximate translations in brackets.
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Annex
Questionnaire for Interviews with Local Politicians
This questionnaire was used for the face-to-face interviews that we con-
ducted with 180 local politicians in the framework of our fourteen case
studies. Only those questions are listed that were used for our empiri-
cal analyses. The entire and original questionnaires in German and
French can be obtained from the author. The questionnaire is divided
into four parts:
1. Personal attitudes. These questions were used for measuring the un-
derstanding of citizenship.
2. Influence and contacts. These questions were used to trace the con-
tact networks and power structures.
3. Swiss identity and foreigners. These questions were used for measur-
ing the various indicators for xenophobia and for getting to know
what local politicians are proud of about Switzerland.
4. General questions.
1. Personal attitudes
1. What is your opinion about the current naturalisation pol-
icy in your municipality and its evolution in recent years?
Are you happy with the current naturalisation policy or is
there anything that should be changed, and if yes, why?
2. In July 2003 the Swiss Federal Court decided that deci-
sions on naturalisations taken at ballot are unconstitutional
and that justifications for the decisions and possibilities for
appeals against such decisions on this subject must be
made available. What is your opinion about these verdicts?
3. In your opinion, which criteria have to be fulfilled by a can-
didate for naturalisation to become naturalised. For this
question we are interested in your personal opinion that
may not be commensurate with the current naturalisation
policy of your municipality.
4. In the context of naturalisations one often distinguishes in-
tegration from assimilation. By assimilation we understand
that one disrobes one’s former culture and completely
adapts to the new culture. On the other hand, integration
means that one finds his or her way in the most important
social domains of the new country without giving up one’s
own culture. In your opinion, should candidates for natura-
lisation rather be integrated or rather be assimilated, or
does this not constitute a criterion for naturalisation?
❏ Rather be integrated
❏ Rather be assimilated
❏ No criterion
❏ Don’t know
5. Do you prefer that a naturalised Swiss abandons his or her
old citizenship or should it be possible to have two nation-
alities?
❏ Is possible
❏ Is not possible
❏ Don’t know
6. Should a naturalisation candidate absolutely, if possible or
not necessarily be a member of a local association in which
also Swiss participate; or does this not constitute a criterion
for naturalisation?
❏ Absolutely
❏ If possible
❏ Not necessarily
❏ No criterion
❏ Don’t know
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7. A Muslim woman wearing a headscarf in public, does this
constitute a problem for naturalisation or not?
❏ Rather a problem
❏ No problem
❏ Don’t know
8. A naturalisation candidate should he or she has good or
broken knowledge of the German/French language? Does
it suffice if he or she speaks a national language or if a
member of the family speaks German/French?
❏ Good knowledge of German/French
❏ Broken German/French
❏ A national language is sufficient
❏ It suffices if a family member speaks German/French
❏ Don’t know
9. It might happen that a candidate for naturalisation benefits
from disability insurance, social security or is unemployed.
Could you please indicate for each possibility whether this
constitutes a big problem, rather a problem, rather not a
problem or not a problem at all?
9a. Disability
❏ Big problem
❏ Rather a problem
❏ Rather not a problem
❏ Not a problem at all
❏ Don’t know
9b. Social security
❏ Big problem
❏ Rather a problem
❏ Rather not a problem
❏ Not a problem at all
❏ Don’t know
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9c. Unemployment
❏ Big problem
❏ Rather a problem
❏ Rather not a problem
❏ Not a problem at all
❏ Don’t know
10. A naturalisation candidate who attended his or her entire
school years in Switzerland, should he or she benefit from
a simplified naturalisation?
❏ Yes
❏ No
❏ Don’t know
11. A naturalisation candidate who was born in Switzerland,
should he or she benefit from a simplified naturalisation?
❏ Yes
❏ No
❏ Don’t know
12. A naturalisation candidate should he or she has a very
good, good or minimal knowledge of Swiss history and the
Swiss political system or does this not constitute a criterion
for naturalisation?
❏ Very good knowledge is necessary
❏ Good knowledge is necessary
❏ Minimal knowledge is necessary
❏ No criterion
❏ Don’t know
13. Candidates for naturalisation have emigrated from differ-
ent countries to Switzerland. Many people think that for
some applicants it is more difficult to integrate or assimi-
late themselves in Switzerland. Do you agree that there are
such differences?
❏ Yes
❏ No
❏ Don’t know
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13.a. [IF YES] In your opinion, which nationalities, religious or
other groups have more difficulties and which ones have
less difficulty?
13.b. Could you briefly give reasons for your answer?
2 Influence and contacts
14. Could you please indicate whether you are formally in-
volved in the naturalisation processes of your municipality?
Are you…
❏ a member of the local parliament and decide on or de-
liberate about applications?
❏ a member of the executive body and decide on or delib-
erate about applications?
❏ working at the local administration and responsible for
naturalisations?
❏ a member of a commission and decide on or deliberate
about applications?
❏ a member of another political body that is involved in
the naturalisation procedures?
15. Since when have you been involved in local naturalisation
politics?
16. We have compiled a list of actors who are somehow or
other involved in naturalisation politics of your municipal-
ity. Could you please indicate which are the actors with
whom you discuss naturalisation matters once in a while?
Could you please also indicate whether or not you share si-
milar attitudes about naturalisation politics with those per-
sons?
Actors Contact Similar
attitudes
Different
attitudes
Don’t
know
1. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
2. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
3. ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
… ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
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16. Are there any other actors – at the local or cantonal levels –
with whom you discuss naturalisation matters once in a
while with regard to naturalisation politics in your munici-
pality?
❏ Yes
❏ No
17.a. [IF YES] Could you please name them and indicate
whether or not you share similar attitudes about naturalisa-
tion politics with those persons?
18. The contacts with the persons you have indicated have
probably not been equally intensive. Which are the three
actors of those you have indicated with whom you have
had the most intensive contact concerning citizenship poli-
tics in your municipality?
1.
2.
3.
19. Please indicate which one of these three contacts has been
the most intensive?
20. In the following list could you please indicate all those
who, according to your personal opinion, have had some
power in naturalisation politics of your municipality in re-
cent years? You can also indicate yourself. For this question
we are not simply interested in actors who have been in-
volved in naturalisation politics, but in those who have ex-
erted some influence. Influential persons can be directly
involved and force their point or they indirectly shape the
attitudes of the involved politicians.
Actors
1. ❏
2. ❏
3. ❏
… ❏
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21. Are there any other actors – at the local or cantonal levels –
who have been influential in citizenship politics of your
municipality?
❏ Yes
❏ No
21.a. [IF YES] Could you please indicate them?
22. Of all actors you have indicated as influential, which are
the three persons who are, according to your personal opi-
nion, the most powerful in naturalisation politics of your
municipality?
1.
2.
3.
23. And which of these three actors do you consider as the
most influential person?
3 Swiss identity and foreigners
24. In this table, please tick how strongly you identify yourself
with Europe, Switzerland, your canton, your region and
your municipality.
Very
strongly
Rather
strongly
Rather
little
Very
little
Don’t
know
a. Europe ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
b. Switzerland ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
c. Canton ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
d. Region ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
e. Municipality ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
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25. In general, are you ...
❏ very proud,
❏ rather proud,
❏ not so proud or
❏ not proud at all
... of Switzerland?
❏ Don’t know
26. What are you particularly proud of about Switzerland?
27. What are you not at all proud of about Switzerland?
28. In the following table we have compiled a list of statements
that are related in the broadest sense with questions of for-
eigners and naturalisations. Those are statements that of-
ten have been made by different people. Could you please
indicate for each statement to what extent you agree. ‘1’
stands for complete disagreement and ‘6’ for complete
agreement.
Statements about foreigners who live in Switzerland:
Do not agree at all Do completely agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
a. Foreigners who live in
Switzerland are a cultural
enrichment for this country.
❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
b. Due to a growing num-
ber of foreigners in my
neighbourhood I do no
longer feel at home where I
live.
❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
c. In general, the ratio of
foreigners in Switzerland is
too high and should be
limited.
❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
d. One day, immigrants
from Turkey will be comple-
tely integrated in Switzer-
land.
❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
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In a political system, in which the citizens are strongly involved, as it is the
case in Switzerland, one has to ask whether or not the citizens have the
capacity to form their own opinion, and what is the role of the elite and
education for the formation of an opinion. To what extent do you agree
with the following statements?
Do not agree at all Do completely agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
e. We should be grateful to
have leaders who tell us ex-
actly what to do and how
to do it.
❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
f. For their future, it is in
general useful for children
to follow their parents’ con-
victions.
❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
g. School should mainly
teach discipline and perfor-
mance.
❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
Debates about foreigners are often related to the problem of growing crim-
inality in Switzerland. What is your position towards the control of crimin-
ality in Switzerland? To what extent do you agree with the following state-
ments?
Do not agree at all Do completely agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
h. The police should com-
bat criminality more ag-
gressively.
❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
i. For severe crimes the
death penalty should be re-
introduced in Switzerland.
❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏ ❏
29. How often are you in contact with foreigners?
❏ Very often
❏ Rather often
❏ Rather rarely
❏ Very rarely
❏ Don’t know
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30. Are your contacts to foreigners very positive, rather posi-
tive, rather negative or very negative?
❏ Very positive
❏ Rather positive
❏ Rather negative
❏ Very negative
❏ Don’t know
31. Some people assert that important characteristics of Swit-
zerland are about to disappear and that this is related to
the growing number of foreigners. With this statement, do
you …
❏ Completely agree
❏ Partially agree
❏ Partially disagree
❏ Completely disagree
❏ Don’t know
32. Some people assert that the growing number of foreigners
leads to an aggravated situation on the labour market. With
this statement, do you …
❏ Completely agree
❏ Partially agree
❏ Partially disagree
❏ Completely disagree
❏ Don’t know
4 General questions
33. How long have you been living in this municipality?
34. What is your highest education?1
❏ Keine Schulbildung (No education)
❏ Primarschule (Primary school)
❏ Sekundarschule (Secondary school)
❏ Anlehre (Basic apprenticeship)
❏ Berufslehre (Apprenticeship)
❏ Diplommittelschule oder allgemeinbildende Schule
❏ Handelsschule, Handelsdiplom (Commercial school)
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❏ Berufsmatura (A-levels for those who have accom-
plished an apprenticeship)
❏ Matura, Seminar (A-Levels, general qualification for
university entrance)
❏ Ho¨here Fachschule (Krankenpflegeschule, Schule fu¨r
Sozialarbeit, Medizin-technische AssistentIn) (Schools
for nurses, social workers etc.)
❏ Ho¨here Berufsausbildung mit Meisterdiplom, Eidg. Fa-
chausweis oder gleichwert (Continuing school for those
who have accomplished an apprenticeship)
❏ Fachhochschule, Technikerschule (Technical schools)
❏ Universita¨t, ETH (University)
35. Are you member of a political party?
❏ Yes
❏ No
35.a. [IF YES] Of which political party are you a member?
❏ SP (Social Democrats)
❏ CVP (Christian Democrats)
❏ FDP (Liberal Party)
❏ SVP (Swiss People’s Party)
❏ Gru¨ne (Green Party)
❏ EDU (Federal Democratic Union)
❏ EVP (Evangelical Party)
❏ Others:
35.b. [IF NO] Which party would you elect if national elections
were held next Sunday?
❏ SP (Social Democrats)
❏ CVP (Christian Democrats)
❏ FDP (Liberal Party)
❏ SVP (Swiss People’s Party)
❏ Gru¨ne (Green Party)
❏ EDU (Federal Democratic Union)
❏ EVP (Evangelical Party)
❏ Others:
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